

MIND

A QUARTERLY REVIEW

OF

PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY.

I.—PSYCHOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES.

II. FUNDAMENTAL FACTS AND CONCEPTIONS.

In a preceding article (MIND XXX., 153) it was argued that the standpoint of psychology is individualistic: by whatever methods, from whatever sources its facts are ascertained, they must—to have a psychological import—be regarded as having place in, or as being part of, *some one's consciousness*. In this sense, *i.e.*, as presented to an individual, “the whole choir of heaven and furniture of earth” may belong to psychology, but otherwise they are psychological nonentities. The problem of psychology, in dealing with this complex subject-matter, is in general—first, to ascertain its constituent elements, and secondly, to ascertain and explain the laws of their combination and interaction.

As to the first, there is in the main substantial agreement: the elementary facts of mind cannot, it is held, be expressed in less than three propositions: I feel somehow, I know something, I do something. But here at once there arises an important question which claims our attention before we attempt to discuss the meaning or the merits of the accepted analysis, the question, *viz.*, what we are to understand by the subject of these propositions. Nobody nowadays would understand it to imply that every psychical fact must be ascertained or verified by personal introspection: perhaps no modern writer ever did understand this; at any rate to do so

is to confound the personal with the psychological. We are no more confined to our own immediate observations here than elsewhere; but the point is that, whether seeking to analyse one's own consciousness or to infer that of a lobster, whether discussing the association of ideas or the expression of emotions, there is always an individual mind or self or subject in question. It is not enough to talk of feelings or volitions: what we mean is that some individual, man or worm, feels, wills, acts—thus or thus. Obvious as this may seem, it has been frequently either forgotten or gainsaid. It has been forgotten among details or through the assumption of a medley of faculties, each treated as an individual in turn, and among which the real individual was lost. Or it has been gainsaid, because to admit that all psychological facts pertain to a psychological subject seemed to carry with it the admission that they pertained to a particular spiritual substance, which was simple, indestructible, and so forth; and it was manifestly desirable to exclude such assumptions from a psychology which aims only at a scientific exposition of what can be known and verified by observation. But the psychological conception of a self or subject is by no means identical with the metaphysical conceptions of a soul or mind-atom, or of mind-stuff not atomic; it may be kept as free from metaphysical implications as the conception of the biological individual or organism with which it is so intimately connected.

It would, however, be a mistake to seek to explain the individuality of the psychological subject by reference to the individuality of the organism. Yet this mistake has been made by those who represent the individual mind as a complex of faculties which work consentiently like the organs of the body, and are sometimes active and sometimes quiescent. As a man has legs whether he is walking or not, so they suppose he has a memory, whether remembering or not; but the analogy is false. If we find anything among the facts of psychology corresponding to the parts or organs of the animal body, these would rather be the ideas, objects or presentations which constitute the contents of consciousness. In the unity of this content at any one moment and its continuity from moment to moment we have indeed a certain counterpart to the unity and continuity of the body. Still this unity and continuity of consciousness is not what we mean by the psychological subject; on the contrary, we look to this subject for an explanation of this unity. And we may have to look to it too for an explanation of the unity of the organism. At any rate, as soon as the biologist regards the organism as

adapted to the end of living, of surviving in a struggle for life, thereby giving to life a meaning other than that of a series of physical processes, he has changed his front; for such teleological references imply feeling and effort or impulse as the result of feeling: and it is just these purely psychological facts of feeling and impulse that compel us to recognise a subject of consciousness as well as a unity and continuity of consciousness.

Still the attempt has frequently been made to resolve the former into the latter, and so to find in mind only such an individuality as has an obvious counterpart in this individuality of the organism; *i.e.*, what we may call an objective individuality. But such procedure obtains all its seeming conclusiveness through leaving out of sight the difference between the physical and the psychological standpoints. The biologist in describing the anatomy and physiology of an animal or plant can do so entirely in terms of matter and motion. If all he means by dog is a certain wondrous complex of protoplasm or cells, then a dog = "the sum of the phenomena which make up this corporeal existence".¹ To say this sum of phenomena = only the body of the dog, as if the dog itself were some distinct phenomenon or further corporeal existence, in the sense in which the tail of the dog is distinct from the trunk, is then, no doubt, to lapse into the mythical and cheat oneself with mere figments of the imagination. The dog as a complex object or phenomenon for the biologist may be described as a sum of simple objects or phenomena, in so far as it is nothing distinct from, or additional to, this sum; and inasmuch as the presentation to anyone in particular is a matter of no importance, the fact of presentation at all may be very well dropped out: the biological dog is a complex unity and that is all. Let us now turn to mind: "leaving aside the problem of the substance of the soul," why should we not here take "the word 'soul' simply as a name for the series of mental phenomena which make up an individual mind"? Surely the moment we try distinctly to understand this question, we realise that the cases are different. "Series of mental phenomena" for whom? For any passer-by such as might take stock of our biological dog? No, obviously only for that individual mind itself. But then that is supposed to be made up of, to be nothing different from, the series of phenomena. Are we, then, (1) quoting J. S. Mill's words, "to accept the paradox that something which *ex hypothesi* is but a series of feelings,

¹ Prof. Huxley, *Hume*, p. 171.

can be aware of itself as a series"? Or (2) shall we say that the several parts of the series are mutually phenomenal, much as Jones may look at Robinson who was just now looking at Jones? Or (3) finally, shall we say that a large part of the so-called series, in fact, every term but one, is phenomenal for the rest—for that one?

As to the first alternative, paradox is too mild a word for it; even contradiction will not suffice: it is simple, or rather complex, nonsense. It is as impossible to express "being aware of" by one term as it is to express an equation or any other relation by one term: what knows can no more be identical with what is known than a weight with what it weighs. If a series of feelings is what is known or presented, then what knows, what it is presented to, cannot be that series of feelings, and this without regard to the point Mill mentions, *viz.*, that the infinitely greater part of the series is either past or future. The question is not in the first instance one of time or substance at all, but simply turns upon the fact that knowledge or consciousness is unmeaning except as it implies something knowing or conscious of something.¹ But it may be replied:—Granted, the formula for consciousness is something doing something, to put it generally; still if the two somethings are the same when I myself shave myself or when I see myself, why may not agent and patient be the same when the action is knowing or being aware of; why may I not know myself—in fact, do I not know myself? Certainly not; agent and patient never are the same in the same act: the conceptions of Self-caused, Self-moved, Self-known, *et id genus omne*, either connote the incomprehensible, or are abbreviated expressions—such, *e.g.*, as Self-shaved = One's hand shaved one's chin.

Let us try the second alternative:—As one hand washes the other, may not different members of the series of feelings be subject and object in turn? In the facts of that higher form of psychical life which we call self-consciousness there is much that would answer to this description. Compare, for example, the state of mind of a man succumbing to temptation (as he pictures himself enjoying the coveted good and impatiently repudiates scruples of conscience or dictates of prudence), with his state when, filled with remorse, he sides with conscience and condemns this "former

¹ A relation which it would often be convenient to symbolise for readier reference. Diagrammatically we might represent it by the relation of the centre of a circle to its circumference; or graphically as SPO or OPS, *i.e.*, subject perceiving object, or object perceived by subject.

self"; the "better self" having in the meantime revived. Here the cluster of presentations and their associated sentiments and motives, which together play the rôle of self in the one field of consciousness, have—only momentarily it is true, but still have for a time—the place of not-self: and under abnormal circumstances this partial alternation may become complete alienation, as in what is called "double consciousness". Or again, the development of self-consciousness might be loosely described as taking the subject or self of one stage as an object in the next; self being, *e.g.*, first identified with the body and afterwards distinguished from it. But all this, however true, is beside the mark; and it is really a very serious misnomer,—though the vagueness of our psychological terminology seems to allow it—to do, as *e.g.* Mr. Spencer does—represent the development of self-consciousness as a "differentiation of subject and object". It is, if anything, a differentiation of object and object, *i.e.*, in plainer words, it is a differentiation among presentations. When Mr. Spencer says:—"I am startled from my reverie by the discordant brayings of a three-boy band" and "perceive . . . that the sound broke across my train of thought," &c., &c., he does not mean to imply that the unseemly noise is any more an object in consciousness than "the train of thought," which began with a drain-pipe and ended with death from fever, or rather was ended by this flourish of trumpets which extruded it. He calls them both states of consciousness, and psychologically regarded neither can be more than this. Not only so, but Mr. Spencer admits that "states of consciousness" imply an Ego or Self or Subject of consciousness, and concludes therefore with "a mystery . . . the consciousness of something which is yet out of consciousness"—a mystery or rather, contradiction, which he finds himself "obliged to think"! A singular obligation certainly; it reminds one of the dervish who had to get into a sack and carry himself off. Well may Dr. Bain express his "misgivings as to any process of reasoning that contains in it this obligation".¹ Quite apart from self-consciousness then, wherever there is psychical life or consciousness at all, there are facts the whole of which cannot *in the same sense* be represented as feelings, phenomena, presentations, or states of consciousness.

The last statement brings us to our third alternative, which like the first, may be expressed in the words of J. S.

¹ *Emotions and Will*, 3rd ed., "Consciousness," p. 584.

Mill, *viz.*, "the alternative of believing that the Mind or Ego, is something different from any series of feelings or possibilities of them". To admit this, of course, is to admit the necessity of distinguishing between Mind or Ego, meaning the unity or continuity of consciousness as a complex of presentations, and Mind or Ego as the subject to whom this complex is presented. In dealing with the body from the ordinary biological standpoint no such necessity arises. But, whereas there the individual organism is spoken of unequivocally, in psychology, on the other hand, the individual mind may mean either (*a*) the series of feelings or mental phenomena above referred to; or (*b*) the subject of these feelings for whom they are phenomena; or (*c*) the subject of these feelings or phenomena + the series of feelings or phenomena themselves, the two being in that relation to each other in which alone the one is subject and the other a series of feelings, phenomena or objects. It is in this last sense that Mind is used in empirical psychology: its exclusive use in the first sense being favoured only by those who shrink from the speculative associations connected with its exclusive use in the second. But psychology is not called upon to transcend the relation of subject to object or, as we may call it, the fact of presentation: ontologically that relation may be one of substance and mode, but psychologically it is certainly not this. On the other hand, the attempt to ignore one term of the relation is hopeless; and equally hopeless, even futile, is the attempt, by means of phrases such as consciousness or the unity of consciousness, to dispense with the recognition of a conscious subject. Had this recognition been always full and explicit, some perhaps of the mistakes of the Scottish or Faculty-psychology might have been prevented. But this brings us to our main business in this paper—the ultimate analysis of mind.

What are we to understand by such ultimate analysis? Is it the exhibition of all the distinguishable facts into which all that can enter into anyone's consciousness can be resolved, and analogous therefore to the chemical resolution of all the varieties of matter into sixty-six elements? Or is it rather the determination of what is always present wherever there is consciousness or psychical life at all, and therefore analogous to the inquiry of the physiologist: what are the invariable characteristics of animal life? In the one case the elements reached might exist apart, just as nitrogen and nickel may; in the other they would coexist and together constitute one concrete "state of consciousness".

There is yet a third view, also suggested by an analogous physiological inquiry, *viz.*, that this consciousness is resolvable into a cycle of events, the several phases of which psychological analysis ascertains. Perfect clearness does not seem to prevail among psychologists on these points. While it is agreed—practically on all hands—that the ultimate facts of mind are cognitions, feelings, and conations, there is no corresponding unanimity either as to the category to which these facts belong or as to how they are related. They are spoken of as processes, products, events, states, modes, affections, and so on: for the most part they are discussed in separation as the “energies” or “functions” of corresponding faculties. At other times we are told that “they are never presented to us separately, but always in conjunction and that it is only by an ideal analysis that they can be discriminated and considered apart”.¹ Again feeling and cognition are sometimes represented as antithetical, “in inverse ratio”; sometimes it is said feeling may be absent altogether: by some, will is said to be dependent throughout upon the feelings, by others it is regarded as a veritable *primum movens*. In such a state of matters it is obviously desirable to distinguish two different questions, even though we work towards an answer to both simultaneously, the questions, *viz.*, (1) What do we find invariably present where there is consciousness at all?—the result of such an analysis being to determine the elements, factors or constituents of a concrete state of consciousness or *psychosis*, as it has been termed: (2) Is there any definite cycle or order of succession among these, and how are they related? Having determined these points—more or less in course of so doing—it may become possible to attain to a more exact terminology and to avoid the confusing interchange of such words as faculty, capacity, operation, state, modification, &c.

Keeping as much as may be to the first question, we are at once confronted by a psychological doctrine much in vogue at present, *viz.*, that feeling is the one primordial and invariable mark of consciousness. Every living creature, it is said, feels though it may never do any more: only the higher animals, and these only after a time, learn to discriminate and identify and to act with a purpose. This doctrine, strictly taken, almost amounts to a denial of the threefold classification of the facts of mind; and as might be expected, derives its plausibility partly from the vagueness of psychological terminology; and partly from the intimate con-

nexion that undoubtedly exists between feeling and cognition on the one hand and feeling and volition on the other. As to the meaning of the term, it is plain that further definition is requisite for a word that may mean (*a*) a touch, as feeling of roughness; (*b*) an organic sensation, as feeling of hunger; (*c*) an emotion, as feeling of anger; (*d*) feeling proper, as pleasure or pain. But even taking feeling in the last, its strict sense, it has been maintained that all the more complex forms of consciousness are resolvable into, or at least have been developed from, feelings of pleasure and pain. The only proof of such position, since we cannot directly observe the beginnings of conscious life, must consist of considerations such as the following:—So far as we can judge we find feeling everywhere, but as we work downwards from higher to lower forms of life, the possible variety and the definiteness of sense-impressions both steadily diminish. Moreover we can directly observe in our own organic sensations, which seem to come nearest to the whole content of infantile and molluscan experience, an almost entire absence of any assignable *qualé*. Finally, in our sense-experience generally, we find the element of feeling at a maximum in the lower senses and the intellectual element at a maximum in the higher. But the so-called intellectual senses are the most used, and use we know blunts feeling and favours intellection, as we see in chemists who sort the most filthy mixtures by smell and taste, without discomfort. If then, feeling predominates more and more as we approach the beginning of consciousness, may we not say that it is the only *sine quâ non* of consciousness? Considerations of this kind, however impressive when exhibited at length,¹ are always liable to be overturned by some apparently unimportant fact which may easily be overlooked. Two lines, *e.g.*, may get nearer and nearer and yet will never meet, if the rate of approach is simply proportional to the distance. A triangle may be diminished indefinitely and yet we cannot infer that it becomes eventually all angles, though the angles get no less and the sides do. Now before we decide that pleasure or pain alone may constitute a complete state of mind, it may be well to inquire: What is the connexion between feelings of pleasure and pain and the two remaining possible constituents of consciousness, as we can observe them now?

Broadly speaking, what we find is (1) that we are aware of a certain change in our sensations, thoughts, or circum-

¹ Cf. Horwicz, *Psychologische Analysen*, Iter Theil, Abschn. vi.

stances, (2) that we are pleased or pained with the change, and (3) that we act accordingly. We never find that feeling directly alters—*i.e.*, without the intervention of the action to which it prompts—either our sensations or situation, but that regularly these latter with remarkable promptness and certainty alter it. In a great number of cases then, a connexion holds which we may express thus:—In a given state of consciousness we do not find first a change of feeling, and then a change in our sensations, perceptions, and ideas, but, these changing, change of feeling *follows*. In short, feeling appears frequently to be an effect, which therefore cannot exist without its cause, though in different circumstances the same cause may produce a different amount or even a different state of feeling. This remark applies more obviously to what we may call the receptive phase of consciousness; but if we start from the active or appetitive phase we find in like manner that feeling is certainly not, in such cases as we can clearly observe, the whole of consciousness at any moment. True, that in common speech we talk of liking pleasure and disliking pain, but this is either tautology, equivalent to saying: We are pleased when we are pleased, and pained when we are pained; or else it is an allowable abbreviation and means that we like pleasurable *objects*, and dislike painful *objects*, as when we say, we like feeling warm, and dislike feeling hungry. But feeling warm and feeling hungry are not pure feelings in the strict meaning of feeling: they admit, if not of description, yet at least of identification and distinction as truly as colours and sounds do. Within the limits of our observation, then, we find that feeling accompanies some more or less definite presentation which for the sake of it becomes the object of appetite or aversion; in other words, feeling implies a relation to a pleasurable or painful presentation, that, as cause of feeling, and end of the action to which feeling prompts, is doubly distinguished from it. Thus the very facts that lead us to distinguish feeling from cognition and conation, make against the hypothesis that consciousness can ever be all feeling.

But, as already said, the plausibility of this hypothesis is in good part due to a laxity in the use of terms. Most psychologists before Kant, and our English psychologists even to the present day, speak of pleasure and pain as sensations. But it is plain that pleasure and pain are not simple ideas, as Locke called them, in the sense in which touches and tastes are; that is to say, they are never like these localised or projected, nor elaborated in con-

junction with other sensations and movements into percepts or intuitions of the external. This confusion of feeling with sensations is largely consequent on the use of one word pain for certain organic sensations and for the purely subjective state. But to say nothing of the fact that such pains are always more or less definitely localised—which of itself is so far cognition,—they are also distinguished as shooting, burning, gnawing, &c., &c., all which symptoms indicate a certain objective quality. Accordingly all the more recent psychologists have been driven by one means or another to recognise two “aspects” (Bain), or “properties” (Wundt), in what they call a sensation, the one a “sensible or intellectual” or “qualitative,” the other an “affective” or “emotive,” aspect or property—the latter being also called the “feeling-tone” (*Gefühlston* or *Betonung*) of the sensation. The term “aspect” is figurative and obviously inaccurate: even to describe pleasure and pain as properties of sensation is a matter open to much question. But the point which at present concerns us is simply that when feeling is said to be the primordial element in consciousness more is usually included under feeling than pure pleasure and pain, *viz.*, some characteristic or quality by which one pleasurable or painful sensation is distinguishable from another. No doubt, as we go downwards in the chain of life the qualitative or objective elements in the so-called sensations become less and less definite, at the same time that physiologically organisms with well-developed sense-organs are succeeded by others without any clearly differentiated organs at all. But there is no ground for supposing even the amoeba itself to be affected in all respects the same whether by changes of temperature or of pressure or by changes in its internal fluids; albeit all of these changes will further or hinder its life and so presumably be in some sort pleasurable or painful. On the whole, then, there are grounds for saying that the endeavour to represent all the various facts of consciousness as evolved out of feeling is due to a hasty striving after simplicity, and has been favoured by the ambiguity of the term feeling itself. If by feeling we mean a certain subjective state varying continuously in intensity and passing from time to time from its positive phase (pleasure) to its negative phase (pain); then this purely pathic state implies an agreeing or disagreeing something which psychologically determines it. If on the other hand we let feeling stand for both this state and the cause of it; then, no doubt, a succession of such “feelings” may make up a consciousness; but

then we are including two of our elementary facts under the name of one of them. The simplest form of psychical life, therefore, involves not only a subject feeling but a subject having qualitatively distinguishable presentations which are the occasion of its feeling.

Dismissing the further consideration of Feeling for the present, let us seek now to ascertain more precisely what it is to have Presentations. It was an important step onwards for psychology when Locke introduced that "new way of ideas" which Stillingfleet found alternately so amusing and so dangerous. By idea Locke tells us he meant true appearances in men's minds, or "whatsoever is the immediate object of perception, thought or understanding"; and it was so far a retrograde step when Hume restricted the term to certain only of these appearances or objects, or rather to these appearances or objects in a certain state, *viz.*, as reproduced ideas or images. And, indeed, the history of psychology seems to show that its most important advances have been made by those who have kept closely to this way of ideas; of this, the establishment of the laws of association and their many fruitful applications, and again the whole Herbartian psychology, may suffice as instances. The truth is that the use of such a term is itself a mark of an important generalisation, one which helps to free us from the mythology and verbiage of the "Faculty-psychologists". All that variety of mental facts we speak of as sensations, perceptions, images, intuitions, concepts, notions, have two characteristics in common:—(1) They admit of being more or less attended to, and (2) can be reproduced and associated together. It is here proposed to use the term Presentation to connote such a mental fact, and as the best English equivalent for what Locke meant by Idea and what Kant and Herbart called a *Vorstellung*.

A presentation has then a twofold relation: first, directly to the subject, and secondly, to other presentations. By the first is meant the fact that the presentation is attended to, that the subject is more or less conscious of it, it is 'in his mind' or presented. As presented to a subject a presentation might with advantage be called an 'object'; or perhaps, a 'psychological object,' to distinguish it from what are called objects apart from presentation, *i.e.*, are conceived as independent of any particular subject. Locke, as we have seen, did so call it: still to avoid possible confusion, it may turn out best to dispense with the frequent use of 'object' in this sense. But on one account, at least, it is desirable not to lose sight altogether of this which is

after all the stricter as well as the older signification of 'object';¹ viz., because it enables us to express definitely, without implicating any ontological theory, what we have so far seen reason to think is the fundamental fact in psychology. Instead of depending mainly on that vague and treacherous word consciousness, which some writers fancy frees them from metempirical bogies; or committing ourselves to the position that ideas are modifications of a certain mental substance and identical with the subject to whom they are presented; we may leave all this on one side, and say that ideas are objects, and the relation of objects to subject—that whereby the one is object and the other subject—is presentation.² And it is because only

¹ Cf. Hamilton, *Reid*, p. 806.

² Of course this is only a question of words, but questions of words are not always unimportant, and in psychology especially a more definite terminology is a great desideratum. Physicists pour scorn upon a man who cannot see the difference between momentum and energy or between force and work, but analogous confusions abound in the language of psychologists. Take for example some of Hamilton's assertions about that "very transparent matter," Consciousness, over which, he tells us, philosophers (*i.e.*, other philosophers, of course) have spread obscurity by their attempts to define it, but which, though undefinable, "we ourselves clearly apprehend". Can a man be said clearly to apprehend a fact of which he makes statements like the following?

It is the one necessary condition of all mental phenomena (*Metaphysics*, i., p. 183).

Among its special conditions are Discernment, Memory, Judgment, Attention, &c. (*Met.*, i., p. 201).

It is an *act* (*Met.*, i., p. 192).

It has *contents*: "The phenomena of Feeling and Conation appear only as they appear in consciousness" (*Met.*, ii., p. 431).

"It is the recognition by the mind or ego of its acts and affections" (*Met.*, i., p. 193).

It "is not to be regarded as aught different from the mental modes or modifications themselves" but is just "these above a certain degree of intensity" (*i.e.*, and *Reid*, p. 932).

"It may be compared to an internal light, by means of which, and which alone, what passes in the mind is rendered visible" (*Met.*, i., p. 183).

"It is not to be viewed as an illuminated place, within which objects coming are presented to . . . observation" (*Reid*, p. 932).

There is an unmistakable contrariety among these statements, and others almost equally conflicting might be added both from Hamilton and other writers. But Consciousness, though perhaps the most protean of psychological terms, is not the only one that is continually flitting from category to category.

objects sustain this relation that they may be spoken of simply as presentations.

On this subjective relation of objects, the relation of presentation, it is not necessary to dwell at length here. We have merely to note that on the side of the subject it implies what, for want of a better word, may be called Attention, extending the denotation of this term so as to include even what we ordinarily call inattention. Attention so used will thus cover part of what is meant by consciousness; so much of it, that is, as answers to being mentally active, active enough at least to "*receive impressions*". Attention on the side of the subject implies intensity on the side of the object: we might indeed almost call intensity the matter of a presentation, without which it is a nonentity.¹ As to the connexion between these two, subjective attention and objective intensity—in that higher form of attention called voluntary, we are aware that concentration of attention increases or its abstraction diminishes the intensity of a presentation in circumstances of a physical and physiological kind, which appear to warrant the assertion that apart from this initial change of attention the intensity of the presentation would have continued uniform. Again, in circumstances when psychologically we are aware of no previous change in the distribution of attention, we find the intensity of a presentation increased or diminished if certain physical concomitants of the presentation (*e.g.*, stimulus, nervous process, &c.) are increased or diminished. Thus, though this is a point we could hardly establish without the aid of psychophysics, we may conclude that under given circumstances, the intensity of a presentation may be altered from two sides; depends, in other words, partly upon what we may perhaps call its objective intensity, and partly on the amount of attention it receives.

But let us now call to mind the second characteristic of objects, their revivability and associability; facts which imply a certain inter-objective relation or action, for which we are sorely in need of an appropriate name. As to their revivability, this is a matter which has always been a great puzzle. A certain idea, *m*, recurs to us in certain circumstances, so that we may represent the whole as *m*₂ and we say we recognise it as the identical *m* that recurred to us formerly, the whole position then being representable as *m*₁. Here then are two times but only one *m*: yet we say it is re-pre-

¹ Cf. Kant's 'Principle of the Anticipations of Perception':—"In all phenomena the real which is the object of sensation, has intensive magnitude."

sented, implying apparently that it had ceased to be presented, but had not ceased to exist. How are we psychologically to explain a continuity which is not a continuity of presentation? And yet without this continuity, what becomes of the identity of our m ? For, without it, m_1 and m_2 are two distinct presentations, the first of which is no more, while the second never was till now. On the other hand, since these two presentations do not exist, the attempt to resolve the identity into a similarity must be unavailing. There seems but one way out of this difficulty,¹ and that is to assume that after all the m was continuously presented, but with a diminished and perhaps ever-diminishing intensity; and, farther, that at its so-called re-presentation its intensity was sufficiently increased to enable it to rise above the 'threshold of consciousness' and become a distinct object of attention. Here, then, let us note, is one kind of continuity among objects to which we seem to be committed in talking of their revival or reproduction. And if we look for a moment at their so-called 'association,' we shall find continuity implied again. For what is the fact, our ignorance of which we cover by this simile? Do objects really stick or fuse together when they are simultaneously presented often enough and at the requisite intensity, as the phrase "adhesion by contiguity" might seem to imply? Or are they bound by hidden links, by which they drag each other on and off the stage of consciousness, in accordance with a psycho-dynamics like Herbart's? It may be that any investigation into the nature of association will be fruitless; but if so, association should be a first principle, and so far admit of statement in a form to remove the need for inquiry. As it is, we cannot help asking how presentations, supposed to be originally distinct and isolated, become eventually linked together. For neither the isolation nor the links are clear. Not the isolation, for we can only conceive two presentations separated by other presentations intervening; nor the links, unless these also are objects, and then the difficulty recurs. It disappears, however, if for contiguity we substitute continuity, and suppose the 'associated' objects to be parts, not isolated wholes. Finally, if we turn to our sense-experience, we find there further evidence in support of this continuity. The increased sensibility acquired by practice can be repre-

¹ It is, of course, useless to have recourse to physiology: a physiological fact cannot serve as an explanation for a psychological fact; it can at most suggest where to look for such explanation, but that when forthcoming must involve only psychological conceptions.

sented as due to a restriction of intensity to a particular object in a continuum over which the intensity was irradiated before. It is quite impossible now to imagine the effects of years of experience removed, and to picture the character of our infantile presentations before our interests had led us habitually to concentrate attention on some, and to ignore others, whose intensity thus diminished as that of the former increased. In place of the many things we can now see and hear, there would then be not merely a confused presentation of the whole field of vision and of a mass of undistinguished sounds, but even the difference between sights and sounds themselves would be without its present distinctness. Thus the further we go back the nearer we approach to a total presentation having the character of one general *continuum* in which differences are latent. There is, then, in psychology, as in biology, what may be called a Principle of Progressive Differentiation or Specialisation; but it is not desirable to attempt further to establish and elucidate this principle here. Enough if we see that this, as well as the facts of reproduction and association, forcibly suggest the conception of a certain objective continuum forming the background or basis to the several relatively distinct presentations that are elaborated out of it—the equivalent, in fact, of that unity and continuity of consciousness which has been supposed to supersede the need for a conscious subject. In this *totum objectivum* we have again a conception peculiar to psychology. From the physical standpoint and in ordinary life we can talk of objects that are isolated and independent and in all respects distinct individuals. The screech of the owl has then nothing to do with the brightness of the moon: sound and light, owl and moon—any one may go and leave no gap in the order of things to which the others belong.¹ But for me they are parts of one whole, not merely because special attention to one diminishes the intensity of the others, but also because as attention passes from one to another it passes over no void, and because the representation of one entails that of the others too.

There is one class of objects of special interest even in a general analysis, *viz.*, movements or motor presentations. These, like sensory presentations, admit of association and reproduction, and seem to attain to such distinctness as

¹ From a philosophical point of view, of course, all things are again connected, and much interest attaches to speculations as to how the discrete. Many of the physical sciences is related to the empirical One of psychology and the transcendental One of metaphysics.

they possess in adult human experience by a gradual differentiation out of an original diffused mobility which is little more than emotional expression. Of this, however, more presently. It is primarily to this dependence upon feeling that movements owe their distinctively psychological character; so much so indeed that merely physiological movements, reflexes, convulsions, &c., may be reasonably regarded as sensory presentations—or at all events temporarily left out of consideration. The broad fact we want to seize is, that, whereas sensory presentations enter the field of consciousness *ex abrupto*, motor presentations have, normally, definite and assignable psychical antecedents. We cannot psychologically explain the order in which particular sights and sounds occur; but the movements that follow them, on the other hand, can be adequately explained only by psychology. The twilight that sends the hens to roost sets the fox to prowl, and the lion's roar which gathers the jackals scatters the sheep. Such diversity in the movements, although the sensory presentations are similar, is due, in fact, to what we might call the Principle of Subjective or Hedonic Selection. Out of all the manifold changes of sensory presentation which a given individual experiences, only a few are the occasion of such decided feeling as to become objects of possible appetite (or aversion). But unless the movements which bring about the presentations of these objects admitted of a subjective initiation, we could not with any propriety talk of selection or of appetite and aversion: subjective interest there might be, but gratification and relief could only be waited for, not sought. As it is, by means of movements we are something more than the creatures of circumstance. The representation of what interests us comes to be associated with the representation of such movements as will secure its realisation; so that—although no concentration of attention will secure the requisite intensity to an object of desire present only in idea (albeit very fervid imaginations are sometimes content with this)—we can by what is strangely like a concentration of attention convert the idea of a movement into the fact, and in that way attain the coveted reality.

And this has brought us round naturally to what is perhaps the easiest way of approaching the question: What is a Volition? For concerning this, the third of the accepted psychical elements or states or functions, more even than of the rest, serious divergence of opinion prevails not only as to its nature but, in some cases, even as to its existence. Two questions are often confused, why is a particular action willed, and what happens in the willing. The former con-

cerns the dependence of volition on feeling and needs no further notice at this stage; for though that connexion is held by indeterminists to be in certain cases suspended, such 'free-will,' if it exists, is a new fact and not essential to complete mental life.

In ordinary voluntary movement we have first of all an idea or re-presentation of the movement, and last of all the actual movement itself, a new presentation that may be described as the filling out of the re-presentation, which thereby attains that intensity, distinctness and embodiment we call reality. How does this change come about? The attempt has often been made to explain it by a reference to the more uniform, and apparently simpler, case of reflex action, including under this term what are called sensori-motor and ideo-motor actions. In all these the movement seems the result of a mere transference of intensity from the associated sensation or idea that sets on the movement. But, when by some chance or mischance the same sensory presentation excites two alternative and conflicting motor ideas, a temporary block occurs; and when at length one of these nascent motor changes finally prevails and becomes real, then, it is said, there has occurred the state of mind called volition.¹ But this assumption that sensory and motor ideas are associated before volition, and that the volition begins where automatic or reflex action ends, is due to that inveterate habit of confounding the psychical and the physical, which is the bane of modern psychology. How did these particular sensory and motor presentations ever come to be associated? It is wholly beside the mark to answer that they are "*organically determined* psychical changes". In one respect all psychical changes alike are organically determined; inasmuch as all alike—so far, at least, as we at all know or surmise—have organic concomitants. In another respect no psychical changes are organically determined; inasmuch as physical events and psychical events have no common factors. To say that two presentations are associated, obviously implies that they are two, two which are not only distinguishable but actually so far distinct as to be or to have been separately attended to: if a given sensation and a given movement were "so coherent that the one follows the other instantly," they would not be two, and could not be spoken of as associated or connected. Now the only psychological evidence we have of any such intimate connexion between sensory and motor representations is

¹ Cf. Mr. H. Spencer's *Principles of Psychology*, i., 496.

that furnished by our acquired dexterities, *i.e.*, by such movements as Hartley styled secondary-automatic. But then all these have been preceded by volition: as Mr. Spencer says, "the child learning to walk, wills each movement before walking it". Surely then a psychologist should take this as his typical case and prefer to assume that all automatic actions that come within his ken at all are in this sense secondarily automatic, *i.e.*, to say that either in the experience of the individual or of his ancestors volition preceded habit.

But if we are thus compelled by a sound method to regard sensori-motor actions as degraded or mechanical forms of voluntary actions, and not voluntary actions as gradually differentiated out of something physical, we have to ask not what happens when one of two alternative movements is executed, but the more general question, what happens when any movement is made in consequence of feeling. It is obvious that on this view the simplest *definitely purposive* movement must have been preceded by some movement simpler still. For any distinct movement purposely made presupposes the ideal presentation, before the actual realisation, of the movement. But such ideal presentation, being a re-presentation, equally presupposes a previous actual movement, of which it is the so-called mental residuum. There is then, it would seem, but one way left, *viz.*, to regard those movements which are immediately expressive of pleasure or pain as primordial, and to regard the so-called voluntary movements as elaborated out of these. The vague and diffusive character of these primitive emotional manifestations is really a point in favour of this position; for it is evidence of an underlying continuity of motor presentations parallel to that already discussed in connexion with sensory presentations, a continuity which, in each case, becomes differentiated in the course of experience into comparatively distinct and discrete movements and sensations respectively.¹

But, whereas we can only infer, and that in a very round-

¹ It may be well to call to mind here that Dr. Bain also has regarded emotional expression as a possible commencement of action, but only to reject it in favour of his own peculiar doctrine of "spontaneity"—a doctrine, however, which is open to the objection that it makes movement precede feeling instead of following it; an objection that would be serious even if the arguments advanced to support this hypothesis were as cogent as only Dr. Bain takes them to be. Against the position maintained above he objects that "the emotional wave almost invariably affects a whole group of movements," and therefore does not furnish the "isolated promptings that are desiderated in the case of the will" (*Mental and Moral Science*, p. 323). But to make this objection is to let heredity count for nothing. In fact, wherever a variety of isolated movements is physically possible, there


about fashion, that our sensations are not absolutely distinct but are parts of one massive sensation, as it were; we are still liable under the influence of strong emotion directly to experience the corresponding continuity in the case of movement. Such motor-continuum we may suppose is the psychical counterpart of that permanent readiness to act, or rather that continual nascent acting, which among the older physiologists was spoken of as "tonic action," and as this is now known to be intimately dependent on afferent excitations so is our motor consciousness on our sensory. Still, since we cannot imagine the beginning of life but only life begun, the simplest picture we can form of a concrete state of mind is not one in which there are movements before there are any sensations or sensations before there are any movements; but one in which change of sensation is followed by change of movement, the link between the two being a change of feeling.

Having thus simplified the question, we may now ask again:—How is this change of movement brought about? The answer, as already hinted, appears to be: By a change of attention. We learn from such observations as psychologists describe under the head of Fascination, Imitation, Hypnotism, &c., that the mere concentration of attention upon a movement is often enough to bring the movement to pass. But, of course, in such cases there is neither emotional experience nor volition in question; such facts, however, show the connexion between attention and movements. Everybody too has often observed how the execution of any but mechanical movements arrests attention to thoughts or sensations, and *vice versâ*. Let us suppose then that we have at any given moment a certain distribution of attention between sensory and motor presentations: a change in that distribution means a change in the intensity of some or all of these, and change of intensity in motor presentations means change of movement. Such changes are, however, quite minimal in amount so long as the given presentations are not conspicuously agreeable or disagreeable. So soon, however, as this is the case, there is evidence of a most intimate connexion between feeling and attention; but it is hardly possible to exhibit this evidence without first attempting to ascertain what are the characteristics of the presentations or groups of presentations that are respectively pleasurable and painful—an attempt that must for the

also are always found corresponding instincts, "that untaught ability to perform actions," in Dr. Bain's own language, which a minimum of practice suffices to perfect.

present be deferred. In general it may be said that we find pleasure to lead at once to concentration of attention on the pleasurable object, and that in consequence pleasure does not lead at all so certainly to movement as we find pain to do; save of course when movements are themselves the pleasurable objects and are executed, as we say, for their own sakes. In fact, pleasure would seem rather to repress movement, except so far as it is coincident either with a more economic distribution or with a positive augmentation of the available attention; and either of these, on the view supposed, would lead to increased but indefinite (*i.e.*, playful) movement. Pain, on the other hand, is much more closely connected with movement; and movement too, which for obvious reasons much sooner acquires a purposive character. Instead of voluntary concentration of attention upon a painful presentation we find attention to such an object always involuntary; in other words, attention is, as it were, decentralised or withdrawn. If therefore the painful presentation is a movement it is suspended: if it is a sensation, movements are set up, which further distract attention, and some of which may effect the removal of the physical source of the sensation. Such movement, of course, the last of the series of apparent tentatives, is by and by associated with the disturbing sensation, which thenceforth suggests its own remedy, a process which Dr. Bain has excellently described.

We are now at the end of our analysis, and the results may perhaps be most conveniently summarised by first throwing them into a tabular form and then appending a few remarks by way of indicating the main purport of the table. Taking no account of the specific difference between one concrete state of mind and another, and supposing that we are dealing with presentations in their simplest form, *i.e.*, as sensations and movements, we have, then:—



¹ To cover more complex cases, we might here add the words "or trains of ideas".

Of the three phases, thus logically distinguishable, the first and the third correspond in the main with the receptive and active states or powers of the older psychologists. The second phase, being more difficult to isolate, was, as we know, long overlooked; or, at all events, its essential characteristics were not distinctly marked; it was either confounded with (1), which is its cause; or with (3), its effect. But perhaps the most important of all psychological distinctions is that which traverses both the old bi-partite and the prevailing tri-partite classification, *viz.*, that between the subject, on the one hand, as acting and feeling, and the objects of this activity on the other. Such distinction lurks indeed under such terms as faculty, power, consciousness, but they tend to keep it out of sight. What are here called objects or ideas or presentations are not the products of a sort of creative activity pertaining to the conscious self; but they have laws of their own, in accordance with which indeed their interactions may be modified, and that is all. It was perhaps a wild dream of Herbart's that there could ever be a psychical statics and dynamics, but his attempt may at least serve to exhibit more impressively the large amount of independence there is between the subject of consciousness and its objects. Keeping this distinction in view—instead of crediting the subject with an indefinite number of faculties or capacities, we should naturally seek to explain not only reproduction, association, agreement, difference, &c., but all varieties of thinking and acting by the laws pertaining to ideas or presentations, leaving to the subject only the one power of variously distributing that attention upon which the intensity of a presentation in part depends. Of this single subjective activity, what we call activity in the narrower sense (as *e.g.*, purposive movement and intellection) is but a special case, although a very important one.

According to this view, then, Presentations, Attention, Feeling are not to be regarded as three co-ordinate genera, each a distinguishable state of mind or consciousness, *i.e.*, all alike included under this one supreme category. There is, as Berkeley long ago urged, no resemblance between activity and an idea; nor is it easy to see anything common to pure feeling and an idea, unless it be that both possess intensity. Classification seems, in fact, to be here out of place. Instead, therefore, of the one *summum genus*, state of mind or consciousness with its three co-ordinate subdivisions, cognition, emotion, conation; our analysis seems to lead us to recognise three distinct and irreducible facts, Attention, Feeling and Objects or Presentations as together,

in a certain connexion, constituting one concrete state of mind or *psychosis*. Of such concrete states of mind we may then say there are two forms, more or less distinct, corresponding to the two ways in which attention may be determined and the two classes of objects attended to in each, *viz.*, (1) the Sensory or Receptive State, when attention is non-voluntarily determined, *i.e.*, where feeling follows the act of attention; and (2) the Motor or Active State, where feeling precedes the act of attention, which is thus determined voluntarily.¹

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¹ It must of course be admitted, on this view of mind, that Attention and Feeling are not presentations and therefore are not *directly* known. How then do we come to talk about them? It is impossible to deal with this question here, but I have already tried to answer it in a paper entitled "A General Analysis of Mind," which appeared in the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, Oct., 1882; *cf.* pp. 378-381.

II.—IDIOSYNCRASY.

EVERY man is, in the true Greek sense of the term, an idiosyncrasy. He is a *syncrasis*, because he derives all his attributes, physical or mental, from two parents, or four grandparents, or eight great-grandparents, and so forth. But at the same time he is an *idio-syncrasis*, because that particular mixture is eminently unlikely ever to have occurred before, or ever to occur again, even in his own brothers or sisters. That he is and can be at birth nothing more than such a *crasis*, that he cannot conceivably contain anything more, on the mental side at least, than was contained in his antecedents, is the thesis which this paper sets out to maintain.

Take a thousand red beans and a thousand white beans; shake them all up in a bag together for five minutes, and then pour them out in a square space on a billiard-table just big enough to contain them in a layer one deep. Each time you do so, your product will be the same in general outline and appearance: it will be a quadrangular figure composed of beans, having throughout the same approximate thickness. But it will be a mixture of red beans and white in a certain order; and the chances against the same order occurring twice will be very great indeed. Make the beans ten thousand of each so as to cover the table ten deep, and the chance of getting the same order twice decreases proportionately. Make them a hundred thousand each, and it becomes infinitesimal. You have practically each time not only a *syncrasis* but an *idio-syncrasis* as well.

Now, a human being is the product of innumerable elements, derived directly from two parents, and indirectly from an infinity of earlier ancestors; elements not of two orders only, but of infinite orders; combined together, apparently, not on the principle of both contributing equally to each part, but of a sort of struggle between the two for the mastery in each part. Here, elements derived from the father's side seem to carry the day; there, again, elements derived from the mother's side gain the victory; and yonder, once more, a compromise has been arrived at between the two, so that the offspring in that particular part is a mean of his paternal and maternal antecedents. Under such circumstances, absolute equality of result in any two cases is almost inconceivable. It would imply absolute equality of conditions between myriads of jarring and adverse ele-

ments, such as we never actually find in nature, and such as we can hardly believe possible under any actual concrete circumstances.

The case of twins comes nearer to such exact equality of conditions than any other with which we are acquainted. Here, the varying health and vigour of the two parents or the difference between their respective functional activities at two given times, are reduced to a minimum: and we get in many instances a very close similarity indeed. Yet even among twins, the offspring of the same father and mother, produced at the same moment of time, there are always at least some differences, mental and physical; while the differences are occasionally very great. A competent observer who knew the Siamese twins, informed me that differences of disposition were quite marked in their case, where training and after circumstances could have had little or nothing to do with them, inasmuch as both must have been subjected to all but absolutely identical conditions of life throughout. One was described as taciturn and morose, the other as lively and good-humoured. Whether anything of the same sort has been noticed in the pair of negro girls called the Two-headed Nightingale, I do not know, but to judge from their photographs, there would seem to be some distinct physical diversities in height and feature. We can only account for these diversities in twins generally by supposing that in that intimate intermixture of elements derived from one or other parent, which we have learned from Darwin, Spencer and Galton takes place in every impregnation of an ovum, slightly different results have occurred in one case and in the other. To use Darwin's phraseology, some gemmules of the paternal side have here ousted some gemmules of the maternal side, or *vice versâ*; to use Mr. Spencer's (which to my judgment seems preferable) the polarities of one physiological unit have here carried the day over those of another.

But why under such nearly identical conditions should there be such diversity of result? Let us answer the question by another: Why, with a thousand red and a thousand white balls, shaken together with an equal energy by a machine (if you will), and poured out on our billiard table, should there be a similar diversity? The fact is, you cannot get absolute identity of conditions in any two cases. Imagine yourself mixing two fluids together with a spoon, as regularly as you choose; can you possibly make the currents in the two exactly alike twice running? And here in the case of humanity you have not to deal with simple red beans or

with simple fluids, but with very complex gemmules or very complex physiological units.

If even in twins we cannot expect perfect similarity, still less can we expect it in mere ordinary brothers and sisters. Here, innumerable minor physiological conditions of either parent may affect the result in infinite ways. Not, indeed, that there is any sufficient reason for supposing passing states of health and so forth directly to impress themselves upon the heredity of the offspring; but one can readily understand that in a process which is essentially a mixture of elements, small varieties of external circumstances may vastly alter the nature of the result. Shake the bag of beans once, and you get one arrangement; shake it once more, and you get another and very different one. To this extent, and to this extent only as it seems to me, chance in the true sense enters into the composition of an individuality. The possible elements which may go to make up the mental constitution of any person are (as I shall try to show), strictly limited to all those elements, actual or latent, which exist in the two persons of his parents; but the particular mixture of those elements which will come out in him—the number to be selected and the number to be rejected out of all the possible combinations—will depend upon that minute interaction of small physical causes, working unseen, which we properly designate by the convenient name of chance. In this sense, it is not a chance that William Jones, the son of two English parents, is born an Englishman in physique and mental peculiarities, rather than a Chinese or a negro; nor is it a chance that he is born essentially a compound of his ancestors on the Jones side and on the Brown side; but it is a chance that he is born a boy rather than a girl; and it is a chance that he is born himself rather than his brother John or his brother Thomas. If we knew all, we could point out exactly why this result and not any other result occurred just there and then; but as we do not know all, we fairly say that the result is in so far a chance one. And even if we knew all, we should still be justified in using the same language, for it marks a real difference in causation. William Jones is an Englishman and a Jones-Brown strictly in virtue of his being the son of Henry Jones and Mary Brown; but so are all his brothers and (*mutatis mutandis*) his sisters too. He is himself, and not one of his brothers or his sisters, in virtue of certain minute molecular arrangements, occurring between certain elements for the most part essentially identical with the elements which went to make up the other members of his family. To be metaphorical

once more, one may say that a Robinson differs from a Jones because he is a mixture of brown peas and white peas ; whereas one Jones differs from another in being a particular mixture of red beans and black beans, differently arranged in each case.

Next after the similarity between brothers and sisters or other blood-relations we may expect to find the similarity between the offspring of the same class in the same community, similarly situated : and this the more so in proportion to the average identity of their several lives. For example, one would naturally expect that our own agricultural labourers, all engaged in much the same sort of work and surrounded by much the same sort of objects, would produce by intermarriage very similar children. Still more would this be the case among very homogeneous savages, such as the Eskimo or the South American Indians. And where the identity of pursuits is very great on both sides, and in all individuals, as among the Fuegians, the Veddahs, the Andamanese, we should expect to find a great likeness of physique and character between all the offspring.

Conversely, where marriages take place between persons of different races or very differently situated, we may look for great differences between the offspring, especially when compared with those of marriages between relatively homogeneous persons. Under such circumstances, the children tend more or less, though very irregularly, to present a mean between the two parents. Thus, to take the most obvious instance, the average mulatto is half way as a rule between the negro and the European, physically at least, though for various reasons to be considered hereafter it often happens that he is more than the equal in intelligence of the average white. But even in the same family of mulattoes great differences exist between the children. Some will be darker, others lighter ; some will be curlier-headed, others straighter-haired ; some will have prognathous faces and depressed noses, others will have more regular features and more prominent noses. So far as my observation goes, too, it does not always happen that the most European physical type has the most European mind : on the contrary, high intelligence often accompanies a very African physique, while English features may be concomitant with a truly negro incapacity for logical reasoning, generalisation, or elementary mathematical ideas. It seems as though in each part there was a struggle for supremacy between the two types : and the one type may apparently carry the day in certain external peculiarities, while the other type carries

the day in the more intimate arrangements of the nervous system. At the same time, I cannot myself doubt that there must be a very intimate connexion between every one of the sense-organs and the brain; and I can hardly believe that prognathism and other like physical peculiarities do not imply various correlated nervous facts of great psychological importance. Though in the resulting compromise between the two diverse heredities, the one seems largely to prevail over the other in certain parts, yet it is difficult to suppose that there is not a minute interrelation between all the parts: and perhaps the significant fact that every mulatto, though darker or lighter, is at least brown, not purely black or purely white, gives us the best key to the true nature of the situation.

So far, I have been tacitly but intentionally taking for granted the very principle which I set out to prove, in order fully to put the reader in possession of the required point of view. The question now arises, where in this series of events is there room for any fresh element to come in? Can any man ever be anything other than what some of his ancestors have been before him? And if not, how is progress or mental improvement possible? That men have as a matter of fact risen from a lower to a higher intellectual position is patent. That some races have outstripped other races is equally clear. And that some individual men have surpassed their fellows of the same race and time is also obvious. How are we to account for these facts without admitting that new elements do at sundry times creep in by chance, in the false and unphilosophical sense of the word? How can we get advance unless we admit that exceptional children may be born from time to time with brains of exceptional functional value, wholly uncaused by antecedents in any way?

The answer to this question is really one of the most important in the whole history of mankind. For on the solution of the apparent paradox thus propounded depend two or three most fundamental questions. It is by this means alone that we can account, first, for the existence of great races like the Greeks or the Jews. It is by this means alone that we can account, secondly, for genius in individuals. And it is by this means alone that we can account, thirdly, for the possibility of general progress in the race. It is surprising, therefore, that the question has so little engaged the attention of evolutionary psychologists at the present day.

There are only two conceivable ways in which any incre-

ment of brain-power can ever have arisen in any individual. The one is the Darwinian way, by "spontaneous variation"—that is to say, by variations due to minute physical circumstances affecting the individual in the germ. The other is the Spencerian way, by functional increment—that is to say, by the effect of increased use and constant exposure to varying circumstances during conscious life. I venture to think that the first way, if we look it clearly in the face, will be seen to be practically unthinkable: and that we have therefore no alternative but to accept the second. Deeply as I feel the general importance of Darwin's theory of "spontaneous variation" (using the words in the sense in which he always used them), it seems to me that that theory cannot properly be applied to the genesis of a nervous system, or of any part of a nervous system, and that in this case we must rather come back to the genesis worked out by Mr. Herbert Spencer in the part of his *Principles of Psychology* entitled "Physical Synthesis".

For let us for a moment try to imagine a nervous system being produced, or increased in value, by natural selection of spontaneous variations alone, without the aid of functional variations at all. It is easy to see that an animal or a plant may vary indefinitely here or there in colour, or in hardness of skin, or in woodiness of tissues, and so forth; and it is easy to see that among these truly "accidental" variations¹ some may be better adapted to their particular environment than others. But can we imagine, say, an eye to be produced by a series of such individual accidents? I do not say a human eye, but a simple pigment-cell, with a nerve given off from it to a ganglion, as in the case of the *Amphioxus*? And if we can imagine this (which I cannot), can we imagine a child being born into the world, gifted, I do not say with innumerable faculties never possessed by his ancestors, but with a single nerve-cell or nerve-fibre more than they possessed? Just let us look at what a palpable absurdity this notion implies.

¹ It is a great pity that to this day one is always obliged to employ this useful term with a caution in the way of quotation marks, in order to avoid a supposed philosophical scholar's-mate from sixth-form critics. "Accidental" in biology means, of course, "produced by causes lying outside the previous vital history of the race": in a word, "individual". Among such accidental variations survival of the fittest preserves a few. But it is annoying that one can never use so transparent a phrase without being informed magisterially by a lofty reviewer that the word accidental is unphilosophical, and that nothing ever happens in nature without a cause.

Here is William Jones's head, containing an average human brain, developed on the same pattern as his father's brain (or as his father's in part and his mother's in part): and here in a particular spot in a particular convolution of it, by a combination of mere physical circumstances, has arisen a totally new and hitherto non-existent nerve-cell. Clearly, this is an acquisition to the race, by way of spontaneous variation. But what is the functional use of this new nerve-cell? What physical circumstance decides whether it is to answer to a new movement in the left little finger, or to a single creative element in the composition of a future fugue? Let us grant a little more: let us suppose the surrounding cells are all concerned in the appreciation of colour, or in the manipulation of numbers. Will the new cell in the first case, answer to a new and hitherto undiscovered colour, or to a further æsthetic pleasure in an existent colour, or to a higher synthesis into which colours enter as elements: or what in the second case will be its mathematical value? Again, what good will it be without a whole network of connecting fibres which will link it to percipient structures in the eye on the one hand, and to all the various higher layers in the stratified hierarchy of colour-thought-elements or number-dealing-elements on the other hand? Granted that one man in a hundred was born with one such new cell in his brain, and (setting aside the question how the cell comes to have any function at all) what are the chances that that cell would be so connected with other cells elsewhere as to make any part of an organised brain? Can we imagine a new cell so imported, connected in rational manners with hundreds of other cells, in any other way than by a miracle? Which is only a different form of saying, can we imagine it at all?

But here again is something more than William Jones's head: here is, let us say, a great poet's, or a great philosopher's, or a great mathematician's head: and here are the upholders of spontaneous variation asking us to believe, not that one cell within it thus spontaneously varied in the right direction, but that a vast number of cells and fibres all varied simultaneously and symmetrically, so as to produce a harmonious and working whole, capable of giving us Othello, or the Evolution Theory, or the Differential Calculus. Why, the thing is clearly impossible: impossible, that is to say, as a result of "accidental" physical causes. We might just conceivably imagine one or two fibres made to connect one or two hitherto unconnected nerve-cells, though even here the probability that the nerve-cells so con-

nected were of heterogeneous orders would be far greater than the probability that they were of homogeneous orders: we could much more readily imagine such connexions resulting in a potentiality for believing that a lobster's tail was a blue hope of raspberry watches than in a potentiality for believing that water was composed of hydrogen and oxygen, or that propositions in A were not convertible. But we certainly cannot imagine a whole network of such fibres to spring up by spontaneous variation in a human brain, and yet to produce an organised result. If spontaneous variation ever works in this way, its product must surely be either an idiot or a raving madman. To believe the opposite is too much like believing in Mr. Crosse's electrical *Acari*, which were developed *de novo*, out of inorganic material, in a dirty galvanic battery, and yet possessed all the limbs and organs of degenerate spiders. It is asking us once more to accept a still greater miracle than the first.

But such miracles, it is urged, do take place elsewhere in nature. For example, an almond tree, let us say, once produced a peach-bearing branch by bud-variation. Hence it has been inferred that the peach is a spontaneous variation on the central almond theme. Yet peaches are in colour, fleshiness, sweetness, and perfume, true fruits, adapted to the fruity method of dispersion, by means of attracting birds; whereas the almond is a nut, with the usual nutty peculiarities of green and brown colour, dryness, absence of sweet juice, and so forth. In this case, then, it would seem that bud-variation immediately produced a variety adapted to a different environment in ever so many distinct ways. Well, I have introduced this case just because it illustrates the very impossibility of such a supposition. For it seems pretty clear that if peaches have grown at one act from almonds, then this must really be a case of reversion; the almond must itself be a dried-up form of a still earlier peach; and this will be equally true even if all the existing peaches can be shown to be descended from nut-like almonds. For the almond is a plum by family; and all the other plums have juicy fruits: while one of them, the apricot, closely approaches the almond-peach group in most of its characters. Seeing, then, that the almond must almost certainly be descended from juicy fruit-bearing ancestors, nothing is more natural than that under altered circumstances it should revert, *per saltum*, to a juicy peach. But to suppose that the peach type was originally developed *per saltum* from an almond is to suppose that it

varied at once in several separate ways, all equally and correlatively adapted to a particular mode of dispersion. It is to suppose that accident could do in a minute what we have every reason to believe can only be done by infinitesimal variations and infinite selection.

But if the naturalist cannot imagine the production of a peach *de novo* out of an almond at a single jump, how can he imagine the production of a new thinking element in a human brain? How can he suppose that the accidental introduction of one more little bit of matter into that vast organised labyrinth,—a mighty maze but not without a very definite and regular plan—can have any kind of intelligible relation to the complicated system of cross-connexions and super-imposed directive departments which make it up? And if it be objected that the view taken above of the constitution of the brain is wooden and mechanical, I would answer that it is certainly absurdly diagrammatic and inadequate, but that it is so far right in that it insists upon making believers in spontaneous variation try to realise their own unthinkable attitude. As to materialism, surely it is more profoundly materialistic to suppose that mere physical causes, operating on the germ, can determine minute physical and material changes in the brain, which will in turn make the individuality what it is to be, than to suppose that all brains are what they are in virtue of antecedent function. The one creed makes the man depend mainly upon the accidents of molecular physics in a colliding germ-cell and sperm-cell: the other creed makes him depend mainly upon the doings and gains of his ancestors, as modified and altered by himself.

And now let us look at this second creed, in order to see how far it surpasses its rival in comprehensibility, concinnity, and power of explaining all the phenomena. If it be true that all nerve-increment and especially all brain-increment is functionally produced, we can easily understand why each new cell or fibre should stand in its true and due relation to all the rest. It will have been evolved in the course of doing its own work, and it will be necessarily adapted to it because the act of working has brought it into being. There will be no doubt whether the new cell governs the peculiar action of the left little finger in performing that amusing conjuring trick, or is, on the contrary, connected with the perception of orange-red, because the cell was actually differentiated (say out of pre-existing neuroglia, though that is a hypothetical matter of detail) in the very act of performing the trick in question. There will be no

doubt whether the new fibres are related to the arithmetical faculty or to the Sanskrit verbs, because they were actually rendered possible as nervous tracks in the act of learning decimal fractions. It is true, we may admit to the utmost the intense complexity of the existing brain, and the vast number of its elements involved in even the simplest muscular adjustment or the simplest visual perception. Nobody feels the necessity for admitting such complexity more fully than myself. One may allow with M. Ribot that every act of thought must be conceived rather as a vast dynamical tremor, affecting a wide plexus of very diverse nerve-elements, than as a single function in a single cell or fibre. One may acknowledge that what one ought really to picture to oneself (at the present stage of human evolution) is not so much the genesis of a new cell for governing the little finger, or of a new fibre for understanding a fact in decimal fractions, as the habituating an immense series of cells and fibres, perhaps in various parts of the brain, to thrill together in unison on the occurrence of a single cue. But let us thus purify and dematerialise our conception as far as we like, we must nevertheless come back at last to the fact that every gain implies a modification in structure, and that this modification in structure, if it is to have any functional meaning and value whatsoever, must be functionally brought about.

That such functional modifications are for ever taking place in all of us is a matter of common observation, as evidenced by psychological facts. We are always seeing something which adds to our total stock of memories: we are always learning and doing something new. The vast majority of these experiences are similar in kind to those already passed through by our ancestors: they add nothing to the inheritance of the race. To use a familiar phrase in a slightly new and narrower sense, they do not help to build up "forms of thought"; though they leave physical traces on the individual, they do not so far affect the underlying organisation of the brain as to make the development of after-brains somewhat different from previous ones. But there are certain functional activities which do tend so to alter the development of after-brains; certain novel or sustained activities which apparently result in the production of new correlated brain-elements or brain-connexions, hereditarily transmissible as increased potentialities of similar activity in the offspring. If this is not so, then there is no meaning at all in the facts collected by Mr. Galton, or indeed, for the matter of that, in the common facts of

human experience as to hereditary transmission of faculties for acquired pursuits of any sort. If the children of acrobats make the best tumblers, if the descendants of musical families make the best singers and composers, if a great thinker or a great painter is usually produced by the convergence of two lines of thinkers or artists, then the general truth of this principle is abundantly clear.

Supposing such small functionally-produced modifications to be always taking place, it will be obvious that they must take place most in the most differentiated societies, and least in the least differentiated. A race of hunting savages will perform a certain number of routine acts, which will be for the most part the same for all members of the tribe, and will remain pretty much the same from generation to generation. In the particular direction of hunting and fishing, the cleverness at last attained will be very remarkable; but in most other directions, there will be little excellence and still less variety. On the other hand, in a tribe which is also made a trading and navigating one by the accident of a maritime position, a new set of activities will be specially cultivated, and will give rise to new functional modifications in a different direction. Suppose some of the tribe, in this latter case, to be mainly inland cultivators and hunters, while others of the tribe are mainly sea-board traders or pirates, then each of these sections will tend to develop certain special hereditary brain-modifications of its own. But if a man of the inland section marries a woman of the maritime section, or *vice versa*, then the offspring will tend to reproduce more or less the structural peculiarities of both parents. And here comes in an important corollary. For though, under such circumstances, the children may none of them fully reproduce all the brain-gains of their father's line, nor all the brain-gains of their mother's line, they will yet on the average reproduce a fair share of the former and a fair share of the latter. Accordingly, they will usually turn out, on the whole, persons of higher general brain-power than either ancestral series; they will partially unite the strong points of both.

It seems to me that this principle is one of very great importance. From it we can deduce the conclusion that in any complex society many children represent directly a convergence of two unlike lines of descent, and indirectly a convergence of innumerable unlike lines, with corresponding gain to the species. Two parents, possessing distinct points of advantage of their own, produce children, some of whom

resemble rather the one, and some the other ; but many of whom will at least tend to resemble both in their stronger points. Of course one must allow much for the *idiosyncrasis* as well as for the *crasis*. This child may fall below both its parents in most things ; that child may reproduce the weakest elements of both ; yonder other child may attain the average or may surpass them in everything. But on the whole, the principle of convergence seems to imply that in a fairly complex society there will always be an average of mental improvement from generation to generation, due to the constant intercrossing of brains specially improved in particular directions. This improvement will, it need hardly be said, be increased and favoured by natural selection ; but it will itself form the basis of favourable variations without which natural selection can do nothing. It seems to me easy to understand how survival of the fittest may result in progress, starting from such functionally-produced gains : but impossible to understand how it could result in progress if it had to start from mere accidental structural increments due to spontaneous variation alone.

Thus it becomes clear why certain countries have by mere geographical position necessarily produced certain high types of human intelligence, while in certain other countries the race has never progressed beyond a very low level. There are places like Central Africa, where the physical conditions do not tend to produce any great diversity of occupation ; and here the general average of intelligence does not tend to rise high. On the other hand, there are places, like Greece, Italy, the West European peninsulas and islands, where the physical conditions tend to differentiate the population into many groups, agricultural, mercantile, sea-faring, military, naval, professional ; and here the general average of intelligence tends to rise very high indeed. Of course, one must allow much influence to the time-element ; for every such increase in differentiation involves yet further increases in the sequel, and brings the social organism, or parts of it, into contact with new environments. The Ægean is not now of the same importance in this respect as during the days when coasting voyages from island to island were the utmost possible stretch of navigation : the science acquired there has widened the sphere of navigation itself first to the entire Mediterranean, then to the open Atlantic, finally to all the oceans of the whole earth. But in principle it has always seemed to me (as against the really accidental view advocated by Mr. Bagehot) that the "philosophy of history,"

the general stream of human development, could be traced throughout to perfectly definite physical causes of this sort. Mr. Bagehot, basing himself on the pure Darwinian theory of spontaneous variations, believed that the differences between races of men were due to mere minute physical sports in their nervous constitution: it appears to me rather that they are due to the action of a definite environment, thus effecting a differentiation of circumstances, and in many cases calling into constant functional activity the highest existing faculties of the various social units in the most diverse ways. We may not thus (though *vide post*) be able to account for the particular character and genius of a Pericles, an Aristotle, a Hannibal, a Cæsar, a Newton, or a Goethe: but we can thus at least account for the general average of intelligence which made Greece, or Carthage, or Rome, or England, or Germany, capable of producing such an individual, as a slight variation on the common type, due to the convergence of separately rich and varied lines of descent. The real illuminating point is this—that such men do arise from time to time among the most intelligent nations, and that they do not arise among the Australian black-fellows, the Digger Indians, or the Andaman Islanders.

And now, how far can we account on these principles for the existence of the individual genius? Well, here we must begin by clearing the ground of a great initial fallacy. Genius, as a rule, has made quite too much of itself. Having had the field all to itself, it has never been tired of drawing a hard and fast line between itself and mere talent. Nevertheless, from the psychological point of view, nothing is plainer than the fact that genius differs from mere talent only by the very slightest excess of natural gifts in a special direction. True, that small amount of superiority makes all the difference in our judgment of the finished work: we say, this is a great poem, while that is a pretty trifle; this is a grand scientific generalisation, while that is a pains-taking piece of laboratory analysis; this is a magnificent work of art, while that is a very creditable little bit of landscape painting. But in the brain and hands of the performer, what infinitely minute structural modifications must underlie these seemingly vast differences of effect! And even in ourselves, the critics, how minute are the shades of feeling which make us give the palm to the one work and withhold it from the other. How many people are really competent to judge in any way of the differences between this poem and that, between

this oratorio and that, between this picture and that? And what is this but to say that the differences are in themselves extremely small and almost elusive?

Now, in a country like Italy, say, where for many ages many men have continually painted pictures of the nymphs and the satyrs, or of the Madonna and of St. Sebastian; where little chapels have studded the land from age to age, with votive tablets to Venus Genitrix or to Our Lady of the Sea; where countless generations of workmen have decorated the walls of Pompeii or covered the vulgarest ceilings of Florence and Genoa with hasty frescoes—in such a country there is developed among all the people a general high average of artistic execution, utterly impossible in a country like Scotland, where there has hardly ever been any indigenous spontaneous art at all to speak of. And when an Italian man of an artistic family, having inherited from his ancestors certain relatively high artistic endowments, marries an Italian woman of another artistic family, similarly, but perhaps somewhat differently endowed, there is at least a possibility, not to say a probability, that their children, or some or one of them, will develop great artistic power. True, we cannot follow the minute working of the *crasis*: we cannot say why Paolo is an artist of the highest type, while Luigi is merely a fair colourist, and Gianbattista is a respectable copyist of the old masters. But at least we can say that all three are painters after a fashion, in virtue of their common artistic descent; and that Paolo is a great painter because he unites in himself, more than either of the others, the respective merits of the two ancestral lines. After all, we common mortals, if we practised all our lifetime, could not turn out as good a sketch as Gianbattista's first water-colour.

In the same way, in a Greece where every god had his temple, every temple its statue, every house its shrine, and every shrine its little deities—in a Greece where marble was what brick is in London, and where artistic stone-cutters were as common as carpenters here—we can understand why a Pheidias was a possible product, and why a Pheidias-admiring public was a foregone conclusion. So, too, we can understand why among ourselves so many artists should come from the only real native schools of decorative handicraft—the workshops of Birmingham, Manchester, and London. We can see why musical talent should arise most in Germany and Italy, or among the Jews, or in our own case among the Welsh and in the cathedral towns. We can see why a Watt is not born in the Tyrol; why a

Stephenson does not come from Dolgelley; why America produces more Edisons, and Bells, and Morses, and Fultons than she produces Schillers, or Mozarts, or Michael Angelos. The convergences which go to produce a great mechanician are more frequent in countries where mechanics are much practised than they are in the western Hebrides or in the British West Indies. The Quakers do not turn out many great generals, and the Kings of Dahomey are not likely to beget distinguished philanthropists.

Of course, there are some hard cases to understand—hard for the most part, I believe, because we do not know enough about the various convergent lines which have gone to produce the particular phenomenon. Here and there, a great man seems to spring suddenly and unexpectedly from the dead level of absolute mediocrity. But then, we do not know how much mediocrity in different lines may have gone to make up his complex individuality: and we do not know how much of what seems mediocrity may really have been fairly high talent. So many men are never discovered. Let me take a few slight examples from our own time, which may help to illustrate the slightness of the chances that make all the difference in our superficial judgments: and if I take them from very recent cases, I think the readers of MIND will not misunderstand my object; for it is almost impossible to recover the facts from remoter periods.

Carlyle, in spite of his spleen, was no bad judge of intelligence: and Carlyle thought Erasmus Darwin, the younger, an abler man than his brother Charles, the author of *The Origin of Species*. Probably nobody else would agree with Carlyle: people seldom do: but at any rate it is clear that Erasmus Darwin must have been a man very high above the average in intellect, doubtless inheriting the same general tendencies which are inherent in the whole of that distinguished family. Yet if it had not been for his brother, probably the world at large would never have heard of him. Again, supposing he had had no brother, but had married and had children, all of whom achieved celebrity, we might have enquired in vain whence these children came by their ability. Once more, take Charles Darwin himself. He was nearly if not quite fifty before he published *The Origin of Species*. It was a mere chance that with his feeble health he lived on to complete that great work. Suppose he had died at forty, how would he have been remembered? Chiefly as the author of a clever book of scientific travels, and of a monograph on the fossil acorn-barnacles. In a

world of such mere accidents as these, who shall say that an apparently negative instance proves anything?

Take another and somewhat different case—the Tennyson family. Here we have three brothers, all with more or less poetical temperament, and all marked by much the same minute peculiarities in cast of thought and turn of expression. Only two, however, I believe, have published or at least have acknowledged their verses; and of these two alone—Alfred Tennyson and Charles Tennyson Turner,—has one a right to speak publicly. When the *Poems by Two Brothers* appeared, who could have said which of the two was destined to turn out a great poet? And in the after event, who can say what little difference of circumstances may have made the one into a clergyman and the other into a professional versifier? If Charles Turner had cultivated his muse as assiduously as the Laureate, would he have produced equal results? What little twist set the one, with Tennysonian love of form carried to the length of a passion, upon the writing of exquisite sonnets alone; while it set the other upon *In Memoriam*, and *Maud*, and *The Princess*, and the *Morte d'Arthur*? What little extra encouragement on the part of a reviewer may have impelled the more successful poet to fresh efforts; what professional distractions or religious scruples may have held back the less illustrious parson? And yet, who can read Charles Tennyson Turner's sonnets without feeling that though the *idiosyncrasis* is not exactly the same, the *crisis* itself is at bottom identical? Compare the sonnets with the work of any one among the imitators,—the men who “all can raise the flower now, for all have got the seed,”—and what a difference! The imitator is all servile copyism in form, with no real underlying identity of matter: the brother is only half a Tennyson in mere externals, but is still own brother in the most intimate turns of thought and feeling.

After such cases as these, do we need any explanation of the sudden apparition of a Carlyle, a Burns, a Shakespeare, a Dickens, from out the ranks of the people themselves? To me, it seems not. Is there not pithiness and sternness and ability enough in the Lowland peasantry to account for the occasional production, out of thousands of casts at the dice, of such a convergence as that which gave us the old man at Ecclefechan who “had sic names for things and bodies,” and his two able sons, of whom the more strangely compounded was Thomas Carlyle? Is there not in another type of Scotch peasant enough of pathos and literary power and *bonhomie* to account for an occasional convergence which

will give us either the old popular-song-writers, or Burns himself, or on a slightly lower level such a woman as Janet Hamilton? Again, the case of Dickens looks at first sight somewhat more difficult; but then one may remember that, as far as general mental power went, Dickens was nowhere. He was a pure artist in a special and very restricted line; he possessed a peculiar faculty for describing queer and original people in a queer and original way. Doubtless this faculty was in him so fully developed that it rose to the rank of genius in its own line; but the line was by no means an exalted one. In such a case, who can say what quaint little combinations of ordinary elements went to make up the power that amused and delighted us so much? Are there not thousands of people in our midst who possess just the same faculty in a less degree; people who, without depth or brilliancy in other respects, can raise a laugh by their clever caricatures of the habits and conversation of their friends? Throw in the merest side-twist of comical exaggeration and a grain of plot-forming capacity into such a *raconteur*, and you get the framework for the genius of Dickens. Of genius of that sort, indeed, more than of any other, one may fairly say that it differs only by a hair's breadth from humorous mediocrity. It is otherwise, I believe, with really deep philosophical or scientific power. Grasp, insight, luminousness, breadth; the capacity for dealing with the abstract ideas of mathematics, of logic, of metaphysics; the power of seeing or formulating great generalisations—these things, if I read the lives of thinkers aright, come only from a convergence of able and powerful stocks. It takes three generations, they say, to make a gentleman: surely it takes many generations of trained intelligence on both sides to make a philosopher.

At the same time, it must be remembered that a convergence even of two mediocre strains may produce comparatively high results, provided the endowments of the two strains be complementary or supplementary to one another. To this cause may perhaps be attributed the general high level of intelligence displayed by half-breeds—even half-breeds with a lower race. I have already alluded to the intellectual superiority of mulattoes, a large proportion of whom appear to me (and to some other observers) considerably above the average of either Europeans or negroes. And this is not surprising when we recollect that the negro brain, though relatively inferior, must almost necessarily be highly cultivated in some particular directions, where the European brain is comparatively deficient. If, then, a

mulatto child inherits in fair degrees the quick perceptive faculties and intuitions of his mother and the higher reasoning faculties and forethought of his father, he is likely on the average to be better equipped in inherited potentialities than either.¹ Similarly, one may take it for granted that each great European nationality has some strong points not equally shared in by the others; and it is a trite observation that intermarriages between members of such nationalities tend to produce an unusually high level of general intelligence. In Ireland, the mixed French families, sprung from intermarriages with refugees, have long been noticed in this respect; at Norwich and throughout the Eastern counties, the mixed descendants of the Huguenots (such as the Martineaus and others) have been equally distinguished. Perhaps one might even point out an exceptional amount of intellectual power in the more mixed Celtic and Teutonic regions of Britain—the borderlands of the two races—notably at Aberdeen and in Devonshire. But the most remarkable and least dubious instance is that of the mixed offspring of Jews and Christians. Here we start with a pure race of unusual intellectual vigour and power, the Jews, long thrown by circumstances into an environment which has brought out many of their faculties in a very high degree. They are the oldest civilised race now remaining on the earth; they are artistic, musical, literary, exceptionally philosophic, and hereditarily cultivated. Even by marriage among themselves they naturally produce a very large proportion of remarkable men. But when they marry out with Christian women—in other words, with women of the European race—the special Aryan traits seem to blend with the Semitic in a very notable and powerful mixture. I have not space to give illustrations, but the list that can be compiled of distinguished persons of

¹ Darwin has somewhere noted that half-breeds with lower races appear to be on the whole often morally inferior to either parent race; and he has suggested that this inferiority may be due to reversion to an earlier and still more savage type of humanity. Without expressing any opinion on the question of fact (a delicate one to decide), I fancy another explanation fits more simply: namely, that as morals are a comparatively recent and unstable acquisition even in the best and highest, they do not crop up in the half-breed; and the union of relatively high European intelligence with relatively low savage ethics may easily produce what seems at least to be a very brutal and diabolical nature. Surely there can be nothing worse in any savage than such abnormal products of our own civilization as Peace the murderer, or as the man Thomasson who attempted to blow up an Atlantic steamer by a piece of dynamite clock-work for the sake of obtaining the insurance.

half-Jewish blood is something simply extraordinary, especially when one remembers the comparatively small sum-total of such intermarriages. Indeed, the difficulty would probably be to find a single person of mixed Jewish race who was not at least above the average in intellect and in plasticity of thought.

Finally, it seems to me that unless we accept the view here contended for, that all increments of brain-power are functionally produced, the whole history of human development ought to present the appearance of a continuous chaos. Granted this principle, we can understand why a Pheidias appeared in Greece, a Raffaele in Italy, a Watt in Britain; without it, we cannot understand why they should not all have appeared in Iceland or in New Guinea just as well. If mere physical circumstances affecting germs and sperm-cells can produce miraculous and really uncaused new developments of structure and function—can make a genius spring from nobodies, and a philosopher grow at one leap out of two common strains, of the earth, earthy—then we can see no reason why there should not be great families, great epochs, great outbursts in any one place as well as another. But if all increments are functionally acquired, then we can understand why this environment produces races of sculptors, that environment races of poets, yonder environment races of traders, or thinkers, or soldiers, or mechanicians. The first hypothesis is one that throws no light at all upon any of the facts; the second hypothesis is one that explains them all with transparent lucidity.

GRANT ALLEN.

III.—MR. HERBERT SPENCER'S THEORY OF SOCIETY.

II. THE LAW OF EQUAL LIBERTY.

IN the last number of *MIND* I ventured to question whether the law of equal liberty which Mr. Spencer now some thirty years ago set forth in his *Social Statics* can in any guise or form find place in that "ideal code of conduct formulating the behaviour of the completely-adapted man in the completely-evolved society,"¹ to determine the contents of which is the task of Absolute Ethics. It remains to consider this law as a rule prescribing the behaviour of men who are not yet perfect, for "when, formulating normal conduct in an ideal society, we have reached a science of absolute ethics, we have simultaneously reached a science which, when used to interpret the phenomena of real societies in their transitional states, full of the miseries due to non-adaptation (which we may call pathological states), enables us to form approximately true conclusions respecting the natures of the abnormalities, and the causes which tend most in the direction of the normal".² Now in *Social Statics*, the law in question, the "First Principle," was thus stated—"Every man has freedom to do all that he wills, provided he infringes not the equal freedom of any other man."³ Mr. Spencer did not regard this as a complete statement of the whole duty of imperfect man. A man is bound to obey this law and in obeying it he is just; but he ought also to be positively beneficent, negatively beneficent and prudent. The field of positive beneficence grows ever narrower; still in some cases a man ought to sacrifice himself in doing good to others. He ought again to be negatively beneficent, for "various ways exist in which the faculties may be exercised to the aggrieving of other persons without the law of equal freedom being overstepped. A man may behave unamiably, may use harsh language, or annoy by disgusting habits; and whoso thus offends the normal feelings of his fellows, manifestly diminishes happiness."⁴ This he ought not to do, for in the last resort happiness is the chief good. Again there are the self-regarding virtues; one ought to be sober

¹ *Data of Ethics*, § 105.

² *Ib.*

³ *Soc. Stat.*, c. 6, § 1.

⁴ *Soc. Stat.*, c. 4, § 4.

and so forth. But these "supplementary restrictions," imposed by negative beneficence and by prudence, "are of quite inferior authority to the original law. Instead of being, like it, capable of strictly scientific development, they (under existing circumstances) can be unfolded only into superior forms of expediency."

These "supplementary limitations involve the term *happiness*, and as happiness is for the present capable only of a generic and not of a specific definition, they do not admit of scientific development. Though abstractedly correct limitations, and limitations which the ideal man will strictly observe, they cannot be reduced to concrete forms until the ideal man exists."¹ . . . "Indeed we may almost say that the first law is the sole law; for we find that of the several conditions to greatest happiness it is the only one at present capable of a systematic development; and we further find that conformity to it ensures ultimate conformity to the others."²

Almost supreme in ethics, it is absolutely supreme in politics. In other words, though the exercise I make of the liberty which this law allows me is not morally indifferent, still it can not be right for any man, prince, potentate or parliament to restrict my freedom within any narrower bounds. Whether we be sovereigns, or whether we be subjects, we must leave every man free to do all that he wills provided that he infringes not the equal liberty of any other man.

Mr. Spencer apparently still holds by this law. It is true that in the *Data of Ethics* he nowhere states it in such plain terms as those cited above. However he tells us that the maintenance of equitable relations between men (and 'equitable' means 'equal') is "the condition to the attainment of greatest happiness in all societies; however much the greatest happiness attainable may differ in nature, or amount, or both," and that "this pre-requisite to social equilibrium," "this universal requirement," was what he had in view when he chose for his first work the title *Social Statics*.³ He has also, at least as lately as 1868, told us that he "adheres to the leading principles set forth" in that book, though not "prepared to abide by all the detailed applications of them," and further that "the deductions included in Part II." (the Part which contains that deduction of proprietary rights which forms the main subject of this paper) "may be taken as representing in great measure those which the author would still draw; but had he now to express them he would express some of them

¹ *Soc. Stat.*, § 5.

² *Ib.*, § 6.

³ *Data*, § 61.

differently."¹ We have reason therefore for believing that Mr. Spencer adheres to the "First Principle" (which must be among the leading principles) of *Social Statics*, and that he is still ready to deduce from it proprietary rights in somewhat the same fashion in which he set about that task in his earliest work. Nor is this all, for in his very last work, the *Political Institutions*, he recurs to the distinction which he took in 1850 between property in land and property in other things, with the result of finding a new justification for one of the most marked peculiarities of the treatment which property received in *Social Statics*. It seems therefore fair to infer that the doctrine here to be criticised is in the main Mr. Spencer's present doctrine; but in any case the fact that it once was his is a sufficient claim to respectful attention, though, should the law of equal liberty disappear from any Deuteronomy that may yet be forthcoming, this would certainly remove a difficulty from the way of some who would much rather agree than disagree with Mr. Spencer.

Now some of the applications which in *Social Statics* were made of this first principle were, so far as I am aware, quite new, and certainly they were very striking. But the principle itself was not new, for it had been stated and adopted by no less a person than Kant. It seems to me probable, if such a guess may be allowed, that in 1850 Mr. Spencer was not aware of this, for on the several occasions on which he has argued that his law is a precise expression of that idea of Justice or Equity which is more or less clearly apprehended by others, he has cited authorities very much less to the point than Kant's political or juristic writings. The dogma of equal liberty is not at all an unnatural outcome of a theory of Natural Law, or (as, to prevent all ambiguity, we may say) of Natural Right. From of old it stood written that all men are by nature free, and that all men are by nature equal, and when it had at length become plain that men clamouring for natural liberty and natural equality were not to be put off with stories about an original contract, to say that all men ought to be equally free must have seemed an obvious mode of reconciling the possibly conflicting claims of these two ideals of Natural Right. It may well be, therefore, that some exponent of *Jus Naturæ*, some natural lawyer had already hit on Mr. Spencer's first principle before it was stated by Kant. At any rate, however, it was stated by

¹ Preface to American edition of 1864, and Preface to English edition of 1868.

Kant, and that very plainly. Already in an essay published in 1793 we find this passage:—

“Ein Jeder darf seine Glückseligkeit auf dem Wege suchen welcher ihm selbst gut dünkt, wenn er nur der Freiheit Anderer, einem ähnlichen Zwecke nachzustreben, die mit der Freiheit von Jedermann nach einem möglichen allgemeinen Gesetze zusammen bestehen kann (d. i. diesem Rechte des Andern), nicht Abbruch thut.”¹

Kant contrasts this principle of freedom with the utilitarian doctrine that a ruler should directly aim at making his subjects happy, and this latter, much in Mr. Spencer's manner, he pronounces despotic. Then in the *Rechtslehre* this rule of equal liberty stands forth as the general principle of all law (Recht).

“Das Recht ist also der Inbegriff der Bedingungen, unter denen die Willkür des Einen mit der Willkür des Anderen nach einem allgemeinen Gesetze der Freiheit zusammen vereinigt werden kann.”

“Eine jede Handlung ist *recht*, die oder nach deren Maxime die Freiheit der Willkür eines Jeden mit Jedermanns Freiheit nach einem allgemeinen Gesetze zusammen bestehen kann.”² . . .

“Das angeborne Recht ist nur ein einziges. Freiheit (Unabhängigkeit von eines Anderen nöthigender Willkür) sofern sie mit jedes Anderen Freiheit nach einem allgemeinen Gesetze zusammen bestehen kann, ist dieses einzige, ursprüngliche, jedem Menschen kraft seiner Menschheit zustehende Recht.”³

Had the *Rechtslehre* fallen into Mr. Spencer's hands ere he wrote *Social Statics*, he might have had the satisfaction of appealing to a high philosophical authority in support of his first principle, but had he watched Kant's struggles to get out of this formula a coherent system of Natural Right, his satisfaction would probably have been alloyed with some misgivings as to the hopefulness of an undertaking which cost his great predecessor many a curious contortion. Coleridge knew well this law of equal liberty. In *The Friend*⁴ he says that all the different systems of political justice, all the theories of the rightful origin of government are reducible in the end to three classes, correspondent to the three different points of view in which the human being itself may be contemplated. That being may be regarded as an animal, and we fall into Hobbism; or as endowed with understanding, and utilitarianism follows; or as rational, and we must have politics of the pure reason, or “metapolitics”. Coleridge professing himself an advocate of the second system (he was

¹ *Ueber den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in Theorie richtig sein, etc.* (Kant's *Werke*, ed. Hartenstein, vol. vi., pp. 322-3).

² Ed. cit, vol. vii., p. 27.

³ *Ib.*, p. 34.

⁴ *The Friend*, First Section:—“On the Principles of Political Knowledge” (ed. 1863, vol. i., pp. 179 ff.).

utilitarian in politics though not in ethics), gives a sketch of the metapolitical system, and in doing so expressly identifies it with the French revolutionary philosophy; but as it seems to me, the theory which he states in order to refute is really an eclectic mosaic of theories part English, part French, part German. But whether or no this sketch fairly represents the opinions which had been held by any one theorist, Coleridge in the following passage not indistinctly foreshadows the main doctrine of *Social Statics*.

"Justice, austere, unrelenting justice is everywhere holden up as the one thing needful; and the only duty of the citizen, in fulfilling which he obeys all the laws, is not to encroach on another's sphere of action. The greatest possible happiness of a people is not, according to this system, the object of a governor; but to preserve the freedom of all, by coercing within the requisite bounds the freedom of each. Whatever a government does more than this, comes of evil: and its best employment is the repeal of laws and regulations, not the establishment of them. Each man is the best judge of his own happiness, and to himself must it therefore be entrusted. Remove all the interferences of positive statutes, all monopoly, all bounties, all prohibitions, and all encouragements of importation and exportation, of particular growth and particular manufactures; let the revenues of the state be taken at once from the produce of the soil; and all things will find their level, all irregularities will correct each other, and an indestructible cycle of harmonious motions take place in the moral equally as in the natural world. The business of the governor is to watch incessantly, that the state shall remain composed of individuals, acting as individuals, by which alone the freedom of all can be secured."¹

Now Coleridge, certainly not biased against the claims of pure reason, rejected the law of equal liberty because, as he thought, it must condemn property. "It is impossible," he says, "to deduce the right of property from pure reason."² To this he appends a characteristic foot-note, "I mean practically and with the inequalities inseparable from the actual existence of property. Abstractedly, the right to property is deducible from the free agency of man. If to act freely be a right, a sphere of action must be so too." We may doubt whether a kind of property, the *esse* of which is *abstrahi*, can be of much value to its owner, but probably Coleridge has his eye on Kant and means that between proprietary rights and the law of equal liberty there is no formal, though there is of necessity a practical contradiction. Kant, as it seems to me, had evaded rather than solved the problem by introducing alongside of his "Allgemeines Princip des Rechts," a "Rechtliches Postulat der praktischen Vernunft". Every external object of desire must, he argues, be capable of appropriation. In order that it may be used, it must be appropriated, and it would be absurd to say that anything

¹ First Section, Essay 4 (vol. i., pp. 219-220).

² *Ib.* 222.

useful can not rightfully be used. The easy reply is that doubtless this is so, that a political theory which condemns to eternal uselessness things that are useful condemns itself as worse than useless; but this does not prove that an admission of this postulate of practical reason is not an infringement of the inborn right of every man to have equal liberty with each of his neighbours. Kant, as I understand him, thought it enough to say that there is no formal contradiction between his postulate and his principle. Certainly there is none, for neither formal logic nor any principles which Kant could discover *a priori* can prove that we are not living in a world wherein it is possible for each of us to satisfy his every wish and yet leave unappropriated as many objects of desire as his fellows can possibly want. Such will perhaps be our condition when we are fully-adapted men in a fully-evolved society, but we happen to know substantially, if not formally, that such is not our present condition and that were it our condition the idea of property, of exclusive right, would be absurd. Who, asks Coleridge, ever thought of property in heaven, property among angels and glorified spirits, beings of pure reason? And why, asks Hume,¹ raise landmarks between my neighbour's field and mine when my heart has made no division between our interests, but shares all his joys and sorrows with the same force and vivacity as if originally my own? Property means that the world being what it is and men being what they are, every man cannot have all that he wants.

The real problem which has to be faced by any scheme of Natural Jurisprudence which rejects arguments based on mere expediency, is just the old problem which Locke set before him, though the terms in which it has to be stated may be new. God made all men free and equal and gave the earth to them in common; it is required to find a justification for exclusive proprietary rights. It is required to find a justification; the conclusion to which the theorist must come is a foregone conclusion, for, as Locke pointed out in memorable words, proprietary rights there must be if the human race is to exist. Carry our socialism never so far, we must end with appropriation, and appropriation by individuals. When did the acorns become the property of the natural man—"when he digested? or when he eat? or when he boiled? or when he brought them home? or when he picked them up?"² At latest they must be his when

¹ *Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals*, sec. 3, pt. 1.

² *Of Civil Government*, § 28.

they are fairly in his stomach. Mr. Spencer knew well how to use this argument against "M. Proudhon and his party," and of course there is a plain absurdity in saying that no appropriation can be just. It does not follow, however, that the law of equal liberty is not committed to this absurdity and merely refrains from declaring that property is theft because the use of a word like *theft*, which commonly imports some blame, might seem to imply that property is at least possibly rightful.

We may now consider how Mr. Spencer, in 1850, sought to avoid this ugly and impotent conclusion. Most certainly he meant to avoid it; every man would so mean, but he more than others, for his practical teaching in politics requires that proprietary rights shall be built on a foundation so sure that they can resist the attacks of any occasional exceptional expediency. He begins, as I venture to think, very logically by making large, but not too large, concessions to the anarchist.

"Given a race of beings having like claims to pursue the objects of their desires—given a world adapted to the gratification of those desires—a world into which such beings are similarly born, and it unavoidably follows that they have equal rights to the use of this world. For if each of them has freedom to do all that he wills, provided he infringes not the equal freedom of any other, then each of them is free to use the earth for the satisfaction of his wants, provided he allows all others the same liberty. And, conversely, it is manifest that no one, or part of them, may use the earth in such a way as to prevent the rest from similarly using it; seeing that to do this is to assume greater freedom than the rest and consequently to break the law. Equity, therefore, does not permit property in land."¹

This we must allow to be very sound argument, very much more logical than anything in the *Rechtslehre*. By *world*, however, Mr. Spencer must mean the material universe, and when the *world* of the first sentence becomes the *earth* of the second, and the *land* of the fourth, we think that he is but drawing by way of example a particular conclusion from general premises. So with *property*, this word in our ears connotes some large and permanent right, for we are not accustomed to say that the man in the street is proprietor of the spot upon which he is standing. What "Equity" really does not permit is the exclusive possession by one man of any particle of matter which any other men wish to possess, or the exclusive, though but temporary, occupation of any part of space that any other men wish to occupy. There follows a *reductio ad absurdum* of any contrary opinion. "If one portion of the earth's surface

¹ *Soc. Stat.*, c. 9., § 1.

may justly become the possession of an individual, and may be held by him for his sole use and benefit, as a thing to which he has an exclusive right, then *other* portions of the earth's surface may be so held, and eventually the *whole* of the earth's surface may be so held." This truth of course holds good of other things besides the earth's surface. If one atom may be owned, all atoms may be owned. "Observe now the dilemma to which this leads. Supposing the entire habitable globe to be so enclosed, it follows that if the landowners have a valid right to its surface, all who are not landowners, have no right at all to its surface. Hence such can exist on the earth by sufferance only. They are all trespassers."¹ Worse is behind if theft be worse than trespass, for should we concede property in one molecule inexorable logic may eventually drive us to concede property in all molecules, and our dilemma will then be theft or suicide.

It is true that Mr. Spencer, for some reason or another, spends most of his indignation on property in land. This however does not prevent him from dealing out, in a later passage, impartial though less rhetorical condemnation against such property in movables as now exists. In the meantime he disposes briefly of the existing titles of landowners. It can never be pretended that they are legitimate. "Should any one think so, let him look in the chronicles. Violence, fraud, the prerogative of force, the claims of superior cunning—these are the sources to which those titles may be traced. The original deeds were written with the sword, rather than with the pen: not lawyers, but soldiers, were the conveyancers: blows were the current coin given in payment; and for seals, blood was used in preference to wax. Could valid claims be thus constituted? Hardly." A title originally bad can not be made good by transfer. Sale or bequest can not generate a right. Nor can lapse of time validate the invalid. Clearly the law of equal liberty can not recognise any particular term of years as sufficient to turn trespass into ownership. Then we are told that "not only have present land-tenures an indefensible origin, but it is impossible to discover any mode in which land *can* become private property". The pleas of title by first occupation, by improvement, by, in Locke's phrase, "mixing one's labour" with the land, are dispelled in a spirited dialogue between a "cosmopolite" and a backwoodsman who has made unto himself a clearing.

¹ *Soc. Stat.*, § 2

"The world is God's bequest to mankind," says the former, all men are joint heirs to it; you amongst the number. And because you have taken up your residence on a certain part of it, and have subdued, cultivated, beautified that part—improved it as you say, you are not therefore warranted in appropriating it as entirely private property."¹

This is equally true of all things other than land. We may subdue, cultivate, beautify, work up into this form or that form, but matter we can not make, and it belongs to mankind. "The world is God's bequest to mankind; all men are joint heirs to it"; and if no one has a right to take a bit of it, cultivate it, and call it his own, still less can he have a right to carry a bit bodily away in his hands, his pocket, or his stomach and thus consummate a constructive theft by actual asportation. For this conclusion we must wait until the next chapter: but we get it in good time.

"The reasoning used in the last chapter to prove that no amount of labour, bestowed by an individual upon a part of the earth's surface, can nullify the title of society to that part, might be similarly employed to show that no one can, by the mere act of appropriating to himself any wild unclaimed animal or fruit, supersede the joint claims of other men to it. It may be quite true that the labour a man expends in catching or gathering, gives him a better right to the thing caught or gathered, than any one other man; but the question at issue is, whether by labour so expended he has made his right to the thing caught or gathered, greater than the rights of all other men put together."²

Besides, his right can only be admitted if after the appropriation there is, in Locke's words, "enough and as good left in common for others". "A condition like this gives birth to such a host of queries, doubts, and limitations, as practically to neutralise the general proposition entirely," and out of this inquisition "it seems impossible to liberate the alleged right without such mutilations as to render it in an ethical point of view entirely valueless".

"Abstractedly," then, as Coleridge said, there may be a right of property, but practically this is entirely valueless. Property might be rightful in certain conceivable or inconceivable circumstances (circumstances, by the way, that would render the notion of property absurd), but these circumstances are not ours. The landowner and the owner of movables are in the same position, and (though Mr. Spencer does not emphasise this conclusion) all existing titles to property of every kind are bad. Indeed in almost all, if not all, cases no title can be made to a movable that does not involve an admission that there may be property in

¹ *Soc. Stat.*, c. 9, § 4.

² *Ib.*, c. 10, § 1.

land. Whence the title to an apple, a shilling, a coat? Exchange or gift has not generated it; time has not consecrated it. It is null.

The outlook now seems hopeless, and we are beginning to think that Mr. Spencer's "cosmopolite" was really a chaopolite in disguise. But the law of equal liberty having sufficiently proved its power as an engine of impartial destruction, the time for reconstruction has come, and Mr. Spencer has ready for us a scheme which shall give to proprietary rights a legitimate foundation; in theory a very simple scheme, whatever may be the practical difficulties which will impede its accomplishment. He did not recommend what is called "the nationalisation of the land"; that would have helped him but a little way, if any way, towards establishing an equitable system of property. Englishmen can have no better title to England than has Lord A to his deer-forest. We must not exclude Germans or Frenchmen, or the Chinese or the Chinooks from sharing in the rents and profits of our fertile island. The surface of the earth is to be owned by "the public," "the great corporate body—Society," "the community," "mankind at large," and is to be let out upon leases at the best rent. This done, "all men would be equally landlords; all men would be alike free to become tenants". Under this system of land-tenure all difficulties about property in movables disappear "and the right of property obtains a legitimate foundation".¹

Does it? This is a serious question; for, however far distant may be the time when mankind at large will "resume" the ownership of the soil, even a theoretical deliverance from our apparently incurable immorality would be of some value. Now suppose that the resumption has taken place. All men are equally landlords, but are all men equally free to become tenants? All men, it is true, are "equally free to bid" for a farm, just as all men are even now equally free to bid for whatever lands or goods are in the market. If all that the law of equal liberty requires in the matter of land-tenure is that every man shall be equally free to bid for land that law is perfectly fulfilled in this country at this moment. But existing titles, it may be said, are bad, and men can not at present purchase an "equitable" title. The answer is that this truly unfortunate state of things will not be improved by the resumption. Mr. A will outbid his fellows for a site in the best quarter, for the best farm, the best moor. What will enable him to do so will

¹ *Soc. Stat.*, c. 10, § 2.

be his superior wealth, and his wealth will be then as now illgotten. In whatever it may consist, coin or cotton or what not, it will consist of matter subtracted from the common stock of mankind. Sale or bequest can not turn wrong into right, lapse of time will not legalise what was once unlawful, and the long and short of it is that A or his predecessors in title must have robbed mankind and he is to be left in possession of the stolen goods and even suffered to acquire by means thereof a lease of public land. Our original sin of wrongful appropriation is not thus to be purged away.

An equal division of all wealth, which Mr. Spencer would strenuously resist, seems at first sight a more hopeful project. Once let there be an equitable distribution of all desirable things, then, it might be thought, we could leave the future to the law of equal liberty. But to a similar proposal (restricted however to an equal division of land) Mr. Spencer has given a very noteworthy answer. After urging the difficulty of making a really fair allotment, he asks :—

“Is it proposed that each man, woman, and child, shall have a section? If so, what becomes of all who are to be born next year? And what will be the fate of those whose fathers sell their estates and squander the proceeds. These portionless ones must constitute a class already described as having no right to a resting-place on earth—as living by the sufferance of their fellow-men—as being practically serfs. And the existence of such a class is wholly at variance with the law of equal freedom.”¹

The same, be it observed, will happen after as before the “resumption” of the land. Portionless ones will be born with no more chance of holding land for years than they now have of owning land absolutely. But it is more important to notice that here Mr. Spencer throws away the last hope of squaring property with the law of equal liberty. Were it not for the claims of children yet unborn we might harden our hearts and say that this law is not retrospective. Let us sanction existing titles, or let us make some fresh distribution of wealth that seems better than the present, then pass a sponge over the past and abide by our law for the future. But “until it can be proved that God has given one charter of privileges to one generation, and another to the next,” or to adopt other terms, until it can be proved that men hereafter to be born are not *men* within the meaning of our law, we shall find no answer to Mr. Spencer's question, what is to become of all who are to be born next year? They will come into an appropriated world, appro-

¹ *Soc. Stat.*, chap. 9, § 5.

priated without their consent. Redistribution of wealth on the birth of every child is what our law requires. To find Mr. Spencer sanctioning the claims of those "whose fathers sell their estates and squander the proceeds" may surprise us. His usual doctrine is that the sons of the industrially unfit shall not be heirs with the sons of the fit. If the fathers eat sour grapes we must not hinder the salutary process of evolution which sets the children's teeth on edge. Very possibly this argument about portionless ones may have escaped him unadvisedly in the course of controversy with an imaginary opponent, but it is a sound argument, one sanctioned by the law of equal freedom. If we are to tell the child of penniless parents that he is just as free as the rest of us to acquire property by contract or gift we must make exactly the same remark to Mr. Spencer when he denounces "landlordism".

In short, if we are going to be really serious about our law of equal liberty, and think it capable of a "strictly scientific development," we must prepare some scheme which will equalise the advantages of all children hereafter to be born. Any such scheme would be ridiculous enough and, what is more, would be condemned by Mr. Spencer as worse than ridiculous. There remains but one other course; we may adopt the good old device of a constructive contract to which most of Mr. Spencer's predecessors in the attempt to square property with natural liberty and equality have found themselves sooner or later reduced. But much experience has warned us that if once we take to constructive contracts, we may indeed by the exercise of a little metaphysico-legal legerdemain construct whatever pleases us, but it is easiest and simplest to reconstruct pure Hobbism and then our Law of Nature becomes *Quod principi placuit*.

We have seen that according to *Social Statics* the title which any one can now have to movable goods is "in an ethical point of view entirely valueless". Perhaps on this point Mr. Spencer has changed his mind. In *Political Institutions* he insists on the distinction between property in land and property in other things. The one is still "established by force," but the other is now "established by contract". This is presented to us not as guesswork or declamation, but as the sober result of scientific sociology. That this theory is groundless might, in my opinion, be shown even from the evidence which Mr. Spencer brings for its support, but a discussion of history would here be quite out of place. We are concerned with what has been only in so far as it determines what ought to be, and all Mr.

Spencer's historical generalisations shall therefore be taken as true. We must ask then what inferences he draws from the history of property as to the relations which will exist between men in the ultimate stage of human progress and therefore in that ideal society which it is the business of Absolute Ethics to describe. The answer shall be given in his own words.

"At first sight it seems fairly inferable that the absolute ownership of land by private persons, must be the ultimate state which industrialism brings about. But though industrialism has thus far tended to individualise possession of land, while individualising all other possession, it may be doubted whether the final stage is at present reached. Ownership established by force does not stand on the same footing as ownership established by contract; and though multiplied sales and purchases, treating the two ownerships in the same way, have tacitly assimilated them, the assimilation may eventually be denied. The analogy furnished by assumed rights of possession over human beings, helps us to recognise this possibility. . . . Similarly at a stage more advanced it may be that private ownership of land will disappear. As that primitive freedom of the individual which existed before war established coercive institutions and personal slavery comes to be re-established as militancy declines; so it seems possible that the primitive ownership of land by the community, which, with the development of coercive institutions lapsed in large measure or wholly into private ownership, will be revived as industrialism further develops. The *régime* of contract, at present so far extended that the right of property in movables is recognised only as having arisen by exchange of services or products under agreements, or by gift from those who had acquired it under such agreements, may be further extended so far that the products of the soil will be recognised as property only by virtue of agreements between individuals as tenants and the community as landowner."¹

The extreme caution of this prophecy will not escape notice; "it may be doubted," "may eventually be denied," "this possibility," "it may be," "it seems possible," these phrases expressive of hesitation and doubt seem to me most appropriate. Certainly "it may be doubted whether the final stage" of property-law "is at present reached," and for my own part I do not wish to deny that some day the state (possibly mankind at large) may make itself the supreme landlord and let out the land on leases. But the final stage is the ideal stage, and the success of Absolute Ethics depends upon our knowing something, and something precise about the final stage. It is really a matter of some importance to know whether property in land is demanded, or sanctioned, or tolerated, or condemned by the law of equal liberty, and if from Absolute Ethics we get no more than leave to doubt whether such property is rightful, it is to be feared that after all we must fall back on the "moral infidelity" of utilitarianism. Mr. Spencer compares the

¹ *Political Institutions*, § 540.

ownership of land to the ownership of slaves, and the comparison is apt for our purpose. As to the latter the law of equal liberty speaks unequivocally; for the right to personal freedom is perhaps the only right, save the right to life, that can be deduced therefrom. Even if we find some difficulty in persuading our law to condemn slavery founded upon contract, there is always open the way of escape to which Kant resorted, that, namely, of saying that the man who sells himself into slavery makes himself a thing, and being a thing can not be bound by his contract. But we must, if possible, prevail on the law to yield us as definite a conclusion about the ownership of lands and goods.

We must perforce admit for the sake of argument that property in land was "established by force"—the first deeds shall be written not with the pen but with the sword if Mr. Spencer so pleases. Nor will we dispute that property in movables is "established by contract," but to this phrase we must give some plausible meaning. It is true that in every civilised community the title to chattels is very often a title by contract, a title by sale. The *régime* of contract, to quote Mr. Spencer's words, is at present so far extended that the right of property in movables is recognised only as having arisen by exchange of services or products under agreements, or by gift from those who had acquired it under such agreements. This is not quite true, for the only title a proprietor has may have arisen from long-continued peaceable possession, and the easy admission that such a title is good is a characteristic mark which distinguishes late from early law. Still Mr. Spencer's proposition is in the main true, but then it is already just equally true of property in land. Purchase, gift, inheritance, undisputed possession, these are the titles to land as well as to goods. As a matter of fact, for the last three or four hundred years illegal force has had just as little to do with the transfer of land in this country as with the transfer of goods, and legal force has had quite as much to do in protecting the owner of chattels as in protecting the landowner. But of course it is not of the title to existing chattels that Mr. Spencer speaks, for trace that title but two or three stages back and it is seen to involve a title to land and therefore to be established by force. It must be of property as an institution and of the beginnings of that institution that he speaks, and it must be here that he finds reason for the antithesis of force and contract. Men have agreed that there shall be property in movables, they have not agreed that there shall be property in land. Now we must not seriously impute to Mr. Spencer the queer old notion that

men did not respect property in movables until, in due form of Natural Law, they had agreed to respect it, but he shall have the advantage of every hypothesis, however extravagant, as to the past. Suppose even that all men met together and made solemn compact that there should be property in movables. Suppose also that this display of ancestral wisdom demands our humblest reverence. All this is not to the point when we are considering the question raised in *Social Statics*, whether our present or any other distribution of proprietary rights can be sanctioned by that impracticable First Principle. How, we are driven to ask, are you to make good your right to the money in your purse, the wine in your cellar, the cotton in your warehouse? Some one owned a mine, a vineyard, a plantation, and you (to put your case at its best) have bought from him. But his property was established by force, his land was part of the common inheritance. "Would the original claimants be non-suited at the bar of reason because the thing stolen from them had changed hands? Certainly not."¹ Your right is "in an ethical point of view entirely valueless," and no historical theory can give it any value, unless, indeed, we are to suppose that property in land as well as property in movables is somehow or another "established by contract". At least this can not be done by any theory that will bear one moment's consideration. This qualification I add because in his latest work Mr. Spencer contrasts private property in "things produced by labour" with private property in "the inhabited area which can not be produced by labour".² Of course, however, after his refutation of Locke and the backwoodsman he does not intend to base property on labour. The author of *First Principles* has not yet to learn that man does not make matter, the author of *Social Statics* has not yet to learn that mixing our labour with matter does not make that matter ours.

If this reasoning be sound it is hardly worth while to suggest any further difficulties. In these pages, at least, it would be unnecessary to say that should we deduce from our law of equal liberty the rightfulness of something called *property*, little is thereby accomplished. We want to know very much more than this before we can admit the success of Mr. Spencer's method. We want, for instance, to know something about the extent of testamentary power which this law permits or prescribes, and there is still, outstanding, that old question which Locke put to Sir Robert Filmer—Who is heir by the law of

¹ *Soc. Stat.*, c. 9, § 3.² *Pol. Inst.*, § 541.

nature? One remark must suffice to show the nature of these difficulties. It does seem, as Mr. Spencer himself thought, quite out of the question, that his principle should permit a man to gain a right simply by persistent wrongdoing. But to admit that a right may thus be gained, is, as already said, a marked characteristic of civilised law, and the more civilised, the more industrial we become, the easier we make it for men to acquire property in this way. We do not even feign that the rightful owner has acquiesced in the usurpation or been negligent about the assertion of his rights. At one moment a man is a trespasser; the clock strikes, and he is the rightful owner. How can the law of equal liberty sanction or tolerate this, without sanctioning, or, at least, tolerating whatever rules imposed by prince or parliament prove for the convenience of mankind?

So much has here been said of proprietary rights, that little, if any, space remains for the consideration of those other rights which Mr. Spencer proposed to deduce from his First Principle. His treatment of property has particular claims upon our attention both because it is, as yet, the most fully worked-out example of the results that may be expected from Absolute Ethics, and because the practical part of his political teaching requires that he should place proprietary rights beyond the reach of any assaults that may be made by socialist or opportunist. But a very brief glance may be cast at his deduction of some other rights.

The first rights which he sought to obtain were "the rights of life and of personal liberty".¹ These, as I think, must be conceded to him. If A kills B it is physically impossible that B should kill A, and if A puts B under lock and key, then so long as the restraint lasts, B is not free to do the same by A. One naturally expects that Mr. Spencer will next deduce that right to be free from bodily injury, from wounds and blows, which is nearly related to the rights just mentioned. It may be by an accident that he has omitted to do so, or he may not have thought it worth doing, but none the less the task has its difficulties. If A smites B, the latter not unfrequently finds himself perfectly free to repay the blow with interest. This is not always the case, and very antique law does draw a marked distinction between an injury that does and an injury that does not deprive the injured person of the power of fighting; but it would be a curious justification of semi-barbarism were maiming, condemned by our First Principle, the only

¹ *Soc. Stat.*, c. 8.

principle at present capable of scientific development, while mere "dry blows" were subjected only to the empirical restrictions of negative benevolence. A way of escape might seem to be open to us in the doctrine that "every pain decreases vitality,"¹ that every pain involves some loss of power and therefore some loss of liberty. But Mr. Spencer distinctly refuses to avail himself of this refuge, and could hardly do so without falling into the unscientific utilitarianism. "A man may behave unamiably, may use harsh language, or annoy by disgusting habits; and whoso thus offends the normal feelings of his fellows, manifestly diminishes happiness."² Nevertheless we are told that his conduct is not condemned by the law of equal liberty; he merely fails in negative beneficence. What is true of the pain occasioned by harsh language is seemingly true also of the pain occasioned by a cuff or a kick; each, if Mr. Spencer's biology and psychology be correct, will decrease vitality, but the latter need no more than the former prevent him who is hurt from having equal liberty with him who hurts.

Thus among the acts causing bodily pain for which men now are punished or compelled to make reparation we must distinguish those which do from those which do not infringe the law of equal liberty; for it is only the former that the state may use its power to suppress, and any attempt to suppress the latter by coercive action would itself be a breach of the law. The result will be not a little strange, but there seems no choice except to hold either that he who beats his neighbour is not to be punished or that he who speaks harshly to his neighbour may rightfully be punished if pain will be saved thereby.

A similar difficulty occurs when we pass to "the right of property in character."³ Mr. Spencer argues that a good reputation may be regarded as property, but in the end admits that possibly his reasoning may be thought inconclusive.

"The position that character is property may be considered open to dispute; and it must be confessed that the propriety of so classifying it is not provable with logical precision. Should any urge that this admission is fatal to the argument, they have the alternative of regarding slander as a breach, not of that primary law which forbids us to trench upon each other's spheres of activity, but of that secondary one which forbids us to inflict pain on each other."

This, he says, illustrates a remark previously made, namely, that the division of morality into separate sections,

¹ *Data*, § 36.

² *Soc. Stat.*, c. 4, § 4.

³ *Ib.*, c. 12.

though needful for our due comprehension of it, is yet artificial.¹ Now it may at once be allowed that were this a question of mere classification, a question whether the rule which forbids slander looks best under the heading of Justice or the heading of Beneficence, it would hardly be worth discussing, being a matter of taste; but the question whether slander be forbidden by the First Principle is surely one of substantial importance, for on our answer to it depends whether or not the community may rightly strive to prevent slander by punishing the slanderer and giving the slandered a claim for reparation. To use coercion when it is not needed for the maintenance of equal liberty is to infringe the sovereign rule.

It may seem easy at first sight to get from this rule that "right of property in ideas,"² for which Mr. Spencer vigorously pleads, but really in this case there is just the same difficulty to be met as that which faced us when discussing property in material things. The poet, the artist, the inventor, the discoverer, has but like the confuted backwoodsman made unto himself a clearing, improved some part of the common inheritance and mixed his labour therewith. The cosmopolite must explain to him also, that appropriation is only lawful when "enough and as good is left in common for others". A man who wrote a book and could conscientiously say of it that nothing therein contained was due to any one but himself, would assuredly need no law of copyright to protect him in the enjoyment of his perfect originality. Mr. Spencer does not say this, but he does grant that this proprietary right cannot be admitted without limitation, for it is highly probable that the causes leading to the evolution of a new idea in one mind will eventually produce a like result in some other mind. "Such being the fact, there arises a qualification to the right of property in ideas which it seems difficult and even impossible to specify definitely."³ "Such a difficulty does not," we are told, "in the least militate against the right itself," and yet another important department of law seems here handed over to the empiricist.

Of the rights of women, the rights of children and, above all, that crowning right, the right to ignore the state, it would hardly be fair to speak at present, since here we have both warning in the preface to *Social Statics* and some indications in other books that we are not yet in full possession of Mr. Spencer's mature opinions. He perhaps would now say that

¹ *Soc. Stat.*, § 3.² *Ib.*, c. 11.³ *Ib.*, c. 11, § 5.

the right to ignore the state will never exist as a right, but that the time will come when no society or community will wish to retain a member who wishes to be quit of it. Apparently he does not think that we have yet reached the stage when the law of equal liberty should without reserve be applied to women, and the liberties of children are certainly not what they were in 1850. "While an average increase of juvenile freedom is to be anticipated, there is reason to think that here and there it has already gone too far. I refer to the United States."¹ In mitigating his claim for a free nursery Mr. Spencer has, as it seems to me, made a large concession to common opinion, but at the same time thrown fresh doubt upon his First Principle. "For, if it be asserted that the law of equal freedom applies only to adults; that is, if it be asserted that men have rights, but that children have none, we are immediately met by this question—When does the child become a man? at what period does the human being pass out of the condition of having no rights, into the condition of having rights? None will have the folly to quote the arbitrary dictum of the statute-book as an answer."² The temptation to quote the arbitrary dictum is not overpowering, but some sort of answer is now required of Mr. Spencer himself, and it seems likely that the word *man* in our supreme rule must be subjected to an interpreting clause which will be no better than a piece of most empirical utilitarianism.

It is still however possible to hope that Mr. Spencer will make over, or has already made over, the law of equal liberty to its true owners, the metapoliticians, the people who would solve ethical and political problems by juristic methods. They know what to do with it, and by implying a contract here and inventing an estoppel there can turn out a result sometimes ingenious and not always anarchical. But Mr. Spencer is much too great a philosopher to stoop to these little tricks of the trade, and will find, or perhaps has already found, that his practical teaching in politics has nothing to gain from alliance with this unmanageable formula.

F. W. MAITLAND.

¹ *Principles of Sociology*, § 341.

² *Soc. Stat.*, c. 17, § 1.

IV.—THE QUESTION OF IDEALISM IN KANT: THE TWO EDITIONS.

THIS is a question in the investigation of which I have expended a considerable amount of pains; but what I mean to do here is to break ground upon it by an examination of Ueberweg's Latin little work in regard to it.¹ Ueberweg has here brought the subject before us in a very clear manner; and, in regard to Kant, he is an inquirer so laborious, faithful, sound-minded, and yet pious, that, while it is for our advantage to become acquainted with the materials as he disposes them, he himself well merits what little precedence this mode of procedure may seem to accord him.

As is but right, Ueberweg opens with the relative declarations of Kant himself. Kant testifies, he says, that identically the same doctrine is exhibited in both editions, the first and second namely, of the *Kritik of Pure Reason*; that, in the latter of them, he has here and there altered words, indeed, but for no other reason than that there might be for the reader an easier and clearer understanding of the matters discussed. Nor is it inconsistent with this that there should be certain omissions, as well as certain additions; and in the case of the declaration of a man so distinguished at once for intellect and love of truth, there can be no room for doubt.

Now, on the whole, I agree with Ueberweg here; but I, partially, also disagree. I believe Kant's special theory to have remained, at least in his own mind, always the same; but I believe, as well, that, scandalised by certain misrepresentations of his doctrine as mere Berkleianism, he had, with the idea of discrediting and extinguishing the charge, omitted here, and accentuated there, not without the addition of direct expressions that, while all-too strongly

¹ *De priore et posteriore forma Kantianae Critices rationis purae*, Berol., 1862. Ueberweg describes here Kant's inquiry as being, "Quibus ex fontibus emanet, quibusque finibus circumscripta sit, rationis ad res cognoscendas facultas": that is, the *Kritik of Pure Reason* is a Theory of Perception, what the Germans themselves call an *Erkenntnisstheorie*.—The reader is understood to know that, in portions,—the first third of the work,—Kant's second edition of the *K. of P. R.* differs considerably from the first, especially in what seems to concern the question of subjective idealism.

opposed to idealism, and opposed, consequently, and with surprise, to others previously of his own,—were not altogether free from something of disingenuousness and *double-entendre*. This, my general position, being understood, we may proceed with the considerations of Ueberweg, in regard to Jacobi, Michelet, Schopenhauer, Fischer, and others, each in its order.

So far as change of doctrine is concerned, there is scarcely to be seen any support in Jacobi. He simply prefers the first edition to the second, and surely with reason as regards the special portions of the "deduction" to which he refers. These portions are certainly very much more direct and clear in the one form than in the other. In fact, he that feels himself hopelessly puzzled in regard to synthesis in the second edition, can only procure himself light by having recourse to the first. Further, Jacobi represents Kant, not as cowed and renegade with respect to idealism, but, rather on the contrary, as replacing what was only "an inconsequent semi-idealism by a complete and thoroughly consistent universal idealism that embraced both worlds". On the whole then, Jacobi's blame to Kant is only this: "I hold the loss for the reader, which Kant admits, to be extremely important".

From Michelet, again, as quoted by Rosenkranz, we have as follows:—

"The prominence given to the subjectivity of thought is to be acknowledged as an immortal merit of the Kantian philosophy. There was nothing wanting but that Kant had consciously gone on to throw down the wall that lay between thought and thing—a wall which, in his system, seems again and again to totter,—especially in the first edition of the *Kritik of Pure Reason*, which contained much that, in the highest degree speculative, will be looked for in vain in the second and subsequent editions. For these, and in part also the *Prolegomena*, allow the *idealistic* tendency somewhat to recede, because Kant saw that this side of his philosophy was the most directly exposed to attack and misunderstanding."

Now, there seems really nothing so far, that we should take exception to. It may or may not be a merit that Kant accentuated the subjectivity of thought, and it may or may not be true that he just failed to throw down the wall between thought and thing; but it seems, at least to me, certain that both the *Prolegomena* and the second edition of the *K. of P. R.* did, in comparison with the first edition, allow the idealistic stand-point somewhat to recede, and for no other reason than the attacks (of course, in the Berkeley reference) to which the general doctrine had been exposed. Doubtless, too, in that reference, subjective idealism being such to Michelet, much highly speculative matter, contained

in the one edition, had disappeared from the other. So far, surely, Michelet is perfectly correct—correct to the very letter. Ueberweg, however, makes other quotations in this connexion, and it is on these that the weight of his displeasure falls. They concern certain passages in Kant, which are as follows, and I take leave to quote fully what in Ueberweg we find somewhat abridged:—

“Were matter a thing in itself, it would, as of a composite nature, completely distinguish itself from the soul as simple. But it is a mere phenomenal presentation to external sense, the noumenal substrate of which is to be known by no adducible predicate whatever. I may certainly assume of this latter that,—although, indeed, in the mode in which it affects our sense, it produces in us the perception of what is extended and, consequently, composite,—it is still in itself simple, and to the substance in itself, therefore, to which in respect of our external sense extension attaches, there belong thoughts which may be consciously conceived through its own inner sense. In this way, precisely the same thing, which, in one reference, is termed corporeal, would, in another, be at the same time a thinking being.—If we compare, however, the thinking ego, not with matter, but with that *intelligible* (to call it so) which lies under the external sense-presentation which we term matter, then, inasmuch as we know nothing at all about it, we cannot say of said *intelligible* that the soul distinguishes itself from it any way inwardly at all” (Kant, *WW*. ii. 288 *sq.*). “Ego, presented through internal sense in time, and objects in space outside of me, are, specifically, without doubt, wholly different sense-presentations (phenomena), but they are not thereby thought as different *things* (noumena). The transcendental object (thing, thing-in-itself, noumenon), which lies under external sense-presentations, as also that that lies under internal perception—this object is neither matter, nor a thinking being in itself, but (to us) an unknown ground of the presentations which furnish us with the empirical notion in the one case, as well as in the other” (ii. 303).

Michelet sees here (especially in the fourth sentence above—“In this way,” &c.), examples of those “fine passages where *speculative truth* lifts the veil of *subjective idealism*, if only immediately to let it fall again”. And, surely, as it appears to me, most people will agree with him, at least so far as an avowal of subjective idealism is concerned. Kant, as quoted, undoubtedly affirms: first, that there are causal noumena underlying all our sense-presentations whether external or internal; second, that these noumena, however unlike in their resulting presentations, may not be different things (things-in-themselves, namely); third, that the noumenon subjacent to presentations extended and composite may be simple, and even possessed of thoughts, of consciousness, of conception, and of an internal sense; fourth, that we cannot say of the soul that it is in any way internally different from this noumenon; fifth, that the thinking ego is in this reference identified with the soul; and sixth, that the ego and objects

without, may be, noumenally, or transcendently, that is as things, things-in-themselves, not different. Now, if it be certain that that is precisely what Kant says, it is equally certain that Michelet says exactly the same thing and nothing else,—as thus. “Kant, now, holds it as not impossible that this one object, the thing-in-itself, which lies behind all the manifold of the presentation to sense, may be one and the same thinking substance with the ego.” Of course, it is to be at once allowed that, as what is spoken of is something utterly unknown, it may be hypothetically complemented with every possibility whatever, and that all Kant’s relative speech is but an idle dalliance of the moment, to any possible consequences of which he is not seriously to be held. That, of course, is, to a certain extent, true, we say; but it is surely legitimate to point out that Kant’s mind must very often, and in truth very seriously, have occupied itself with such speculations, let them be as hypothetical as they may. So far as his own expressions go, they are good evidence for this, that he did think to himself, what can be the ground of these ideas in me which I call presentations to sense? They must have a source,—now what can it be? Is it one or many? Is it the same for what I call external, as for what I call internal sense? Is it of the nature of mind, or is it of the nature of matter? Where is it? It cannot be what we call *out*; for nothing is out but what is in space, and there is nothing in space but what is a presentation to sense, which it, very certainly, by no manner of means is. Is it, then, *in* me, and so *me*? Surely, it is very legitimate, from all that has been quoted, to figure for Kant such thoughts as these. Why, what else does that altogether unquestioned and unquestionable word of Kant amount to, “There are two stems of human cognition, sprung, it may be, from a common but unknown root,—namely, sense and understanding, by the former of which objects are given to us, and by the latter thought”? Does not that single word, taken in its connexions of course, grant the whole case, and can we wonder that henceforth, by the successors of Kant, “the wall between thought and thing,” really *was* assumed to be broken down, and an absolute idealism established?

I cannot say, then, that I am quite pleased to hear Ueberweg remark, with such words in regard as we have seen whether on the one side or the other, that Kant does not characterise the thing-in-itself as “the same with the essence ego”; that he grants, indeed, “the transcendental substrate of matter to be possibly a thinking substance, but

that he does not at all think, or wish it to be supposed legitimate to think, this substrate the *same* with *our* mind ;" that Michelet has substituted "unity" (identity) for "likeness and agreement," &c., &c. It is impossible not to see that Ueberweg has chosen to trust himself here to a simple difference of words, and of words, perhaps, that have an identity of meaning, Kant does not say exactly "same"; but he does say "not different," and where there is no difference, it is not unusual to find sameness. It is, on the whole, rather too adventurous of Ueberweg to ride off so confidently, as it were, on the bare letter. Nay, after all, it is not on Kant's letter he takes his ride, but on a substitution of his own. If Michelet construes "not different" into *sameness*, Ueberweg, for his part, converts it into *likeness and agreement*. I wonder which has the better right on his side. Surely it is not Ueberweg. To replace nullity of difference by mere similarity and agreement (Ueberweg's Latin words are "*similitudo*" and "*convenientia*"), is a proceeding, on the whole, a little more oblique and strained, than to have recourse to the surrogate of sameness. Numerical identity with Kant does seem to be at a greater distance from Ueberweg than from Michelet. Of course there is to be granted to Ueberweg that, besides the mere play at *suppose this* and *suppose that*, Kant does, in the last quotation, verbally contradict himself: "The transcendental object, whether for without or for within, is—neither matter, nor a thinking being in itself!" It is but fair to point out that, settle it who may. We may mention here too—as something that might have been worth Ueberweg's looking at—certain further Berkleian inferences. When Kant, namely, says that the thing-in-itself, underlying both externality and internality, may be one and the same thinking substance, it is impossible not to think of the rôle which Berkeley assigns to God. What more likely supposition than that, since there must be a source for our ideas, and since that source is possibly a single thinking being, this source and this being can be nothing but God? Here, surely, there is in Kant an assonance to subjective idealism, if ever such assonance was—an assonance that might have staggered even Ueberweg! Indeed, one cannot quite be sure that what Ueberweg himself reads into Michelet's quotations from Kant is not itself idealism. He admits that "nothing hinders either the supposition of both substrates (external and internal) being very like each other (*inter se simillima*), or even the conjecture that the very thing which seems to us a body may, being

endowed with a certain internal sense, seem to itself a soul". It is quite possible that Ueberweg had some consideration here which, to his belief, still saved Kant from Berkleianism. As much as that we may suppose indicated in the words which describe Kant's doctrine, all passages concerned being considered, thus:—"As it is a recession at once from a realism and an idealism merely subjective, so also, it is an approach to true idealism and that philosophy which correctly speculates things, and whose principle is that most celebrated sentence, *cogitare et esse unum esse idemque*" (the τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστίν τε καὶ εἶναι which Berkeley, *Siris*, 309, phrases and translates, "To understand and to be, are, according to Parmenides, the same thing"). At the same time, it is not to be forgotten that Ueberweg's main object is, so far as the two editions are concerned, to vindicate for Kant consistency of doctrine in both—an adventure that certainly runs risk of foundering at any moment on the fact that the passages most loudly idealistic in sound have been omitted from the second edition, and in such wise, too, that it will be hard to get us to acknowledge with Ueberweg that what has been omitted was a mere gratuitous hypothesis, capable of misleading if left. It is quite certain that Kant's mind was much exercised on the subject, that he did speculate, ratiocinate, and revolve in that direction, that he did conjecture that the outer thing might be a thinking thing, and this thinking thing not different from our ego. It is really impossible to absolve Ueberweg from a mere play with literal expression here, so far as Michelet's report is concerned. As said, he has a little too confidently ridden the bare letter, and that letter, after all, pretty much Ueberweg's own, for Ueberweg's interpretation is much more the attribution of an alien opinion ("sententiam alienam") to Kant, than Michelet's was. If Kant says "not different," surely Michelet has a better right to say *same* than Ueberweg *similitudo* or *convenientia*.

Herr Dr. Schopenhauer, as we may be aware, is emphatically the German Berkleian. *No object without a subject* is, in a way, his entire philosophy; and he is fully assured that all the things of this world—even the twenty feet of gilt frame, scrolls and all, that surrounded his chimney looking-glass, as was once wickedly put to him—are packed within his own ego, and never outside of it at all. Accordingly, he had been gratified to find, in many passages of the *K. of P. R.*, a distinct enunciation of the proposition of Berkeley; but he had also been shocked and scandalised

by what equally appeared elsewhere as an "evasion" of it. From the consequent unhappy state of mind, he was thankful to have been rescued by a perusal of the work in its now rare first edition. "To his great joy, all the contradictions disappeared"; and he saw "that Kant, though he does not exactly flaunt the formula, *no object without a subject*, yet, with just as much decision as Berkeley and I, declares the external world, presented there in space and time, to be mere idea of the subject perceiving it". Henceforth, accordingly, the gratitude of the worthy Herr Doctor is literally boundless. Kant is the man "whose depth of intellect he admires and venerates"; Kant is the man "to whom he owes so much, and so much that is great, that his spirit might say to him, in the words of Homer,

'Αχλὺν δ' αὖ τοι ἅπ' ὀφθαλμῶν ἔλον, ἢ πρὶν ἐπῆεν".

And yet, when one considers of it, it occurs that, in this reference, Schopenhauer must be a peculiarly gentle being, and very amiably thankful for small favours—this because we presently find that there is no philosophical system in existence which gives Schopenhauer more occupation for the pulling of it to pieces. Kant is wrong on causality, Kant is wrong on reciprocity—Kant is wrong on the whole twelve categories indeed, and if the reader wants to see what alone is right, he is duly referred, by number and page, to respective sections of Schopenhauer's own. In fact, Schopenhauer's objections to Kant are quite unmanageable in numbers, and it is difficult to see what it is he has ever learnt from him that he did not know perfectly well before, if not from Berkeley, then from his own self. The great thing he makes such a veritable cackling over in the end is, as he himself directly avows, the "*Maya*"; that is, what is so familiar to us as the "ideal theory"; what has just been described, indeed, as that ultimum of learning, wisdom and philosophy which declares the object—that is, the whole vast universe—to be *idea* of the subject! (It really *is* so; but it is the idea of *the* subject, God.—Curious to think, that, in a way, however diverse the thoughts are, Berkeley says the same thing too!)

But Schopenhauer requires to be taken, in this matter, a little more particularly still. His words are reported at full length by Rosenkranz; and we are now in a very fair condition, not incorrectly, and, I hope, not unrighteously, to judge of them. Nevertheless, to repeat them here *in extenso*

would take up more space than they are well worth, and I shall content myself with allusion.

Of the difference between Kant's two editions, we may now be disposed to conjecture that it lay simply, not only in omission, on the one hand, of what might seem as in support of an internal thing-in-itself, too much to befriend Berkeley, but not less in accentuation, on the other hand, of what, as in support of such thing-in-itself only externally, might seem all undeniably to oppugn Berkeley. That Kant's second edition should, in consequence of only as much as that, be characterised as "self-contradictory," "mangled," "disfigured," "ruined," and he himself accused of falsehood, fraud, and wilful imposition (*Unterschleif*, &c.), and only from a cowardly terror of his fellow-men, in the failing heart of a frail old man—all that we feel to be only characteristic of the eminently weak, self-contradictory, hectically rash and mis-seeing *littérateur*, Schopenhauer himself. The whole account, indeed, is throughout extravagant to absurdity; and there is not one word of truth in it unless we interpret it to say, in the respective reference, that Kant, with a certain disingenuousness of expression, was moved by the charge of Berkleianism—grossly unjust and dangerously injurious as it was—at once to omit here and accentuate there.

Ueberweg adds a few quotations from Schopenhauer which are not found in Rosenkranz: as, that Kant's contradictions of doctrine in his second edition are wanting in his first; that in the former, namely, he had wrongly regarded the thing-in-itself as a certain object or noumenon, and credited it with the law of causality; that, instead of exhibiting the object as directly dependent on the subject, he had, with infinite toil and trouble, only made the mode and manner of objectivity dependent on the peculiar faculty of the subject, with no result but this, that things are not in themselves as we perceive them, yet still that there does remain, as thing-in-itself, an object, a noumenon, which is wrong, for there is no object that is unconditioned, nor can any such be a thing-in-itself, inasmuch as it is the subject that wholly presupposes it; that it is a gross inconsequence only to obtain this noumenon by an extension of the law of causality which Kant himself had declared to be impossible; that Kant's true doctrine lay in these words of the first edition: "If I abstract from the thinking subject, the whole world must disappear, as being nothing but presentation in the sensibility of our subject, and a kind of ideas of it;" and that he had even left in his second edition passages to this

effect—naming four pages in chapters vi. and vii. of the *Antinomies*.

There is a just enough thought here and there in the above, taking what is said on its own level; but Ueberweg is still right in pointing out that, as regards *doctrine*, expressions as strong as those referred to by Schopenhauer are to be found repeated in both editions. From both editions, for example, we can quote (ii., 162): "For we have always to do only with our own affections; how things may be in themselves (without respect of the impressions by which they affect us) is completely beyond the sphere of our cognition"; and also (ii., 388): "All that is perceived in space and time, consequently all objects of an experience possible for us, are nothing but presentations to sense, that is, mere perceptions which, as they are perceived, namely as extended objects or series of changes, have no existence outside of our thoughts and founded in itself". Such presentations to sense are truly for Kant the "only things empirically objective"; at the same time that the assumption of a thing-in-itself, or noumenon, or transcendental object, may justify us in crediting Kant, at least so far, with—in Ueberweg's words—"an axiom of realism".

Schopenhauer, from some expressions, as that the object should be wholly dependent on the subject, seems, though obscurely, perhaps, and hardly with his own consciousness, to have some idea of the necessity of an experience as such, not one among others as with Kant, whom he would appear to blame for making experience, so to speak, only relative to a very relative subjective faculty.

Only in one point Ueberweg allows Schopenhauer reason,—in that, namely, which concerns the attribution of causality to the transcendental object (otherwise, of course, noumenon or thing-in-itself). This is a point which, even in Kant's life-time, had been very cogently raised both by Jacobi and Aenesidemus Schulze; and here Ueberweg is wholly as they. Causality, namely, in Kant's theory, is reserved for phenomena (the sense-presentations) alone; nevertheless, and for all that, he does attribute it to the noumena as well: as Ueberweg says, it is "by virtue of those transcendental objects that the empirical ideas (perceptions, to wit) are effected in the human mind". This is probably seen at its glaringest, so to speak, in the quite unambiguously idealistic passage which so, far as I know, it had been left for the *Text-Book to Kant* (pp. 448 *sq.*) to point out as inadvertently left standing in the second edition

unaltered.¹ For it is said there that, while the transcendental object cannot possibly "be thought as quantity, or quality, or substance," &c.,—that is, as any category,—it is yet to be regarded "as cause of the *Erscheinungen* (the sense-presentations)". What, namely, cannot possibly be *any* category, is still, for all that, eminently and pre-eminently *the* category,—just the category of categories! We have already seen the relative remark of Schopenhauer. That of Jacobi has all the subtlety of insight and literary perfection of statement which we are accustomed to at his hands. Kant, he says, uses the noumena as causes of impressions in us, and yet holds these latter (the impressions), not to be anything external, but only ideas within, while of those former, again (the noumena), we know nothing whatever: "they are only hypothetically assumed by Kant as intelligible causes of the presentations to sense; merely that we may have what, to sense as a receptivity, shall be respondent or correspondent". "Truly," adds Jacobi, and this is what I mean above as admirable, "it is not very well possible to see how, without this supposition, the Kantian philosophy could find door into itself; I, for my part, *without* it, should be unable to *get* into, while *with* it, I am equally unable to *remain* in." With his consequent conclusion on the whole matter, Ueberweg completely agrees, and even clinches it thus: "This contradiction is undoubtedly extant in Kant; it breaks up the foundations of his philosophy; it annihilates his whole system; but it is to be distinctly recognised in either edition of his book."

Now, I wonder if, after all, there cannot be said a single little word for Kant here. There cannot be a doubt that he himself was quite well aware of the so-called contradiction; it abundantly occurs in both of his editions; and it was, directly, expressly, unescapeably, put before him. What he has done, then, in that respect, he has done consciously and with his eyes open. Could he have had

¹ Since this paper left my hands, I have read certain writings of Dr. Benno Erdmann. I find him to be far and away the most accomplished expert in Kantian *loci* whom I have met, and, though I do not always agree in his conclusions, I think Dr. Arnoldt has been too hard upon him. Dr. B. Erdmann is perfectly familiar with the passage referred to above; but I have not seen that he has perceived its peculiar importance to lie in the fact that—even isolatedly—it has been inadvertently left standing unaltered. It was that I pointed out to Ueberweg when he sent me his little "dissertatio;" he did not conceal the shock it offered to his all-too-unexceptionable justification of Kant; and he who reads his *Logic* (*Modern History of Philosophy*) in the latest edition, will acknowledge that, substantially, he comes very much to my own position.

any reason in his own mind that quite reconciled him to the propriety of the expedient? It was plain that some expedient was an absolute necessity. How, as Jacobi says, was the system otherwise to get entrance into itself? The world consisted only in these subjective characters impressed on our own minds; it was impossible not to ask, What impressed them? Berkeley, in the same circumstances came, as we know, to the answer, God—God impressed them. But, if we consider with what Kant started,—the reason of the apodictic necessity, namely, which we undoubtedly ascribe to causation,—and how he was led from point to point, in his progress, until his whole system, at least as internally constructed, stood complete before him, I think we shall see that, within or without, it would be more to an objective influence, so to speak, than to a transcendently personal one, that he would be led. Arrived there, it would only be natural for him to say to himself: The source, the influence, to which I am to attribute all these innumerable characters within me, can only be an unknown noumenal one, whether one or many, I know not; whether, in an absolute sense, within or without, I know not; whether material or immaterial, or of what nature soever, I know not.

Now, after all, is not this quite natural, eminently human, nay, not intolerably irrational? It may be to phenomenal causality that we owe the trick; and it may be absurd noumenally to extend it;—but we cannot help ourselves: for a fact, for a presentant fact of any kind, we must ask the origin. What, then, is so natural to us—shall we deny that to Kant? Shall we coldly say, No; you have yourself peculiarly placed and empowered causality, and you must take the consequences; it is your own act? I do not know that this is quite just; I am disposed, rather, to allow Kant the benefit of the device. Was it, after all, an unallowable thing to refer the phenomena to *some* source, and was it very much to trench on the allowable to say, I only speak of an unknown *x*,—I leave it in the absolute,—I do not pretend to describe it,—I do not even pretend to describe, and still less prescribe, its influence or powers. It, with its powers and its influences, I leave in the transcendental and transcendent *other*. I only ask to be allowed no more than the bare hypothesis of a simple *x*—as respondent or correspondent to an element which we all assume to be sensitive and receptive.

I, for my part, in conclusion here, will avow that, if said

x were all I had against the system of Kant, then there were no devouter Kantian in the universe than I.

The last commentator on the difference of the two editions, of whom we have to speak here, is Kuno Fischer. He, too, is disposed to agree with those who find subjective idealism in the first edition, and a recantation of it in the second. Ueberweg supplies us with sufficient quotations (from the third volume of the *Geschichte der neueren Philosophie*). Fischer maintains, it seems, "that a very serious contradiction has crept into the doctrine of Kant through his retrocession, in his second edition, from the true views in regard to time and space expressed in his first". "There is no question," he says again, "but that Kant intentionally held back the strict idealism of his doctrine, in order to make it popular and exoteric; people wanted the small concession from him, that the presentations to sense are something besides ideas; Kant made it, and so won for himself that numerous school which he would hardly have got otherwise." Of course, truth in these words goes no farther than what has been so often said about expressions, on Kant's part, omitted here, and others accentuated there. All that about popularity, numerous school, &c., is but the ornamental filling-in of a critical subtlety that need not look far. Ueberweg, very properly, restricts his speech here to this: "That Fischer has played the poet and the orator; but in the composition of a history of philosophy, neither poet nor orator has any part to play". There is the further censure of Fischer, indeed, for saying that Kant in his second edition had falsely spoken "as though the thing-in-itself were contained in the sense-presentation as its concealed x ". "Contained in" is, perhaps, fully strong; but it may mean only *underlying*; and in that case it is quite right.

The opinion of Ueberweg himself, as more than once already before us,—namely, that Kant altered expressions only, and that neither that change nor those of omission or addition were made for any other purpose than to assist the reader,—certainly errs by excess. I quite agree that, throughout the two editions, the general doctrine remains the same: "the phenomena," to use again Ueberweg's own words, "which are themselves nothing but ideas depend on certain things-in-themselves, or transcendental objects, which are neither in time nor space". But, then, are we not to consider all that Kant himself allows to be possibly said of these noumena? And, still more, are we to be blind to Kant's manifest panic at the charge of Berkleianism? In his anxiety, does he not rather blink this charge? In fact,

does he not, a little disingenuously, a little Jesuitically, attribute his whole relative action, not to anything that has to do with Berkleianism, but solely to a desire of increased commodity for the reader? Not but that as much simple, somewhat ostrich-like, cunning as that may be cheerfully allowed to the good old man without the slightest imputation on his "*incorrupta veritas*".

We may permit ourselves, in conclusion here, just to glance for a moment at the strange unawareness of the state of the case manifested by more than one of these claimants to a mastery of the doctrine of Kant. I do not mean mere oversights, of which I, for one, have to apologise for a goodly number; but fundamental mistakes in regard to much that, essential with Kant, seems yet to lie on his very surface. Here, in the half-dozen pages of this little essay of Ueberweg's, how many examples do we not find to countenance the statement!

Jürgen Bona Meyer, for instance, is a remarkable name and an excellent Kantian,—an excellent Kantian even to Ueberweg who, however, is rather surprised that "he should, without just cause, have persuaded himself that Kant did not deny the things-in-themselves to be in space, but left it in doubt whether they were in space or not". One is disposed, in consideration of simply our absolute ignorance of these things-in-themselves, to find, in the first instance, any such idea as this of Meyer's eminently venial; but still it is quite certain that it is undoubtedly wrong to speak of a thing-in-itself being in space, as though it (space), too, were a thing-in-itself. The thing-in-itself never reaches us in itself, but only in its impressions, and, consequently, it is not it, but only its impressions, that can possibly be received into the mere subjective form of our own sensibility within us, which space is.

Fischer displays elsewhere an error of an altogether different and more palpable nature. He talks, to take Ueberweg's report, as if Kant had two doctrines in regard to time and space. It is only with surprise that such an inapplicable word as that will fall on the ears of every Kantian. There is nothing in all Kant easier than what he means by time and space; and there is nothing in all Kant that remains, from first to last, more completely identical. Nay, there is nothing in such a doctrine, if once held, that very well could be altered. It is just possible, however, that Fischer's difficulty with time and space concerned, like Meyer's, not themselves, but the noumenon in respect of them; and that we have already discussed.

I have more difficulties with Hartenstein, and perhaps graver ones. He, certainly, of all Kant's editors, is the most faithful, careful, correct, excellent; and his edition of the *K. of P. R.* is, to me, undoubtedly the best. I should say editions here indeed, and not edition. Hartenstein edited in 1838 that issue of the works of Kant, which has always been understood, if less common, to run at least even with that of Rosenkranz and Schubert. To him also we owe an elegant and commodious separate edition of the *K. of P. R.* in 1853. Again in 1867 we had an issue of Kant's collected works at his hands; and we have even a fourth obligation to him in the special edition of the *K. of P. R.* in 1868. It is really hard, then, to have anything to object, in a Kantian reference, to so very accomplished and familiarly instructed a Kantian expert. Nevertheless, there may be some little gain in what I have to say here, and I shall not withhold it.

Hartenstein, in his preface to the issue of 1853, whilst stating that between the edition in 1781 and that in 1787 of the *K. of P. R.*, there are "not only in single places many smaller changes, but also two sections completely re-written," declares also that it appears to him "a sort of duty" to prefer that "form of exposition" which appeared to the author himself "the most appropriate expression of his thoughts". Besides, he adds,—and these are his reasons for adopting the text of the second or 1787 edition in his own,—it is the most currently used edition, and it offers certain typographical, or other, advantages. Then, as regards the changes, we find from him in the end that those of any importance consist in a new preface, a new introduction, a new "deduction," and a new or re-written section on the "paralogisms". The preface and introduction he characterises as improvements; but the "deduction," in his opinion, is not so, and any accusations as regards doctrine will require pretty well to confine themselves to the section named as referring to the paralogisms. In all this one can only concur, as also in his particular reasons for preferring, not the second deduction, but the *first*, which ran thus:—It is "indisputably" the best, not for any considerations that have idealism in regard, but because "the entire exposition, in accordance with the peculiar spirit of the *K. of P. R.*, exactly follows the clue of the several mental faculties and their functions," while certain particular disadvantages attend its successor. This appears to me very specially correct, and calculated to be of great service at this moment to the English student, whose attention has been much solicited of late by more than one critical

inquiry which, leaving the lines of Kant, have fallen into lines of their own, where any vestige of the originals is hardly to be recognised.

What I am disposed to disagree with lies in what follows the above. "When, on the other hand, in the second form of the deduction, the proposition that the understanding is itself the source of the laws of nature, gets expressly limited by the provision that the perceptive complex must still be given before, and independently of, the synthesis of the understanding, then in that there is to be found nothing less than a change of the fundamental principles, in consequence of which change Kant has, as it were, bungled his work, and left his system in extremity." Now, it is difficult to reconcile this with what I regard as an understanding of the commonest conditions of the Kantian machinery. The passage which we may suppose Hartenstein here specially to have in view, occurs in the last paragraph of § 21 of the new deduction, and it is to this effect:—

"The perceptive complex must be given before, and independently of, synthesis of the understanding, as will be particularised further on. For, should I conceive an understanding which did itself perceive (as, it may be, a divine one, not only with perception of objects, but with actual production to its own self of the very objects it then and there perceives), then the categories, in respect of any such sort of perception as that, would have absolutely no function. The categories are only rules for an understanding whose entire operation is to think, or, in other words, to bring into the unity of self-consciousness what synthesis of complex may, in sense-perception, be given it from elsewhere. Such an understanding, consequently, of itself, *perceives* absolutely nothing at all; it only connects and brings into order the materials for perceptive cognition, the sense-perception itself, that is, which sense-perception must be given it (the understanding) by the object. For the peculiarity of our understanding, however, *a priori* to bring about unity of self-consciousness, only through the categories, and only through precisely that kind and number of categories, there can just as little a reason be any further given, as why we have precisely these, and no other functions for judgments, or why time and space are the sole forms of our possible perception."

I am glad to quote this passage at full, as, in fact, it is itself alone a complete picture of the whole doctrine of Kant. There can be no cognition but that of the perception of systematically connected objects. Besides the divine cognition which, as we may suppose, not only cognises, but, even as it cognises, creates, its objects, there may be an infinite number of other cognitions such as the human one. *We* have such and such special sense, such and such general sense, such and such understanding endowed with such and such categories, &c.; but, in each of these particulars, there is the possibility of infinite variety, with the resultant

possibility, consequently, of an infinite variety of cognitions, consciousnesses, minds. Now this doctrine is the one central doctrine in Kant all through, whether in this edition, or in that, or in any edition, and it does look strange to see Hartenstein, with such familiar Kant in his hands, stumbling so signally over it. The perceptive complex—the raw material—must be given, so to speak, to the teeth of the understanding to card, else these teeth (the categories) would have nothing in the world to work on, and would remain, in consequence, wholly vacuous and idle. Nevertheless, the *a priori* forms of the understanding are the primary laws of nature. This is Kant's doctrine; and it is Kant's doctrine from first to last. Nor does it, in the slightest, compromise, obstruct, or interfere with that doctrine that, for the understanding to act, for the laws themselves to run their courses, it is absolutely necessary for an empirical element, a perceptive complex, to be first of all provided for them. It is to be feared that the expression 'laws of nature,' as so used, misleads, widely, not on the part of Hartenstein only, but on that of a great many others, to some very fatal mistakes. Laws of nature! such an expression calls up gravity, inertia, impenetrability, polarity, cohesion, motion, affinity, &c., &c.; but, taken from the mouth of Kant, it ought to call up only this: Things are extensive and intensive; they are related by substance and accident, by cause and effect, by action and reaction; and, lastly, they are, as to us, either possible, actual or necessary. Positively, that is the whole. That is the entire Table of the Laws of Nature, so far as Kant is concerned. That there are supplementary corollaries from these—that, of course, is very possible; but it is very possible, also, that even Kant may err in drawing them.

As though in support or explanation of what he had said, Hartenstein adds two clauses which, as they stand, seem meant to be opposed to each other, and so, as it were, make good a double contradiction on the part of Kant. What he had said, as we see, amounts to this, that the presupposition of sense for action of the categories compromising the attribution of the laws of nature to the understanding, the whole system is to be understood as compromised thereby. That is pointed off by a semicolon, and these are the clauses which follow: "Partly Kant, in the second edition, has placed precisely the proposition, that our perception constructs itself, not according to the objects, but, on the contrary, they construct themselves according to it,—quite expressly in the foreground, the preface,

namely of the whole work; partly, again, all the many passages in which he indicates the difference between mere thought and perceptive cognition are to be found in the first edition as well as the second." Now, in point of fact, neither of these clauses contradicts the other; nor does either, or do both, contradict what precedes. That understanding must presuppose sense; that objects must adapt themselves to our perception, and not our perception to them; that understanding, alone and by itself, must be simply logical, and not perceptive: these are not only main propositions, and quite consistent the one with the other, of the whole work; but they are essential moments of the single thought that lies at the bottom of all.

The unsatisfactoriness here becomes only all the more pronounced when we find Hartenstein going on in the very next words to affirm that Kant's half-idealism is no peculiarity of the second edition, but that it is "grounded from the first in the entire plan". Surely, these particulars, presently under review, are precisely the elements determinative of that "half-idealism," in regard to which as *pervading* element, Hartenstein is perfectly right. He is perfectly right, also, we may say here, in his strictures of the second form of the deduction of the categories. That, perhaps, is the worst piece of writing in the whole of Kant's works; who has taken no pains to lay down here the steps of the process in a clear order before his own self. Rather, indeed, on the whole, these steps seem only *mentioned*, now this one and now that one, without order, and only as a matter of course already understood. This is especially true in regard to all that concerns synthesis; for a regular, consecutive, and intelligible exposition of which, we have to turn to the first edition.

But, agreeing with Hartenstein as to general "Unklarheit" in the second deduction, we do not feel quite as sure of the case when he goes on to find that want of clearness specially in § 27. Here Hartenstein says Kant "makes futile endeavours to reconcile with the necessity of the categories that complete subjectivity of them which he has asserted elsewhere". Now, with this, too, one feels it natural to be surprised. The categories are of course subjective, and nothing but subjective,—in origin and place; but that is no reason why they should not be necessary in function. What has given pause to Hartenstein is probably this, that Kant, in this place, expressly denies necessity to certain other elements, and just for the reason that they are *subjective*. Why so are the categories, Hartenstein thinks. That is

quite true ; but still the two things spoken of are quite different. The one is simply an arbitrary and blind instinct ; the other is a logical element and brings *evidence*. The understanding, with its categories, is a *cognitive* element ; and it is this, probably, which Hartenstein forgets.

I, too (*Text-Book to Kant*, p. 444), have an objection that may seem to bear on the same point, but that really regards something quite different. There are only three ways of it, says Kant. This necessity which we find in experience, as of the connexion of the effect with its cause (say), may either be derived by us from experience, or it may depend on cognitive elements anterior to, and determinative of, the very possibility of experience ; or, a middle way, it may be innate, —an implanted instinct, as it were. To the first of these alternatives Kant objects that, experience being incompetent to necessity, any derivation of the latter from the former would amount merely to a *generatio aequivoca* ; while the third would give a genesis due only to an arbitrary *pre-formation*, which would be only subjective and unpossessed of the objectivity of intellect. There remains, then, only the second alternative, that of a logical *epigenesis* from principles of intellect. Now, to this last alternative I do not object, like Hartenstein, that it too is subjective ; for I grant it, as *logical* and *cognitive*, to bring *evidence*, and evidence that is *objective* and apodictically *necessary*. But I say the *epigenesis* can apply itself only when and where it finds materials to suit. If the logical nexus of the two things antecedent and consequent is to add itself on to a nexus of two empirical facts, in order to make the one cause and the other effect, then this latter nexus must, in some way or other, be recognised beforehand, and as analogous to, as simply a case of, the former nexus. The attribution of the one nexus to the other nexus can assign, consequently, only a validity borrowed, and not a validity native. In a word, it is obvious that the necessity of the category can only *varnish*, only *gild*, so to speak, the necessity already present in the facts.

The two objections in hand, then, are radically distinct ; and Hartenstein, for his part, only forgets that, as Kant (with whom such considerations constitute, as it were, the very *theme* of the piece) says himself (*WW.* viii., 118), the one case (the *pre-formation*) concerns "a necessity *felt*," the other (the *epigenesis*) "a necessity *seen*," while both are in origin and situation undoubtedly subjective.

One is glad to find Hartenstein quite as stern in regard to the absurd and offensive extravagance of the unfortunate Schopenhauer as Ueberweg himself. "Fear of men," &c. !

Why, Kant maintained his "*Kritik aller speculativen Theologie*," and his chapter "*Ueber die Disciplin der Vernunft im polemischen Gebrauche*," throughout all his editions, with "not a word changed," for all "*die Wöllnerschen Censur-und Religionsedict*" in 1788-1794!

I fear, however, when all is considered, that we shall be unable to acquit even Germans of a certain slovenliness in the mere reading of Kant. Macaulay remarks on the slovenliness with which most people are contented to think, and we may similarly remark on the slovenliness with which most people are contented to read.

But there is not a vestige of any such slovenliness in Ueberweg. Kant does not lie before him in passages only, and all the rest dark. I acknowledge in Ueberweg a thorough intelligence, and it is no contradiction to this, that I am nearly as much softer than he to Kant's noumenal causality as I am harder again to his concealment, or quasi-concealment, of the Berkleian shock.

Whether the entire subject itself of Kant's idealism and the difference of his two editions in its regard, has been adequately discussed in the foregoing, I willingly allow the reader to doubt: I only consider it myself as a preliminary breaking-ground on the question,—as a preliminary clearance of it.

J. HUTCHISON STIRLING.

V.—PROFESSOR GREEN'S LAST WORK.¹

THIS volume is the last fruit of the labours of the late Prof. Green, and though incomplete, and wanting, even in the part which is completed, the final corrections of the author, it is in some ways a fuller representation of his mind than anything which has hitherto been put before the public. In his Introduction to Hume, and his other published essays, he had indeed expressed the main principle of his philosophy, and had illustrated it very fully by a comparison with the main forms of Empiricism or Sensationalism. Perhaps the central ideas of Critical Philosophy have never been presented with greater force of evidence than in the former work. But in this volume he has, for the first time, given a positive and constructive statement of his ideas, freed as far as possible from controversial matter. The fact also that the book is about Ethics has brought another result with it, which will give it an additional interest for many: that so much of the man himself is expressed in it. The repressed strength of his moral and political interests, the severity and simplicity of his moral temper, the unpretending practical aims with which his Idealism was bound up, the deeply religious spirit which underlay all his views of life, must be brought vividly before any one who carefully studies these pages, and especially before all those who have ever come into any contact with the author. In this review it is not proposed to write anything in the way of criticism, but only to indicate what seems to be the general bearing of the argument—and even this can be done only imperfectly in the case of a book which is too full of meaning to admit of abridgment.

What is implied in the possibility of a moral philosophy, a philosophy which shall explain, but not explain away, the moral consciousness of men? There is implied in it—such at least is the view taken in this book—that man's life is not merely one among the other forms of nature, not merely one of the phenomena or series of phenomena, which are the *objects* of his knowledge. Yet the main effort of the prevailing school of English writers on these subjects is to explain the moral nature of man as a special modification of

¹ *Prolegomena to Ethics*. By the late T. H. GREEN, Whyte's Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Oxford. Edited by A. C. Bradley. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1883. Pp. 427.

the general animal susceptibility of pleasure and pain, brought about by the influence of what is called the 'social medium'. Such a natural history of man rapidly reduces the moral sentiment and the consciousness of freedom and responsibility which goes along with it, to mere illusions, in regard to which the only problem is to explain how they arose. And if the anthropological moralist has the courage of his opinions, he will not be content with "reducing the speculative part of ethics to a natural science," but will proceed "to abolish the preceptive part of them altogether". For it is vain to preach to a being "who is merely the result of natural forces" that it is his duty "to conform to their laws".

This conclusion cannot be combated by any isolated treatment of the practical or moral side of man's life. For, if it be once admitted that man, as a perceiving and knowing subject, is a merely natural being, it will be found impossible to claim any exemption from natural law for his will. Hence the only way in which it is possible to maintain the reality of the ideas of duty and freedom, is that which Kant took, through the criticism of experience. Only if it can be shown that man, as a conscious subject, is something more than a natural object, will it be possible even to attempt a proof that his action is not an expression of nature and necessity. The aim, therefore, of the first book of the *Prolegomena* is to repeat briefly the Kantian criticism of knowledge, only removing those inconsistencies which were incidental to the first statement of it in Kant.

"Can the knowledge of nature be itself a part or product of nature?" Or, can a subject in whom such knowledge is realised be rightly treated as if he were one of the objects he knows? Can we, *e.g.*, legitimately regard his life as a series of 'modes of matter and motion'? To say that we can, is to commit a gigantic *hysteron-proteron*; for "matter and motion, just so far as known, consist in, or are determined by, relations between the objects of that connected consciousness which we call experience"; and if, in giving an account of either, we try to abstract from relations which exist only for a conscious subject, we will find that nothing remains. How then shall we explain the existence of a self by that which only exists *for* a self? The moment this difficulty is really felt, the problem comes to be rather how that which is only as it is for consciousness, should be so often imagined to be a sufficient, or indeed any, explanation of consciousness. The reason is undoubtedly to be found in the twofold aspect in which man is forced to regard himself.

For while there is a "sense in which man is related to nature as its author," there is also "a sense in which he is related to it as its child," and it seems impossible to do justice to the latter sense without sacrificing the former.

In the Kantian philosophy this difficulty is got over by a compromise. Man is supposed to 'make nature,' but not to 'create it'. The understanding supplies the forms by which the matter of sense is brought together in experience and determined as a world of objects, but the matter is given to the mind from without. This compromise draws its plausibility from the fact that it seems to preserve for us the idea of a world which is determined in its own nature, independent of our consciousness of it, while yet it admits the constitutive power of consciousness in relation to that world which exists for us. It does so, however, only by introducing a conception which is found ultimately to be unmeaning; the conception of an object which causes our sensations, but which, in itself, does not exist for consciousness. Kant thus from another side falls into the same difficulty which had led Locke to treat the 'real' or objective element in knowledge as presented to us by, or consisting in, simple feelings or sensations which are given apart from any 'work of the mind' in establishing relations between them. But of such feelings, apart from the relations, nothing can be said. They do not exist either as knowledge, or as conceivable elements in knowledge, and hence they are of no avail in explaining—what they were introduced to explain—that permanent reality which we attribute to things as independent of the process whereby *we* individually come to know them. For what underlies all such attempts to divide the indivisible unity of fact and thought in experience is simply the idea that the real is an unalterably determined order of relations, combined with the idea that consciousness is a shifting succession of feelings. But while we may admit the truth of the former idea, we can find no ground for the latter, except in a confusion between the *existence* of feelings as successive states of a sensitive subject and the *consciousness* of having them—a consciousness which is possible only for a subject which distinguishes itself from them, takes them out of their transitory existence, and fixes them as definite facts, in relation to other facts, in the system of experience. Our feelings, therefore, like external objects, exist for us, *i.e.*, they are intelligible objects for us, only as an element in an unalterable order of relations, which remains unchanged amid all changes in the objects among which it holds, and contains in itself the proximate explanation of these changes. But the con-

ception of nature as such an all-inclusive system of relations is not one that can "stand alone". It requires, to render it intelligible, the idea of something else beyond the beings related—something else which shall combine them together "without effacing their severalty". And such a combining energy can only be an intelligence. We cannot, therefore, separate nature as a system of objects and events from the intelligence for which it exists, as if it were something which first exists by itself and then copies itself on our minds. Rather we must hold that the same principle through which there exists a world to be known, is present also in us, and so constitutes the intelligence through which we know it. "Nature is the system of related appearances, and related appearances are impossible except through the action of an intelligence. . . . Does this then imply the absurdity that nature comes into existence in the process by which this person or that begins to think? Not at all; unless it is necessary to suppose that intelligence first comes into existence when this person or that begins to understand—a supposition not only not necessary, but which on examination will be found to involve impossibilities analogous to those which prevent us from supposing that nature so comes into existence" (p. 38).

If this view of things is true, and if we cannot regard nature as complete in itself apart from a principle of intelligence substantially identical with that which we know in ourselves, then we may fairly argue that man, in so far as such a principle of intelligence manifests itself in him, is not to be reduced to a merely natural existence, a mere part of the natural system. If he were merely a part of it, he could not know it. Or, at least, if we do regard him as a part of nature, we must be using the word 'nature' to express the whole system of related phenomena, *including* the spiritual principle which it implies. And then we must find some other word to express the system of relations *exclusive* of that principle. In any case, we must be careful to observe that a being in whom the spiritual principle, which is the principle of unity in the world, manifests itself, must not be brought under categories, such as the categories of substance and cause, which apply only to those things which are parts of the natural system; nor can he be conceived as an object existing under conditions of time and space in the same way in which they exist. No doubt, as has been already admitted, it is true that there is one aspect of his existence in which man may be regarded as part of the natural system, in so far as his life is "an order of events in time, consisting in the

modifications of his sensibility". But in so far as it is a *consciousness* of these events in a related series (and what we call *our* life—the life of the self—is essentially a life of consciousness), it cannot be reduced to those events themselves, nor can any of its modifications, even the simplest, be accounted for simply as an event in time. This is equally true of *perception*, the function in which consciousness is usually supposed to be most dependent on something else than itself, as of those higher functions of thought and knowledge, in which it seems to be most independent. For perception is not sensation, nor is indeed sensation any part or element of it, though it is the consciousness of *the fact of our having* a sensation in relation to other facts. Its object, indeed, is represented as in time, but just for that reason, it implies and is a consciousness which is not *in* time, but *for* which time is. It is true that "the very consciousness which holds together successive events as equally present, has itself apparently a history in time". "But this apparent state of the case can only be explained by supposing that, in the growth of our experience, in the process of our learning to know the world, an animal organism which has its history in time, gradually becomes the vehicle of an eternally complete consciousness." What is called the history of our consciousness is the succession of feelings which, *as* parts of our consciousness, are taken out of their succession and fixed in reference to a subject which is not one of them, and which, therefore, has properly no history. Hence, if we talk of man's intelligence as a cause, we must call it a "free cause," a cause which does not depend on some other cause for being what it is, which cannot be externally explained like an event or object, which is what it is through other objects or events. In other words, we cannot transfer the term 'cause' "from the relation between one thing and another within the determined world, to the relations between that world and the agent implied in its existence," without observing that, in the latter case, what is before us is not an external relation of one thing to another, but a correlation of elements which imply each other. "There is no separate particularity in the agent on the one side, and the determined world as a whole on the other, such as characterises any agent or patient, any cause or effect within the determined world"; for "the world has no character but that given it by this action; the agent has no character but that which it gives itself in this action" (p. 81). This which is true of the spiritual principle of all things, is equally true of man in so far as spiritual life—the life of intelligence—is developed in him. Nor are we to take this

as meaning that his life is in part spiritual and in part natural, for, though natural processes do in a sense condition his life, yet, as mere natural processes, they form no part of it. In the first place, the very functions which would be merely natural "if they were not organic to an end consisting in knowledge, just because they are so organic, are not in their full reality natural functions. . . . For one who could comprehend the whole state of the case, even a digestion that served to nourish a brain which was in its turn organic to knowledge, would be essentially different from digestion in an animal incapable of knowledge." And, in the second place,—what is more important,—nothing can come within the circle of self-consciousness, which is man's proper life, without being determined by it; nothing is *for* him, which is not *by* him. And, therefore, his existence as a "free cause" is not affected by the processes of animal evolution by which his physical existence may have been developed. "If there are reasons for holding that man, in respect of his animal nature, is descended from 'mere' animals—animals in whom the functions of life and sense were not organic to the eternal or distinctively human consciousness—this does not affect our conclusion in regard to the consciousness of which, as he now is, man is the subject, a conclusion founded on analysis of what he now is and does" (p. 87).

Having thus, in the First Book, secured his ground in the "metaphysics of knowledge or experience," the author, in the Second Book of the *Prolegomena*, proceeds to treat of the "metaphysics of moral nature," and in this sphere he guides himself by the same principles. As he has shown that the sensational conditions of knowledge do not affect its nature as the product of a self-conscious intelligence, so now he seeks to prove that the fact of our action being conditioned by impulses does not affect its character as self-determination. As perception is different from sensation, so is the desire of a wanted object different from an impulse based upon animal wants. An animal want cannot become a *motive* of action for us, unless "upon the want there supervenes the presentation of the want by a self-conscious subject to himself, and with it the idea of a self-satisfaction to be attained in the filling of the want," (p. 94). Though, therefore, the want is presupposed, it is entirely changed in its character by its becoming an object which a self identifies with its own good. As "life is not a mechanical or chemical process because mechanical and chemical processes are necessary to the living body," so "moral action or action

from motives is not a natural event because natural want is necessary to it". Nor can we even say that the animal want is *part* of the motive, part of what determines the conscious being to action; for, as mere animal impulse, it does not determine consciousness at all. Hence, "our self-determination, even when it has merely animal wants for its content, is not a natural event, determined by other natural events before it". It, like perception and knowledge, is the action of a consciousness which cannot be determined by any cause that does not derive its character and its influence as a motive from that consciousness itself. This is the true sense in which we can be said to possess free-will, as opposed on the one hand to what is called 'liberty of indifference' or action without motives, and on the other to Determinism, the theory according to which man's action is determined by the desire that happens to be strongest. Against the former, it needs only to be pointed out that rational or self-conscious action is always action from motives, and that the question of freedom is, therefore, merely the question whether the intelligence or conscious self is constitutive of its own motives. Against the latter it has to be maintained that a mere desire is not a motive except in so far as it is identified by a conscious subject with itself, *i.e.*, with the good or part of the good in which it seeks its satisfaction, and that, as so identified, it can no longer be compared with the other desires as stronger or weaker. Man is determined by his desires only so far as he makes their object *his* object, or seeks his own satisfaction in them. We may admit that there is a sense in which the common saying is true that a man's action is the result of his character and circumstances. But this does not make him a necessary agent; for the circumstances are what they are for him by the action of consciousness, and the character is the man as he has framed to himself an idea of good, of a universe of satisfactions, in which he seeks to be realised.

Determinism naturally goes with a kind of Nominalism, which begins by denying the reality of any such general powers in man as intellect, will, or desire, except as general names for the separate classes of mental acts, and which naturally goes on to deny the reality of the self as distinguished from these classes. To such a theory it is to be answered that, if the self is nothing real apart from the particular feelings, desires, perceptions, it is equally true that *they* are nothing real except in relation to the one self. Now this self is a centre of unity, to which we refer, on the

one hand, our consciousness of the world as it *is*, and on the other hand, our consciousness of the world as it *should be*—*i.e.*, of a world whose realisation depends on the previously given idea of it. And as mere fleeting sensations are translated by consciousness into a system of related objects so the appetites and impulses are changed by it into a "world of wanted objects," or the idea of a complete good in which there lies a full satisfaction for the self. Thus there is for each conscious subject "a world of feeling, however limited in its actual range, yet boundless in capacity, of which he represents himself as the centre". Every one of our desires, whether their objects be sensuous or spiritual, by being brought together in one consciousness, is determined and modified by the others in a way impossible to a purely animal subject, for which each impulse passes away with its satisfaction. "The conception of general well-being is a medium through which each desire is at once qualified and reinforced by all the rest." Hence we are unable to treat desire as a mere general name for a number of isolated particulars, which externally limit and conflict with each other, but must rather regard it as a unity in which each particular is determined in its relation to the other particulars, *through* its relation to the universal which includes them all. The will is often represented as if it were something like a material object moved by different forces of desire. But if we distinguish it from the desires at all, we must rather take it as the unity which specifies itself in them, yet in all its specification remains one with itself.

And the same principles must also be applied to the separate functions of thinking and knowing on the one side, and of desiring and willing on the other. These are not to be treated as separate activities, which are what they are independently of each other. On the contrary, we must regard them as "two equally primitive and co-ordinate possibilities" of man's being, which "have a common source in one and the same self-consciousness," and which, therefore, mutually imply each other. "No desire which forms part of our moral experience would be what it is, if it were not the desire of a subject which also understands: no act of our intelligence would be what it is, if it were not the act of a subject which also desires." This becomes clear if we consider, in the first place, that there is a general agreement between our intellectual and practical consciousness, in and so far as each "implies a relation between a subject and a world of manifold facts of which it is at first conscious

simply as alien to itself, but which it is in constant process of adjusting to itself". In the intellectual life we begin with a consciousness of fact, but the "same self-consciousness which arrests successive sensations as facts to be attended to, finds itself baffled so long as the facts remain an unconnected manifold"; hence it is constantly seeking to make the facts its own, *i.e.*, one with its consciousness of itself, by tracing their relations to all other facts in the "cosmos of experience". In like manner, our will or practical consciousness begins also in a "consciousness of opposition between a man's self and the real world," and is a continuous effort to overcome it "by giving a reality in the world, a reality under conditions of fact to the object which, as desired, exists merely in idea". The activity of the intellectual and practical consciousness thus deals with the same dualism, which they seek in different ways to reconcile, by "taking the world into the self, or by carrying the self out into the world". Furthermore, it may be shown that desire is involved in the process of knowing, and the action of the understanding in the process of willing. Nor can we even say that willing is *more* than thinking, but only that it is a *different kind* of thinking from that which is speculatively directed. It appears, therefore, that the division which we make between the faculties of thought and action, like all the other divisions which we make between particular desires and ideas, must be taken as merely relative, and we cannot talk of these faculties any more than we can talk of the particular desires and ideas as externally determining each other. Or if we do so, we must constantly remember that such language is somewhat misleading, since it is apt to make us forget the unity of the self, which expresses itself in these different ways. For "thought and desire are not to be regarded as separate powers, of which one can be exercised by us without, or in conflict with, the other. They are rather different ways in which the consciousness of self, which is also necessarily consciousness of a manifold world other than self, expresses itself" (p. 142). Intellect, desire, and will, are simply the man thinking, desiring, and willing, "and carrying his whole self with him" into each of his actions.

The Third Book of the *Prolegomena* is occupied with the contrast of the good and the bad will, and with the determination of the moral ideal. All will involves self-identification with an object, and, therefore, the goodness and badness of the will must depend on the nature of the object. But the important point to determine is whether in the case

of the good will the object is external to the activity by which it is realised, and can be characterised independently of it. According to strict Hedonism, the object of desire or will is always pleasure, and therefore, there is no *intrinsic* difference of the good and the bad will. Such a doctrine, however, is offensive to the unsophisticated moral consciousness, and its plausibility is mainly due to a confusion. The undoubted truth, that the individual always finds pleasure in the attainment of the object which he seeks as good, has been supposed to carry with it the consequence that the object sought is itself always pleasure. On the other hand, if we say that there is an *intrinsic* difference between the good and the bad will, we seem to be involved in a kind of circular reasoning. For then it appears as if we should be obliged to explain the good or moral ideal merely as the end of the good will, while yet we have no definition of the good will except that it is directed to the good as its end. This circle is, in a sense, necessary if we are not to give man's moral being an end external to itself, and so reduce it to a mere means or instrument. But it may be at once explained, and, for practical purposes, escaped, if we consider that, though we cannot say man's end is anything else than to realise the faculties of his being as a self-conscious subject, and though we cannot know what these faculties are except from their realisation, yet that from reflection upon that realisation so far as it has gone, we can in a measure estimate both what the faculty is, and what is the direction in which it may be further developed. "We cannot indeed, describe any state in which man, having become all that he is capable of becoming—all that according to the divine plan of the world he is destined to become—would find rest for his soul. We cannot conceive it under any forms borrowed from our actual experience, for our only experience of activity is of such as implies incompleteness. . . . Yet the conviction that there must be such a state of being, merely negative as is our theoretical apprehension of it, may have supreme influence on our conduct, in moving us to that effort after the Better, which, at least as a conscious effort, implies the conviction of there being a Best" (p. 180). This view must, however, be taken in connexion with the general conception of man's life, previously developed, according to which "as our knowledge, so our moral activity was only explicable on supposition of a certain reproduction of itself by the eternal mind as the self of man, a reproduction of itself to which it makes the processes of animal life organic, and which is qualified and limited by

the nature of these processes, but which is so far essentially a reproduction of the one supreme subject, implied in the existence of the world, that the product carries with it under all its limitations and qualifications the characteristic of being an object to itself" (p. 181). For, if this be true, we can understand how the beginning of morality for man lies in his presenting to himself some object in which he thinks that he discerns his 'good,' or the complement of his being; and how it is that, through many deceptions arising from the discordance between *that* which he seeks and that *in* which he seeks it, he is continually coming to clearer insight into the nature of that moral good which alone can satisfy him. From a consideration of the nature of the self to be satisfied we can say that the good, or the object of the good will, must have certain characteristics; it must be permanent, like the self of which it is the satisfaction, and it cannot therefore consist in a series of isolated pleasures that perish with the using, and leave the self not richer, but rather poorer. It must be a good which is realised in persons, and is inseparable from their self-consciousness, as that in which alone a divine self-consciousness can reproduce and express itself. It must be a social life of persons, since "social life is to personality what language is to thought," and it is only in participating in the life of a community, that the individual in spite of his finitude, can realise the infinite possibilities of his nature. Nor must these persons be conceived as passing phenomena of a general life of humanity, which uses them as its vehicles, but is not realised in them; for, "to speak of any progress, or improvement, or development of a nation or society or mankind, except as relative to some greater worth of persons, is to use words without meaning" (p. 193). Finally, as there is no realisation or development in a process *ad infinitum*, a process not relative to an end, we must conceive that neither the persons, nor the good realised in them, can ever pass away. "On the whole, our conclusion must be that, great as are the difficulties which beset the idea of development when applied to the facts of life, we do not escape them, but empty the idea of any real meaning, if we suppose the end of the development to be one in the attainment of which persons—agents who are ends to themselves—are extinguished, or one which is other than a state of self-conscious being, or one in which that reconciliation with the claims of persons as each at once a means to the good of the others and an end to himself,

already partially achieved in the higher forms of human society, is otherwise than completed (p. 199).

When we try more definitely to describe the end, or still more to draw from it particular precepts for moral conduct, we seem at first to be reduced to a standstill. For there are, properly speaking, no special rules of morality, which hold good *absolutely*, or which are not liable to modification from the further development of human capacity. Are we then to fall back on the tautology that the unconditioned moral imperative commands us only to obey the unconditioned moral imperative? Practically, this difficulty is met by the fact that there is a certain established order of morality, a certain code of 'respectability,' in which the good has already expressed itself, and which is to be regarded as unconditionally binding, as against any mere desire for pleasure or aversion from pain; as in short unconditionally binding against every desire, except that "desire for the best in conduct" which has produced the present code, and will from time to time suggest its improvement. Further light may be had by considering the development of this code in history, in view of what has already been said of the nature of the self-consciousness which is the subject of development. In its earliest form, the moral end appears as some permanent social well-being of persons, which may be conceived in a very external and material way, and may be limited to a narrow circle of individuals, but which still bears in it recognisably the general characteristics of moral good as already described. This first form is gradually changed, both quantitatively and qualitatively, by the enlargement of the area of persons included within the social bond, and by the deepening and purifying of the idea of good, in which satisfaction for these persons is sought. These two processes are interdependent, for the true good can be found only in that in which rivalry is impossible, and the consciousness of such a good can reach its purest form only when men have recognised each other as members of one all-embracing community. Thus we find the area of justice and of charity gradually extending from the family to the nation and to humanity, and at the same time the idea of good rising from being to well-being, and from all kinds of outward good to the intrinsic qualities of soul which are exercised in their attainment or enjoyment. The decisive turning-point in this latter respect may be found in the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle, writers to whom mainly we owe two great steps in the moral culture of mankind. For they first gave a general

systematic view of the qualities of the virtuous life, and they also first distinctly expressed the idea that it is in the development and exercise of these qualities, and not in any extraneous end, that the good of man consists. The results of this effort of Greek speculation were permanent. For, notwithstanding all that subsequent deepening and widening of man's moral life which has been the result of Christianity and other influences, the general principle of morality must still be expressed in the form in which it was first brought to a consciousness of itself in Greece. "And when we come to ask ourselves what are the essential forms in which the will for true good (which is the will to be good) must appear, our answer follows the outlines of the Greek classification of virtues. It is the will to know what is true, to make what is beautiful, to endure pain and fear, to resist the allurements of pleasure (*i.e.*, to be brave and temperate), if not, as the Greek would have said, in the service of the State, yet in the interest of some form of human society; to take for oneself, to give to others, of those things which admit of being taken and given, not what one is inclined to, but what is due" (p. 276). In what follows this quotation, the author has illustrated this view—in some of the most striking pages of the volume—by a detailed consideration of the virtues of courage and temperance, showing how the Aristotelian ideas of these virtues have been purified and widened in modern Ethics without losing their fundamental identity.

The general result of this Book of the *Prolegomena*, in the analysis of which we cannot here proceed further, is to show that there is an ideal of good bound up with the consciousness of self, and involving the consciousness of other selves as partaking in one common life, which grows with the individuals partaking it, and with which they grow. This ideal is present and implicit in the first practical self-consciousness of man, in so far as he is not driven into action by wants like the animals but directs himself by motives, *i.e.*, by ends which he sets before him, and in which he seeks to realise and satisfy himself. He seeks objects only as he subsumes them under the idea of good, and the first objects which he so subsumes are always inadequate to the idea. Hence, by partial disappointments and partial satisfactions, he is gradually awakened to a consciousness of himself and of the good he wants. Growing self-consciousness makes him seek higher objects, and higher objects bring clearer self-consciousness. The most critical turning-point in this progress is that in which the adequate end of the social

community is recognised as no other than the development of mind and character in the self-conscious beings who are its members. And the end—so far as we can think of the end—must lie in the widening of the community to all self-conscious beings, and the elimination of all activities except those in which the good of one is the good of all the others.

The Fourth and last Book of the *Prolegomena*, which we must notice very summarily, is devoted to the question of the practical value of Moral Philosophy. It begins with discussion of the value of having a moral ideal, and especially of that self-questioning as to motive, which is commonly called conscientiousness, and which involves the comparison of self with such an ideal. What, in other words, is the value of conscious and reflective, as opposed to what is called unconscious, morality? "A man's approach to the ideal of virtue is by no means to be measured by the clearness or constancy of his reflection upon the ideal." There have been many benefactors of humanity who have improved and elevated man's life, but who have been absorbed in their schemes for the bettering of men's estate almost to the exclusion of all reflection upon their own motives. At the same time, the highest moral purity cannot be attained without those searchings of heart which arise from the humbling yet elevating comparison of ourselves with the highest ideal of virtue. Nor can we separate this purifying of motive from the outward efficiency of effort after particular goods, though it may not be always easy to trace the connexion between the improvement of action and elevation of the character of the motives. It is somewhat perplexing to see what seems to be great efficiency for ends in themselves good, going along with mean motives; but in most cases, this only means that selfishness has found its account in making itself the instrument of something higher than itself. And the real originative power of a moral act is probably, if we could see the whole, exactly proportioned to the purity of its motive. While, however, it may be allowed that the purification of motive is as real a part of moral progress as the performance of outwardly good actions, and that reflection is the necessary instrument of such purification, this does not yet carry with it the practical value of the kind of reflection which is involved in the establishment of a moral theory. And, indeed, if practical influence be claimed for this kind of reflection, yet it must not be estimated too highly, at least if we mean by that *direct* influence. In the main, the work of moral theory must be defensive.

Reflection in this sense is needed mainly to heal the wounds of reflection itself—to save men from the dangers of that kind of sophistication by which intellectual doubt aids in weakening the moral force of resistance to passion. Nor is it easy to get from any theory the means of directly determining cases of moral difficulty (such as that of Jeanie Deans in the *Heart of Midlothian*) when what is in itself a good impulse comes into conflict with the ordinary rules of morality. In the face of such an emergency, moral decision must necessarily be the intuitive expression of character. Still a true moral theory may aid in the formation of a character which will make the right decision possible. It may do this service in a reflective age by enabling men to recognise the essential truth of the imaginative forms in which the moral and religious consciousness has to express itself. It may also help to solve casuistical difficulties which arise from the conflict of different authorities which have a traditional claim upon our respect, by making us reflect on the real basis of such claims in the moral consciousness which all these authorities partially express.

The last two chapters of the *Prolegomena* contain a comparison of the hedonistic theory with the theory of the good as consisting in the perfect actualisation of human capacity, in relation to their respective *practical* influence. It is pointed out that the hedonistic criterion was useful in the hands of Bentham, because he insisted so strongly on the *equal* claims of all to a share of happiness, and not because he defined happiness as pleasure. The nature of the reforms which he was mainly concerned in urging did not make it necessary to have any very exact definition of the nature of happiness. Such a definition, however, it is maintained, becomes necessary when we advance beyond the broad legal aspects of conduct. And in connexion with the proof of this, Mr. Sidgwick's theory (which admits that reason is so far constitutive of motives as to generalise the desire of pleasure and bid us seek it for all and not for self) is carefully criticised. In opposition to this theory, the author repeats his argument that the good, as the end determined by reason, is not only quantitatively but qualitatively distinguished from the end determined by sensuous feeling. And the book ends with the guarded conclusion that in those not very numerous cases where a criterion is wanted "for estimating those claims upon us which are not enforced by the sanction of conventional morality," such a criterion "is afforded by the theory of ultimate good as a perfection of the human spirit resting in

the will to be perfect (which may be called in short the theory of virtue as an end in itself) but not by the theory of good as consisting in the maximum of possible pleasure".

The very imperfect outline which has just been given of a volume so rich in matter, cannot do more than indicate its general line of argument. The points in which probably the greatest originality and freshness of remark will be found, are the discussion of the nature of will in the Second Book, the account of the development of the ethical ideal in the Third Book, particularly the comparison of Greek and modern ideas of virtue, and the fine and subtle ethical observation shown in the sections on purity of motive and on casuistical difficulties, in the Fourth Book. The strong practical insight of the author into the difficulties and furtherances of the spiritual life is shown in almost every page, and is the feature which distinguishes this from most of his previously published writings. It is a book which is not easy to review for any one before whom it brings so vividly, even in the peculiarities of phrase, the constant self-questioning fairness and unwillingness to pass over any difficulty which were characteristic of the writer. Whether it will carry conviction to those of another way of thinking, it may be difficult to say. But we think that no attentive reader can fail to be struck with the singular desire to give full justice to every opponent, and the absolute avoidance of anything like harsh or polemical expression, which are its characteristics.

We shall only make one criticism. The method pursued in the investigation of the moral ideal may be described as that of Aristotle modified by Kant. Following the latter, the author asks what are the conditions of experience, and especially of moral experience. But, like the former, he takes his start from the concrete moral experience reached in the social community of the family and the state. And as this ethical experience is not, as by Aristotle, taken to be completed in the definite form of a municipal state, which once for all has exhausted the moral capacity of man, but is viewed as still in process of being realised in a growing community which is gradually learning to recognise the claims of all self-conscious beings, so the ethical ideal is seen to involve a far more thorough transmutation of the natural man, a far stronger demand upon the individual to die to his lower self that he may live to the higher self and to mankind, than could be recognised by an ancient philosopher. At the same time, the author, while, like Kant,

he bids us reason backwards from our intellectual and moral experience to that spiritual nature in which lies the possibility at once of knowledge and of moral action, is also like Kant in refusing to say much of that spiritual nature in itself. That "the source of the categories cannot be brought under the categories," and that the moral acts in which the self is realised cannot be treated as natural events, he maintains with great force of argument. But he is unwilling to go much further—either in the direction of speculation about the nature of the self-conscious principle to which he has referred all things, or in positively working out any view of nature and human history as the manifestation of spirit. In regard to the theoretical aspect of the subject, after pointing out that reality is that which exists for a thinking consciousness, he adds (p. 54), "as to what that consciousness is in itself, or in its completeness, we can only make negative statements. *That* there is such a consciousness is implied in the existence of the world, but *what* it is, we can only know through its so far acting in us as to enable us, however partially and uninterruptedly, to have knowledge of a world or an intelligent experience." And in a similar sense, speaking of the practical ideal as the realisation of human capacity, he declares that in its completeness we cannot say *what* it is. "We cannot conceive it under any forms borrowed from our actual experience, for our only experience of activity is such as implies incompleteness. Of a life of completed development, of activity with the end attained, we can only speak or think in negatives, and thus only can we speak or think of that state of moral being in which, according to our theory, the ultimate moral good must consist" (p. 186). This language will probably seem to many to be at variance with some of the results subsequently arrived at by the author himself as to the nature of the moral ideal as determined by the idea of the self. And it seems to be inconsistent with the value which is assigned to the Platonic and Aristotelian criticism of morality, as not only enabling these philosophers to understand the life of Greece, but to lay a basis for a universal morality. It is true that we cannot explain the spiritual principle, which is implied in all explanation, by reference to anything else than itself, but this does not imply that we only know *that* it is, and not *what* it is. Our knowledge of the self is rather the type to which all other knowledge imperfectly approximates, than an inferior kind of knowledge. And, on the other hand, if it is possible for us to carry back the world of experience to conditions that

are spiritual, there seems to be nothing that should absolutely hinder us from regarding the world *positively* as the manifestation of spirit, and from re-interpreting the results of science by the aid of this idea,—however difficult it may be to realise satisfactorily such an idealistic reconstruction of science. And in like manner, if it is possible to carry back our moral life to its conditions, and to regard it as the realisation of the self, there seems to be no absolute hindrance in using this idea positively, not only as a key to the history of the past, but also to determine, in outline at least, the idea of moral perfection. Nay, it seems as if this volume, even in view of its own disclaimer, was itself a proof that this result can be in some measure realised.

EDWARD CAIRD.

V.—NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS.

IS THERE SUCH A THING AS PURE MALEVOLENCE?

I beg to offer a few observations on Mr. Bradley's Note, in the last number of *MIND*, relating to the ultimate analysis of our malevolent dispositions. It would be as agreeable to me, as it is to him, to be able to believe that there is no such feeling in the human mind as the delight in pure malevolence.

I should have been saved the necessity of some repetition, if Mr. Bradley had disposed, *seriatim*, of what I consider the least ambiguous cases of pure malevolent pleasure; as, for example, in Mr. Stephen's critic of a sensitive poet. Or to take a still wider-ranging class—the delights of teasing, so well developed in our earliest years: he does so far recognise these as to call them by other names, but it remains to be seen how far the case is improved thereby. Certainly nothing could well be more diabolical than the conduct of boys at school to the new entrants; similar conduct being reproduced on the entry into trades and professions, as the army. That our most highly-bred youth can behave as we hear they do in such circumstances, sufficiently proves the deep-seated depravity of human nature, and the fact is not made either better or worse, whether we refer it to a natural feeling of malevolence or to certain other roots capable of yielding the same fruit. Still, it is interesting psychologically, and not unimportant in an ethical point of view, to trace out the real foundations of the bad side of our nature. The suitable modes of remedial treatment may perhaps depend upon the correct analysis of the evil.

My strong cases, in addition to those just quoted, were,—temper or angry passion generally; the delight in seeing punishments; laughter, comedy and humour; sensational crimes as recorded in history, or worked up in romance, including the pleasures of tragedy. I should add the prominence given in our newspapers to disasters and horrors of every kind. I may also have to remark on the gratifications of sport.

Let us first state to ourselves the bearings of malevolence in its widest compass: as including the infliction of suffering, the destruction of life, and the deprivation of active power more or less, as in reducing to bondage or subjection. In every one of these forms of injuring others, we can take a strong positive delight; greatest of all when done by our own hands, but yet great when merely viewed as done by any other agent.

Of the various explanations given as substitutes for the hypothesis of a pure pleasure of malevolence, I have to remark generally that they are all affected with vagueness or ambiguity; so that we have first to reduce them to definite statements.

Perhaps the most plausible of the alternatives is the feeling of retaliation for wrong inflicted, in other words, genuine and legitimate Anger. This takes us back to the early struggle for existence, where, if anywhere, we ought to find the sources of our malevolent dispositions such as they are. That life-long struggle could not be carried on without baffling, disabling, and maltreating other creatures. One section of the animated beings around had to be attacked as prey, another section as standing between us and our wants. That, in such a situation, pleasurable associations should be formed with all the signs of discomfiture in sentient creatures, seems quite inevitable. But we are not in a position to estimate the probable strength of those associations, nor their persistence, as a large pleasurable susceptibility, in the altered circumstances of civilisation. We must endeavour to analyse the case as now presented to us.

To be pained and wronged is the common source of angry feeling. The ordinary operation of the will would be to rid us of the pain, to prevent its recurrence, and also to obtain such reparation as to place us as nearly as possible in our original condition. One form of reparation is the undoubted satisfaction of inflicting an equal, perhaps a greater, amount of pain on the offender. As Mr. Bradley expresses it, we identify our loss or suffering with the happiness of another, and are therefore urged to remove that happiness. All this is the common course of the will, in using known means to accomplish an end, namely, the conservation of our own happiness. Our action in the matter should exactly correspond to the requirements of the case, and no more; indeed, it ought to be wholly devoid of passion. If we do not at once succeed in regaining the *status quo*, we record a debt against the party, and determine to recover it on the earliest opportunity.

Such, however, is not the course of anger, in our actual experience of it. There is usually an amount of passionate excitement, with the accompanying exaggerations of strong feeling. There is a tendency to gloat over the occasion, to feast upon it, by virtue of some source of luxurious susceptibility that lies within us.

I can partly account for the mere exaggeration of the irascible feeling, by invoking the element of Fear. When we are unexpectedly wronged or injured, we consider not only the present but the future. When our house is for the first time attempted by burglars, we lose our sense of immunity, and are filled with alarm; the effect being to induce exaggerated precautions of every sort. So in rectifying ourselves against a deliberately inflicted harm, we are not satisfied with a moderate and calculated retaliation: our tendency is to go considerably beyond the limits of sobriety and rationality, especially with the view to future prevention.

As yet, however, we get no special insight into the origin of our pleasure in the suffering that we cause by our retaliation; nor does even the exaggeration of preventive effort account for the peculiar sweetness of the revengeful feeling. To study this in its

purity, we must refer to the instances where the harm done is but small, easily rectified, and involving no serious apprehensions. Now, the irascible temperament is shown in taking offence at mere trifles; in resenting out of all proportion to the offence and the danger. A slight affront, a small money-loss, involving no ulterior consequences, a slight trespass, will induce in some minds a fierce retaliation, and perhaps a lasting and incurable resentment.

There are two ways of representing the pleasure of revengeful feeling. The mode that seems to me to square best with the whole of the facts, is to regard it as the genuine pleasure of malevolence drawn upon by way of *solatium* for the original pain and injury. The other mode is to regard it as the simple and proper outcome of the sense of wrong, with precaution for the future; the pleasure lying in the security achieved by the suffering, the subjection, or the death of the wrong-doer.

It is not easy to obtain an *experimentum crucis*, as between the two views. The second, however, is open to an obvious remark. The outgoings of revenge have, in all ages, greatly exceeded the reasonable protection of the injured party; so much so, that the sufferings inflicted in the name of revenge would not have been greater, even on the supposition of an independent delight in suffering. So long as revenge is excessive and cruel, what does it matter whether it be due to pure malevolence or to a grossly exaggerated view of the necessities of our protection? If mankind can habitually give way to such exaggerations, we have all the evil that the disinterested pleasure in suffering could inflict.

But the case of revengeful passion is not the best for trying the question at issue. There being always present a reason or pretext for the misery caused, we are not sure that the mind delights in misery as such. Let us take then the examples where we are witnesses to suffering inflicted by others, and where we ourselves are noways concerned, or at all events very remotely. Why do multitudes delight in being spectators of punishments, including the gallows? In former days, when executions were public, when whippings, the pillory, and the stocks were open to everybody's gaze, what was the source of the fascination attending the spectacles? They were remotely connected with the security of people generally, but they were most frequented by those that thought least of public security. I have no doubt that if military floggings had been exposed to the public gaze, they would have been very largely attended; while the attraction could, on no pretext, be said to consist in the satisfaction of preserving military discipline, and securing the nation against foreign attacks. There is a fascination in witnessing school-punishments, even when everyone feels liable to be a victim in turn. The pleasure of a mere spectator here can have no bearing upon any future protection, unless the offence happen to consist in annoying the pupils generally.

We can go a step farther. There are abundance of examples

of delight in mischief of the most absolutely gratuitous kind; beginning in tender years, and continuing more or less until maturity. The love of teasing, of practical joking, of giving trouble and annoyance, without any cause whatever, is too manifest to be denied; while to bring it under retaliation requires an enormous stretch of assumption. The midnight revels of youthful spirits have been known in all ages; they have no bearing upon the security of the actors, except to put that in peril, by an example that is to recoil upon themselves some time later.

When this last class of cases is brought up, the opponents of the theory of pure malevolence take other ground. Retaliation is plainly inapplicable. The explanation next resorted to, is Love of Power: on which, the remark may be repeated, that if love of power conducts us to such extremities of unprovoked cruelty, it is to all intents and purposes a principle of malevolence. We must, however, trace the workings of Power more minutely. It is by no means a simple motive. Power is sought very largely for its fruits and consequences. It brings us many of the ordinary gratifications of life, and saves us from numerous evils. So far well; but what has the gratuitous infliction of suffering to do with Power? The answer is somewhat complex.

For one thing, it is a test or evidence of the possession of power. We cannot put another being to pain, without having in some way the advantage or superiority. In point of fact, however, the operation is almost always unnecessary for the end in view. In nearly every case, we know perfectly well what is the extent of our power; and, indeed, without that assurance to begin with, we seldom venture upon tormenting anyone. The process of teasing and annoying others is, therefore, not to give a proof of our power, but to turn that power to account in furnishing us with a gratification distinct from power. What could a Roman Emperor gain, in the way of confirming his sense of power, by having an animal tortured to amuse his evening-meal?

But, in the second place, the operation of inflicting suffering is one of the ways of losing power. By setting loose the desire of retaliation in the injured person, we make an enemy; and even if we can disable our victim, we are not out of danger; there may still be friends and sympathisers, whose resentment we have henceforth to endure. Unless the received principle—that beneficent action tends to multiply itself—be a delusion, influence over other beings is more effectually gained by serving them than by hurting them. Those persons that delight most in giving pain, have often to confess that it has been a losing game in the end. Milton is near the truth in saying—

“Revenge, at first though sweet,
Bitter ere long back on itself recoils”.

Cases where power is gained by inflicting pain do indeed occur, but if the law of benevolent action holds, they are the exception

and not the rule. We cannot always put a check upon tyranny, but we are perpetually striving after a state of things where it shall not be profitable to inflict gratuitous suffering upon anyone. Even as things are now, there must always be a sense of danger attending cruel practices. Yet the freeing of ourselves from apprehensions and fears is one of the most relied-upon explanations of our malevolent propensity.

Another phrase introduced into the handling of the question is Self-assertion. We are said to assert ourselves with peculiar emphasis when we can put another person to pain. No doubt this is so. As already remarked, it is a very good proof of our being the stronger party. Nevertheless, it is not essential in order to give us that proof. We have many other ways of completely satisfying ourselves on that head, without inflicting any more suffering than is implied in the very fact of inferiority. If we choose this one way, out of all possible ways of self-assertion, it must be from set preference, arising out of the gratification attending it in particular. Self-assertion is a wide-ranging fact. In the one extreme, it implies claiming our own just rights, without a particle of encroachment on other persons' rights; in the other extreme, it goes the length of reckless grasping at everything within reach. He that proceeds on the first plan, is not in the mood for causing anyone to suffer needlessly; his only possible gratification would be to see the suffering of a thief, a burglar, or a swindler, in their disappointment at being thwarted. The self-assertor of the other type is of course pleased at any suffering that attests the success of his nefarious designs. He would not, as a matter of course, enjoy the suffering of parties entirely unconnected with his schemes. He would have, in the first instance, to take a very broad view of his position. Knowing that in asserting himself by injustice and crime, he becomes the enemy of the human kind, he might come to feel that no man was entirely indifferent to him; that the suffering of others, whoever they might be, was in the line of his advantage. Nay more, he might consider that his position required him to cherish the taste for suffering to the uttermost corners of sentient life; so that the torture of the most insignificant insect would come within the scope of his delight. In short, he must first become a devil, in order to attain the pure pleasure of malevolence through the medium of self-assertion. Mr. Bradley admits that self-assertion does not lead to the infliction of pain as such; and I quite agree with him. But I ask, why then does he adduce it by way of accounting for the facts? If I understand his argument, it seems to revolve in a circle. In order to account for the admitted facts, he brings forward such alternative explanations as love of power and self-assertion; but finding that these do not carry him far enough, he draws the inference that there cannot be such a thing as pure malevolence.

I must take particular notice of what he adduces by way of

confirming his explanation or no-explanation, founded on power and self-assertion. He says, correctly enough, that "torture inflicted by a third person, who is not our agent, lacks a certain element of pleasantness. No doubt we here may sympathise with the torturer, and so get pleasure; but a tyrant, speaking generally, would care little to see the cruelties of a neighbouring tyrant. The malevolence which would take delight in the quiet and passive starvation of the unoffending, would be an abnormal product." I agree in part with these remarks. It is quite certain, that the pleasure is at a maximum when we ourselves are the actors. The delight in exercising power or superiority in any shape is undoubtedly genuine and great; to produce any effect that, when produced, comes home to any of our agreeable susceptibilities, is intrinsically grateful. But here comes the pinch. The pleasure of the sight of suffering is so decided that it counts for an important standing item of enjoyment with the mere spectator. To take pleasure in the starvation of the unoffending is an abnormal product, in this sense, and this sense only:—certain modes of suffering, such as the starvation of the unoffending, grate upon our cultivated sympathies, and are objectionable on that ground. With nothing more abnormal than dulness of sympathy, which is so abundantly exemplified in the history of mankind, the starvation of any number of unoffending creatures, would be extremely enjoyable. The sight of physical torture is as bad as starvation, if not worse, and that has given ecstasy to millions. The reader of the ethical volume, in Samuel Bailey's *Letters on the Mind*, may remember an anecdote, quoted by him, of a man accidentally drowning in the presence of a multitude of lookers-on, who watched with exquisite satisfaction every turn of his writhings and struggles, and, when he sank, gave forth a shout of exultation. The man was a stranger, and had done them no sort of harm.

I read lately an extract from a book entitled *Siberian Pictures*, describing a scene still more revolting. It was prefaced by the general remark that the natives of Siberia have not risen to sympathy with the lower animals. The scene was this. A number of boys had suspended a dog by the hind legs over a fire to roast it slowly to death and enjoy the spectacle of its agonies. The traveller remonstrated. He was answered readily by the boys, that the dog did not belong to him. Some of the parents witnessing the interference soon came up, and told him in still more emphatic terms that the boys were doing what they had a perfect right to do and warned him to depart. The delight of the boys was genuine and intense; it could in no sense be referred to vindictiveness. It might be called love of power, but the direction taken by the sentiment would seem to show more than the pleasure of mere power. It was not necessary for self-assertion; the dog was wholly incapable of contesting any claims or privileges that the boys might be supposed to be vindicating. The traveller's

remark as to the undeveloped sympathies of the population towards animals, is the one in point. The delight in suffering is apparently natural and primitive. It comes into conflict with our sympathies such as they may happen to be; so far as these reach, it undergoes restraint; beyond their range it manifests itself in purity.

I must next advert to the love of Excitement as a possible means of accounting for the fact. There is considerable vagueness in the term "excitement". We may be pleased, or pained simply; and we may be in a state, not describable as either pleasure or pain, called excitement. A surprise is a good example of excitement, with neutrality as regards pleasure or pain; for although these may accompany surprises, they are incidental, and not essential, to the state. Another variety of excitement is seen when we are either pleased or pained, but not at all in proportion to the mental agitation or the intensity of our consciousness. Great pleasures are apt to subside before the agitation of mind subsides, hence the propriety of having such a term as "excitement," in addition to the terminology of pleasure and pain.

Now it is quite correct to say that we court excitement, as a relief from dulness or ennui, or as a diversion from low spirits. We may not see our way to pleasure pure and simple; but if we can only get excited with something, we may thereby get into a pleasurable mood. To agitate the nerves anyhow (not painfully) may chance to bring some pleasure, if only of the organic sort. We quit a scene of depressing stillness, for the bustle of a street, a market, a crowd; we call that excitement, to be within the mark; we are not quite sure that it amounts to pleasure. There are conflicting currents, pleasant and painful: we scarcely know which is in the ascendant; at all events, we are made more awake, or alive; our nerves and muscles have got an accession of activity. Gambling is a good example of pleasure from excitement. It contains alternations of proper pleasure and pain; but there is a high pitch of excitement throughout.

The demand for excitement of itself proves nothing. What we are to look at is the forms that it takes by preference; inasmuch as these are probably something more than mere excitement; they involve real and unambiguous pleasure. If the votaries of excitement are in the habit of seeking it by molesting, annoying, chaffing other people, the inference is that the excitement is a mere cover for a definite pleasure, the pleasure of malevolence. To sit on a road-fence, and pass insulting and jeering remarks upon the innocent passers-by, is not to be slurred over as mere love of excitement; it rises from the deeper fountains of malignity. We may easily procure excitement in forms that hurt nobody; we may even find excitement, and pleasure too, in bestowing benefits; when we habitually seek it in the shape of inflicting pain, we must be credited with delighting in the pain.

I reserve to the last the special discussion of the Ludicrous, which, I believe, confirms my view, with the least scope for

evasion. I could not, for any amount of bribe, explain the pleasures of Comedy and the Ludicrous without assuming a disinterested pleasure of malevolence. I must examine Mr. Bradley's observations on this head, with some minuteness.

In the first place, Mr. Bradley will not admit that the Comic is everywhere reducible to a perceived degradation. In the next place, he holds that degradation is very far from establishing malevolence. Degradation must imply a degrading *power*, and our pleasure would lie in thus feeling our self-assertion increased. Moreover, Mr. Bradley thinks that I should "find it difficult to verify the presence of malevolence in every species of the ludicrous". No doubt I should, but that does not dispose of the question between us.

I will notice first the connexion between the ludicrous and degradation. Mr. Bradley does not go the length of denying this wholly; he merely says that it does not exist *everywhere*. I should like to know whether he admits it *anywhere*, and, if so, to what extent. Are the cases so few as to be mere chance coincidences, or so numerous as to go beyond chance, and yet not amount to a general or prevailing connexion? I think the history of Comedy is dead against him, if he means to say that degradation is no essential feature of it. The ancient critics judged differently. Quintilian had perused all the great productions of Greek and Roman Comedy; and from him, we have this observation: "A saying that causes laughter is generally based on false reasoning (some play upon words); has always something low in it; is often purposely sunk into buffoonery; *is never honourable to the subject of it*". This is pretty sweeping; indeed, a little too sweeping. I could undertake to produce considerable exceptions; some of them, however, would but prove the rule; and all of them taken together would fail to invalidate it as a general truth. The reason why such wide generalisations are not absolute and universal, is simply that they are occasionally crossed by other principles that turn aside their application in particular cases. Thus, a laughable saying may be even honourable, by being the occasion of a still greater compliment. Many people that are ridiculed in Comedy, are pleased by the importance of being publicly mentioned. Then, the causes of laughter are not exhausted by comic degradation. It often accompanies mere good spirits, and the cordiality of friendship. There will always be cases even of the genuine comic too subtle to analyse to everybody's satisfaction. But that Comedy from its first start in the Dionysiac processions, down to the present hour, is in its very essence the degradation of some person, or interest, or institution, is established by an overwhelming preponderance of examples beyond the possibility of cavil. Mr. Bradley thinks he refutes the position by remarking that degradation must imply a degrading *power*, and that in such a case any pleasure would lie in an increase of our self-assertion. I can scarcely make out from this whether he is admitting or

denying that degradation is the cause of laughter; the expression might mean that there is degradation, but the pleasure is the pleasure of our own power, or self-assertion, and not the pleasure of seeing another person degraded. The answer to this has been partly anticipated, but is not complete. An important consideration remains.

All through his argument Mr. Bradley keeps in the background, or, I may say, all but suppresses, the fact in connexion with the pleasure of the ludicrous that is most at variance with his conclusions. It is this. While, in a few instances, our pleasure is in part the self-consciousness of our own power, these instances are but a drop in the ocean of our enjoyment of ludicrous degradation. Aristophanes must have had an exquisite pleasure in the exercise of his gift of comic degradation. But how many have been delighted even to ecstasy with his comedies, whether as seen on the stage, or as read! Our pleasure in the ludicrous goes far beyond any power of our own; it is coincident with felicitous mockery however originating. We enjoy our own jokes with a special unctio; but we enjoy also the jokes of the wits of all ages. The collective comic literature of the past counts for a large fraction of our happiness; it is, like music, one of the institutions that make up the salt of life. Yet the creators, who alone had the pleasure of power or self-assertion, are a mere sprinkling; they can be counted by tens. In fact, to put the phenomenon in its just light, we must leave these out altogether, and deal with the millions whose enjoyment of comic degradation is intense, and who are nothing more than spectators. Mr. Bradley says that torture inflicted by a third person lacks a great element of pleasantness. Very true, but a great element still remains; and that element, in the case of the ludicrous at least, is one of the substantial and enduring pleasures of mankind.

The bearings of this remark are not yet exhausted. I must apply it to Mr. Bradley's second position, namely, that although the comic were everywhere reduced to degradation, that is very far from establishing malevolence. I answer that degradation is undoubtedly pain to the subject of it; and to take pleasure in seeing (and not merely in bringing about) degradation would *primâ facie* indicate pleasure in putting others to pain. If we are not to admit this conclusion, we must find another way out of the puzzle. Power and self-assertion are of little avail, in the case of mere spectatorship; all that could be said is, that we sympathise with A's elation of power in putting B to pain; but such a mixture of sympathy and cruelty is not to be readily assumed. Then, again, we have the alternative of love of excitement, but with a difficulty, as already noticed, in showing why the desire for excitement should run so often and so largely in this particular channel. Take a familiar instance: the pleasure of children (and not of them alone) in the pantomime; which pleasure reaches its acme in the afterpiece. While looking up with admiration and

envy to the prowess of the clown, the youthful spectators have an intense enjoyment in seeing how he puts everybody to trouble, annoyance, and discomfort, while eluding detection, and escaping all the perils of his venturesome occupation. Even poetic justice is not allowed to overtake him at last; the idea would be most distasteful to his young admirers. Excitement might be given in other ways; but would any amount of mere glitter and stage movement possess the unction of the clown's successful career in diffusing petty vexation all around him?

The strongest point in the illustration from the ludicrous is the very large amount of the pleasure arising from a comparatively slight class of pains. No doubt a loss of dignity affects us considerably; yet, in the scale of inflictions it stands low: bodily injury, loss of means, an ill name, sorrow for bereavements, danger to life,—leave the suffering of a temporary loss of dignity at a great distance. Anything that gives an acute annoyance, without serious injury, is included among the incidents productive of laughter; such, for example, as a malodour, an unexpected check to one's progress, awkwardness and failure in some performance, or any small disappointment. These are pains that we can take delight in seeing any one suffer, even though we have no hand in causing them. If our delight in the greater pains were in proportion to their magnitude, the charm of seeing creatures in the extreme of bodily agony would be something enormous. And so it is, in certain circumstances. Our sympathies usually interfere with our enjoyment in the worst forms of suffering; but there are modes of getting over sympathy; the chief being resentment for injury, which suspends fellow-feeling for the time, and gives our malevolent gratification full swing. Why have punishments so often been accompanied with extreme barbarity and cruelty? Putting a man to death ought to be a full discharge of any ordinary criminality; yet civilised nations have added to it the utmost ingenuity of torture.

The illustration of the ludicrous is not complete without remarking that the collective pleasure is so great as far to outweigh the pains even of the passing sufferers. In order to provide ourselves with the enjoyment, we are willing to be victims in turn; a small amount of occasional suffering is rewarded by a large fruition of pleasure. Something of the same kind happens in the acuter forms of teasing; the schoolboy undergoes the torments of his initiation for the sake of becoming one day a tormentor himself. So that, with good management, even the malevolent pleasure has something of the diffusive tendency attributed to benevolent pleasure; it multiplies itself, and more than defrays the cost of the sacrifice. This of course is the last refinement of the passion. In the evolutionist millennium, when altruism will be developed to the point of destroying all the coarse and brutal forms of the pleasure of cruelty, the arts of comedy, as well as the play of humour in our social intercourse, will be saved.

At the risk of being tedious, I must dwell a little farther on an aspect of the ludicrous already implicated in our examples, namely, the efficacy of purely fictitious sufferings in awakening our interest. The children at the pantomime are aware that the clown's ingenious teasings are all unreal; yet the mere idea is delightful. So it is with the fictitious in comedy and romance. The charm in witnessed suffering (properly regulated) is so great as to dispense alike with our own self-assertion in causing it, and with the reality of the cases. Now, it must be a very powerful feeling that can be worked upon in this way. The love-passion, and the admiration of personal beauty, attest their strength by responding to the most far-fetched examples. Hamlet affects astonishment at the player's excitement over Hecuba; so he might ask, What is Helen of Troy to us in the present day? But if a picture of female beauty, immersed in stirring adventures, can be skilfully set forth, it will interest the human race to the end of time; the natural intensity of the sentiment of love being the sole explanation. And if we can take delight in the mere recital of gratuitous sufferings, with only an insignificant pretext, what inference can be drawn, but that suffering fascinates, that is, pleases us? All the other explanations—Power, Self-assertion, Love of Excitement—melt away in the presence of mere imaginary forms of infliction.

The love of Sport needs the delight in suffering to maintain it. In the sport of the gun we must have the pleasure of killing; otherwise, we might be equally amused by firing at bottles projected in the air at a proper distance. In hunting, we enjoy the torture of the fox, if only in the indirect form of sympathy with the hounds, whose blood-thirstiness is thoroughly unaffected and unconcealed.

I cannot enter into the farther question of the connexion of malevolence with our joy in the Sublime; that needs a discussion to itself. If the sentiment is once shown to exist as an independent fact of the mind, and not as a mere occasional incident of other feelings, it will crop out in many more ways than those we have now been considering.

Mr. Bradley ends with a sort of apology for our apparent malevolence, as he accounts it to be. He says—"We all cling to our wrongs, for they keep us in mind of our rights, and we hug our hatreds since without them how little would be left to some of us". But the most prosperous of human beings include, in the roll of their pleasures, a number of hatreds. For my own part, I would as soon be called malevolent after the purest type, as declared capable of hugging hatreds to make up for a joyless lot. The question ever recurs—Why is hatred such a source of consolatory feeling, if there be not a fountain of pleasure in connexion with the sufferings of others?

A. BAIN.

SYMPATHY AND INTEREST.

Does our interest in others come solely from sympathy, and is sympathy a mere consequence of intellectual progress? In the following remarks I shall try to show that these questions must be answered in the negative. They suggest a simplification which the facts will not warrant, and they would press a truth till it becomes one-sided.

Taken broadly, it is true that the idea of others' pleasure or pain must itself be pleasant or painful to my mind. It is true that I am led to promote or to remove this source of my feelings, and it is true that, in the main, I do so by a benefit to the person concerned. It is true once more that mere want of perception is a sufficient cause of defective sympathy, and that a very large part of immorality can be fairly reduced to perceptive stupidity. But I think that these truths are not the whole truth. Instead of saying that interest comes from sympathy we might say that sympathy depends upon interest. And the second statement, I believe, would be as true as the first. In what follows I shall not aim at a complete view of the subject, but shall point out that to some extent we do first perceive because we happen to love, and do not love merely because we happen to perceive.

It cannot in the first place be said that sympathy by itself *is* interest. In rudimentary sympathy the expression of a feeling by another person produces in my mind the feeling which I have similarly expressed. But this feeling contains no reference to another person, nor in itself is it even an active desire. And when it leads to desire I need not aim at the benefit of the person who thus affects me (*cf.* Stephen, *Science of Ethics*, p. 243). Like some gregarious animals I may turn against the being the sight of whom gives me pain.

Thus sympathy is not interest; and on the other hand we can have interest without any sympathy. The condition of something other than ourselves may be pleasant or painful, although we do not sympathise. Let me endeavour to explain this.

We are sorry when we see the daisies mown or the trees cut down, and we take an interest in many inanimate objects. But do we sympathise? For trees or flowers we to some extent do feel, but can most of us feel for a book or a house? The illusion is possible, but does it always exist? When the bird cleaves to its eggs and the cat to its den, when the child bewails his broken toy, and the workman groans over the spoiling of his work, when the loss of common articles, if long-possessed, can vex us, and when the mere alteration of places that we love makes us wish for the old scene—is there everywhere here a latent sympathy? Such an explanation would surely in the end prove over-strained. But, if so, we may have interest when sympathy is absent.

Is this fact inexplicable? So far from being so, it is even a psychological necessity; and, if we could not love without sympathy, our whole nature would have been changed. We shall agree, I think, that to feel pleasure in one's own welfare and pain at one's own loss is possible without sympathy. Well what is this 'self' in which we take an interest? Is it confined to the sensitive parts of our body? May not rather our idea of that which is our 'self' include anything which is immediately connected with our well-being? We might say that the 'self,' in which we feel interested, is the world of our habitual sources of pleasure. And when anything we regard as such a source is damaged, we feel that our personal existence is lowered, and are at once concerned to protect or recover. I cannot indeed see how this fact should be otherwise.

Thus interest precedes sympathy, is possible without it, and does not always rest on it. But, when we pass to our interest in animate beings, then sympathy will come in. For we cannot have regard for the feelings of others unless we perceive those feelings, and we cannot perceive them unless in some measure we ourselves feel them. And here at least it may be contended that perception comes first, and that the process is primarily intellectual. Here at least, we may be told, it is defective understanding that is the cause of our deficient sympathy.

But even this contention I cannot admit. I do not doubt the validity of the process described. The mere intellectual apprehension of another's pleasure is assuredly an actual emotional fact, and that emotion must in the main cause an interest in the welfare of the other person. This account will cover a great part of the phenomena, but it will not cover them all. For the interest need not come from and depend upon the perception, while on the other hand the perception may depend upon the interest.

The first point I have explained. When our pleasure or pain is identified with an object, we desire the continuance or cessation of that object; and our desire is so far free from sympathy. The mother is an object of desire to the child before he can know that she feels pleasure or pain. And when this knowledge has come in, I see no reason to suppose that it makes such a simple affection impossible. But, if so, speaking broadly, our sympathy might more depend on our attachment than our attachment on our sympathy. And we may remember that selfishness and defective sympathy are not *always* concomitant, nor again do their opposites always go together.

But—to come to the second point—even where they coincide, and where our interest in others seems proportionate to our intellectual apprehension of their state, even here I must pause and must raise a doubt. You tell me that I sympathise because I perceive, but *why do I perceive?* When C is in pain why does A's

mind dwell on this, while B remains blind or inattentive? Can we say that it is simply because B is stupid? Is it true that the most clever persons are the most sympathetic, and the most sympathetic the most clever generally? Experience shows the opposite. Take, for example, our present interest in the lower animals as compared with that felt by our fathers and grandfathers. The change is striking, but I do not see how it can be simply set down to general growth of intellect. It would be as true to say we are now less obtuse because our sympathies are wider, as to assert that these are wider because we are more clever. And if in answer I am told 'not more clever *generally* but in this *one* respect,' that reply is an admission. Why in this one respect if there is no special reason, and what is this special reason?

Let us state the question thus. Granted that if my attention is fixed upon the misery of others, that will lead me (speaking generally) to regard them with an active interest in their welfare—granted this, why does A's attention keep fixed while B's fails and wanders? Is it not often because A takes an interest while B takes none? And what is this interest? Is it purely theoretical? We cannot say that. Apart from the doubt (which I do not entertain) as to the existence of *any* pure theoretical interest, it is certain that at first the direction of our mind is wholly practical. At an early stage there *is* no attention save practical interest. But if sympathy, to be active, involves attention, while attention itself comes from practical feeling, is it not clear that our regard for others' welfare does not *always* in the end depend upon intellect? If so, the doctrine we criticise has proved one-sided. It is a simplification which would shut out of view one great part of our nature.

We might learn something on this point by considering the development of the lower animals. Are sympathy and affection proportional to intelligence? Are 'clever' and 'affectionate' inseparable qualities? The example of ants and bees would not support an affirmative answer. Co-operative societies perhaps may exist before intelligent sympathy is even possible. But at any rate it is clear that in sympathy we have not got the sole root of morality. If it is right to affirm, Without sympathy no interest, it is as right to affirm, Without interest no sympathy. I believe *neither* would be accurate.

A further consideration of these points would, I venture to think, make the instructive discussion in Mr. Stephen's pages still more instructive.

F. H. BRADLEY.

KANT'S THEORY OF MATHEMATICS.

As Mr. Sidgwick thinks I am bound, as a defender of Kant (of whom, however, I am not by any means a thorough-going disciple), to show that $7 + 5 = 12$ is a synthetical judgment, I desire to state my reasons for arriving at that conclusion. The argument to the contrary is that stated by Mr. Sidgwick, *viz.*, that, starting with the definition of 12 as $11 + 1$, we can logically deduce the proposition $12 = 7 + 5$ without employing any principle except "the sums of equals are equal," which Kant himself describes as analytical. Mr. Adamson, like the late Dean Mansel (*Prolegomena Logica*, p. 116), seems to think that the definition of 12 as $11 + 1$ should not be conceded. Without dissenting from this, I propose to take a different ground. The argument proceeds $12 = 11 + 1$, but $11 = 10 + 1$, therefore (since the sums of equals are equal) $12 = 10 + 1 + 1$; but $10 = 9 + 1$, therefore $12 = 9 + 1 + 1 + 1$; and $9 = 8 + 1$, therefore $12 = 8 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1$; and $8 = 7 + 1$, therefore $12 = 7 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1$. So much of the argument is perhaps strictly logical, but now we come to the proposition $1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 = 5$. How is this shown? Mr. Sidgwick would probably say that, starting from the definition of 5 as $4 + 1$, we could in the same manner logically arrive at the conclusion that $5 = 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1$. But how do we know that the number of units in the latter equation is the same as in the former? Simply by counting. To this process, after all our logical reasoning, we must come in the end. And though the logical process is complete as soon as the number of units is set out, the task of counting them would, in the case of large numbers, be very difficult and perhaps entirely beyond the capacity of some persons who were able to follow the reasoning. Accordingly Kant says that the synthetical character of arithmetical judgment will appear more clearly if we try large numbers. But if counting is a synthetical process resting ultimately on an appeal to intuition, the Kantian doctrine seems sufficiently established. Indeed, I doubt the possibility of retaining the requisite number of units in the memory during the counting operation unless they are represented in intuition. But in any case they do not count themselves. That task must be performed by the thinker.

I wish to add in conclusion that I am not in the least surprised to find that Kant has somewhere spoken of Physical principles as Philosophical cognitions, for his language is very vacillating and inconstant. But in the well-known section of his 'Methodology,' in which he shows that the Mathematical Method is inapplicable to Philosophy, he seems to me to confine the latter term to Ontology, in which sense I therefore employed it in that connexion.

W. H. S. MONCK.

MR. MONCK's argument is clear and to the point. But he will see, I think, on further consideration, that, if it is once granted to me that the equation between a number and the number next below it + 1 is the definition of the higher number and therefore an analytical proposition, I can deduce $12 = 7 + 5$, without any more "counting" than is involved in the substitution of the right-hand term of such an equation for its left-hand term. This deduction, as I conceive it, diverges from that which Mr. Monck has given when the step $12 = 10 + 1 + 1$ is reached: at this point I take the definition of $2 = 1 + 1$, and substituting 2 for $1 + 1$ in the equation first given, I get $12 = 10 + 2$: then substituting $9 + 1$ for 10 I get $12 = 9 + 1 + 2$, and using the definition of $3 = 1 + 2$ as I used the definition of 2, I get $12 = 9 + 3$: and so on till by precisely similar steps I arrive at $12 = 7 + 5$. Now I do not suppose that a Kantian will contend that the conversion of such a proposition as $12 = 11 + 1$ is a procedure which requires us to go beyond our concepts to intuitions: and Kant has expressly declared the analytical character of the principle that the "sums of equals are equal". Hence I do not see how my conclusion—that $12 = 7 + 5$ is deducible from propositions which Kant must admit to be analytical—can be disputed except by disputing the analytical character of such propositions as $12 = 11 + 1$. Mr. Monck, I gather, does dispute this; at least he refers without dissent to Mansel's argument (*Prolegomena Logica*, p. 116). Mansel there says that to "assume the definitions of the higher numbers (2 is $1 + 1$, &c.) . . . is in fact begging the whole question. The real point at issue is . . . whether a man who has never learned to count beyond two, could obtain three, four, five, and all higher numbers, by mere dissection of the notions which he possesses already." But, as I have urged in answer to Mr. Adamson, the fact that a man who has only counted two, requires a fresh act of synthesis to form the notion three cannot, on Kantian principles, be adduced to show that $3 = 2 + 1$ is a synthetical—as contrasted with an analytical—proposition; because, according to Kant, every analytical proposition is only possible on the ground of a previous synthesis, as "the understanding cannot analyse except where it has previously combined". Mr. Adamson says that he does not see the bearing of this doctrine of Kant's on the question in dispute: but I am not without hope that Mr. Monck may see it, since it appears to me completely to destroy the force of Mansel's argument.

I now turn to the distinction drawn by Kant in the 'Methodology' between "philosophical" and "mathematical" cognition. Mr. Monck still thinks that "philosophical" is here to be understood as equivalent to "ontological". If, however, he will compare § 7 and § 15 of the *Prolegomena* with each other and with the passage in the 'Methodology,' I think he will see, first, that the distinction drawn between "Philosophie" and "Mathematik" in § 7 is identical with the distinction between the same two notions in the 'Methodology'; and, secondly, that the "Philosophie" which in § 7 is said to content itself with "discursiven Urtheilen aus blossen Begriffen" must include the "philosophischen Theil der reinen Naturwissenschaft" which in § 15 is similarly said to consist of "blos discursive Grundsätze aus Begriffen".

Mr. Adamson's remarks on this distinction in his rejoinder appended to my Note in MIND XXXI., 424—no less than his remarks on analytical and synthetical propositions—seem to me to indicate forgetfulness of the previous course of the controversy and of the points at issue. To make this clear, I will briefly retrace the steps of our argument. I criticised Kant's application to Algebra of the distinction between Philosophical and Mathematical cognition, as given in the 'Methodology'; the distinguishing characteristic being that Mathematical knowledge is obtained by "the construction of

concepts"—for which *a priori* intuition is required—and not, as philosophical knowledge, from concepts without such "construction". Mr. Adamson answered by suggesting that I (erroneously) "regarded the mathematical intuition as a single definite object and not as a schema". I replied that it is impossible that Kant should have made the difference between "Philosophie" and "Mathematik" to consist in the fact that the latter requires schemata; since "Philosophie"—at least "der philosophische Theil der Naturwissenschaft"—requires schemata no less, according to the fundamental doctrine of the 'Analytic'. This seems to me a conclusive proof of the inadmissibility of Mr. Adamson's suggestion; and I am surprised that he does not perceive its relevance. I further pointed out that the mathematical intuition of which Kant speaks in the 'Methodology' is expressly stated to be an "individual object," by means of which the "Begriff" is contemplated "*in concreto*," and an object which can be represented either in pure intuition or on paper; and that Kant certainly would not have applied any of these phrases to the schema. I thought that the briefest references to the section on Schematism in the 'Analytic' would have made this clear to Mr. Adamson; but as this is not the case, and as I can hardly ask for space to quote the relevant paragraphs at full length with a commentary, I must content myself with referring the reader to the whole passage "Das Schema ist an sich selbst . . . zusammenhängen sollten" (pp. 142, 3, Hart.).

H. SIDGWICK.

HYPOTHETICAL SYLLOGISMS.

The question whether the so-called Hypothetical Syllogisms have, or have not, the character of Categorical Syllogisms, has been so much discussed that it may seem an impertinence to offer anything further on the subject. But, so far as I have observed, no one has brought into prominence a distinction which seems to me to be here of decisive importance, the distinction, namely, between what are called in Prof. Goodwin's *Greek Grammar* General and Particular Conditional Sentences. Examples of General Conditional Sentences are: 'If a man is dyspeptic, he is unhappy'; 'If salt is dissolved in water, the boiling point of the water is raised'; 'If an ancient Athenian was thought politically dangerous, he was liable to be ostracised'. Examples of Particular Conditional Sentences are: 'If A. is a victim of dyspepsia, he is to be pitied'; 'If this water is salt, it will not boil at 212°'; and so on. Now, whatever one may think of Mr. Venn's account of propositions of the former kind (*Symbolic Logic*, chap. xvi.), certain it is that these propositions are universally understood as stating general rules about matters of fact, and that they may be transformed, without appreciable difference of meaning, into Categorical Universals; e.g., 'All dyspeptics are unhappy'; 'All salt water has its boiling point above 212°'; 'All ancient Athenians believed to be politically dangerous were liable to be ostracised'. When a Hypothetical Syllogism starts off with a General Condition, the second premiss does not, properly speaking, 'affirm the antecedent' or 'deny the consequent'; it

affirms that a particular example of the class referred to in the antecedent has the character there referred to, or denies that a particular example of the class referred to in the consequent has the character there referred to. In other words, the relation of the two premisses to one another, and of course also the relation of premisses to conclusion are precisely what they are in Categorical Syllogisms of the First Figure; the two classes are only verbally distinguished from one another. Not so with the arguments whose major premiss, so-called, is a Particular Condition. These cannot be exhibited as Categorical Syllogisms except by substituting for the special or concrete condition a general rule said to be implied. Thus Mr. Venn (*Symbolic Logic*, p. 333) treats the proposition 'If the glass falls [to-morrow], it will rain,' as implying 'All falling barometers are followed by rain'. But, in the first place, the difference between expressing and implying a general rule is surely important enough to create a difference in the treatment of Hypothetical Syllogisms by Formal Logic; and, in the second place, in some cases (*e.g.*, 'If you offered me a dollar, the book shall be yours') it seems impossible to discover any tacit reference to a general rule, while in other cases where there is undoubtedly some such assumption, it may be difficult or impossible to say precisely what it is. Thus when I say, 'If the glass falls to-morrow, it will rain,' I may not mean to imply that all falling barometers are followed by rain, but that all barometers which fall a certain number of hours after the occurrence of such meteorological conditions as now exist are followed by rain. But on this point I need only refer to the remarks on concrete propositions in the paper contributed by Mr. Alfred Sidgwick to MIND XXIX.; though I cannot follow him when he appears to assume a class of abstract-concrete propositions as tolerably well marked off from the concretes. The concretes seem to me to shade into the abstract-concretes by imperceptible gradations. Both constitute, formally, one class, which is broadly distinguished from the class of true abstract or general propositions.

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VII.—CRITICAL NOTICES.

Essays in Philosophical Criticism. Edited by ANDREW SETH and R. B. HALDANE, with a Preface by EDWARD CAIRD. London: Longmans, Green, 1883. Pp. 277.

The appearance of the nine Essays which form this volume is no unworthy witness to the presence of the 'Neo-Kantian' school as a party and a power. Their method is well indicated by their dedication to the memory of Prof. Green, and the venture of the writers in applying that method is vindicated in the preface by Prof. Caird, who refers also to Prof. Green's general character and the loss to philosophy by his death. The Essays, Prof. Caird tells us, were written independently, the bond of agreement between the writers being as to the lines along which philosophy must proceed. They are at one in the method of philosophical inquiry rather than "in any definite results that have as yet been attained by it". This method is that with which the names of Kant and Hegel have been specially associated. But the writers wish to show a development which shall be living, and not a reproduction which is dead. The evidence of the life of this development "must lie in its power to meet the questions of the day, and in the form in which they arise in that day," and the volume before us is an attempt by the writers to exemplify the bearing of their philosophical principles upon pressing problems. This being the chief purpose of the book, we seek earnestly for the new service to be given in the solution of such problems, and for the defects in other doctrines which are to be superseded. The consideration of these points will be more concerned with the heart of the book than would be any discussion as to the horror of Kant or the perplexity of Hegel at this recent outcome of Critiques and Categories. This needs to be said, the more perhaps as the writers may themselves be not unanimous in their views on this historical point (compare Mr. Seth's careful sketch in the first essay with Mr. Sorley's account of Kant's position, p. 116). Some of the essays exhibit a clearness in distinctions and a largeness of view especially attractive to the patient reader of a different school who may not have expected to find them, but I note here and there throughout the book great failures to appreciate the conceptions of others, and sometimes even an inadequate appreciation of the relations involved in their own principles. The first two essays, which are closely related in subject, deserve special attention, and should go some way towards a reconciliation of opposing theories. There is a much greater extent of territory common, for example, to those who accept Evolutionary Empiricism and

those who accept the new theory of knowledge, than the ordinary member of either party can see; and these Essays have their value as helping to clear this common territory, even though they should claim some of it exclusively for their own.

Mr. Seth, in "Philosophy as Criticism of Categories," begins by giving an account of Kant's system, especially with reference to the notions he destroyed. Kant's method—the criticism of conceptions rather than the criticism of faculties, a somewhat misleading title which Kant himself frequently uses—was the true one, but was not carried out by him thoroughly, as he still "dogmatically assumed the conception of the mind as acted upon by something external to it". Hence the *Critique* "sets out from a psychological standpoint and never fairly gets beyond it," although "this point of view is negated and surmounted in the *Critique*" (p. 11). In Kant's scheme there remains a reality behind phenomena, of which we have no knowledge, knowledge being confined to a "spatial world of interacting substances". This view is erroneous, and really results from Kant's psychological dualism, of which his "division of the mind into receptivity and spontaneity is the mere correlate". But the spatial world—the separation of space from the categories not being justifiable—is simply the world that appears under the construction of Kant's categories, which are "inherently inadequate" to express more. The opposition between the world of sense and the world of ethics is not an opposition of phenomenal and noumenal, but rather a distinction "between more abstract and more concrete points of view". Each world is as real as the other, though neither point of view may be complete.

"It is the province of a theory of knowledge to point out the relation of the one point of view to the other, and, in general, while showing the partial and abstract nature of any particular point of view, to show at the same time how it is related to the ultimate or concrete conception of the universe which alone admits of being thought out without self-contradiction" (p. 21).

Kant himself admits that experience is not exhausted by his twelve categories, the idea of Freedom being necessary for the understanding of action determined by ends, as we find in the world of Ethics. In this *intelligible* ethical world, according to Kant, man has "the consciousness of himself as intelligence, *i.e.*, as rational and through reason active, which is to say, a free cause". "Self-consciousness is here put forward explicitly as the one noumenon to which all phenomena are referred, and by which they are, as it were, judged and declared to be phenomenal. This is the real Copernican change of standpoint which Kant effected, or at least which he puts us in the way of effecting" (p. 26). Mr. Seth then illustrates the distinction of categories by considering "how the ethical point of view stands related to the mechanical". Science rightly objects to any view of freedom

according to which the man is lifted above his surroundings, and can hurl a "solely self-originated fiat into the strife of motives beneath". No such irrational view is here urged. There is no breach in the series of physical events. But to consider them merely as "mechanical transformations" is not to exhaust their significance. What from one point of view is a physical event—a link in a mechanical series—is from another point of view a moral event, which implies "the self-determination of the rational being": "The world of ethics is superimposed therefore upon that of science, not as contradicting it, but as introducing a totally new order of conceptions, by which actions which are for science mere factual units in a series, become elements in a life guided by the notion of end or ought" (p. 29). Thus the category of the scientific observer is cause and effect; the category of ethics is "end, with its correlative obligation". There are, however, other points of view, which Kant recognises in the *Critique of Judgment*. "These are the æsthetic and the teleological judgment of things," or "the phenomena of beauty and of organisation"; and Mr. Seth proceeds to deal with the last of these, *viz.*, organisation, and to maintain against Kant that the "relation of organism to mechanism" is that of "a more adequate to a less adequate interpretation of the same facts," and not that of subjectivity to objectivity.

But there is a higher category still than that of organisation required when we deal with conscious individuals and the social organism. This supreme category is Self-consciousness. Now, that the different points of view from which the world is contemplated are confused in the mind of the ordinary scientific man cannot be doubted, and praise must be given to the endeavour of Mr. Seth and Messrs. Haldane to make clear that such confusion of categories does exist, and to illustrate how reconciliation between conflicting views may be produced by the disentanglement of the planes of outlook. Whether their method of disentanglement is the best remains to be seen. My own chief difficulty arises not so much from the Self-consciousness itself, but from the way in which they speak of it, and I shall consider this more fully, together with some of the previous points, in connexion with the next essay. We have seen that Mr. Seth, after urging that the distinction between the world of ethics and the world of sense is not that between noumenal and phenomenal, draws a conclusion from Kant (whether rightly or wrongly, I do not now inquire) that "the ultimate noumenon is to be found in self-consciousness, or in the notion of knowledge and its corollaries" (p. 27). The exact position adopted here is not made much clearer by the previous remark that "there is nothing transcendent, no unknowable, if we once see that a phenomenal world is a permissible phrase only when taken to mean something in which reason cannot rest". Again, self-consciousness is "the fundamental presupposition and the supreme category of thought" (p. 29). What is this Self?

"The self is individual only to the extent that it is at the same time universal. It knows itself, *i.e.*, it *is* itself, just because it includes within its knowledge not only one particular self, as an object in space and time, but also a whole intelligible world embracing many such selves" (p. 34). I cannot confess to being certain of the meaning of this passage. It appears to me to include a statement which is not expressive of what is found in my experience, but consists of a hypothesis offered as explanatory of my experience, and as such will be considered afterwards. Much more intelligible is the statement that "the self *is* the world and the world is the self," with the accompanying passages (p. 38). It is to this notion of self-consciousness, Mr. Seth urges, that "our whole criticism of categories leads." It is identified with knowledge and the unity of apperception (p. 35). When it is said that the categories are "simply stages or phases of explanation (of greater or less abstractness) which necessarily supersede one another in the development of knowledge" (p. 35), can we substitute self-consciousness for knowledge? Knowledge is described as being related to a "universally synthetic principle," the transcendental Ego (p. 36). On p. 38 I find the "transcendental self" referred to as "the implicate of all experience,"—"the necessary point of view from which the universe can be unified,"—and "the ultimate synthesis of thought". Are Knowledge, Self-consciousness, and the Transcendental Self identical? What then further is the Transcendental Self? "The theory of knowledge makes no assertion" of its existence otherwise than as the form of the Empirical Ego. Is the supreme category, then, merely the form of the Empirical Ego? Let us hope for light in the next essay. Mr. Seth's examination reaches the conclusion that "the Kantian criticism with its claim to map out knowledge and ignorance" must assume "the less pretentious form of a criticism of categories". "On the largest scale the advance of knowledge is neither more nor less than a progressive criticism of its own conceptions." The mutual criticism of their categories should not be left to the sciences themselves. Philosophy as theory of knowledge is to act as critic and arbiter, and show how the different points of view are related.

Some of the ground in Mr. Seth's essay is covered also in Essay II., "The Relation of Philosophy to Science," by Messrs. R. B. Haldane and J. S. Haldane. The point of the new criticism, say the writers, "may be defined, in its own somewhat uncouth language, as a claim to have exhibited even the simplest phases of sensation as possible only through the operation of an intelligible synthesis which cannot itself be made an object of experience, because only through it is experience possible" (p. 41). This seems to be a hypothesis to explain how experience is possible, as is apparently conceded by the writers (pp. 46, 63). We devise a conception, and accept or reject it "according as it does or does not upon application explain the facts" (p. 63). Whether this

new conception does explain the facts we shall see later. I wish to point out at this stage that the "uncouth language" used above refers to something which cannot become an object of experience, but which is nevertheless described in terms drawn from experience, such as *synthesis* and *operation*. Hence to use these terms of that through which experience is possible is to fall into that confusion of categories against which the writers warn us. Nor do I find this confusion avoided when the writers come to speak in their own language. After a concise account of Kant's real treatment, as they conceive it, of the problem of knowledge, illustrating his meaning and inconsistency by reference to the categories and his views on teleology, they proceed to briefly characterise the fully-developed theory resulting from the principle laid down by Kant.

"The fundamental fact beyond which we cannot get is the fact of self-consciousness. This fact contains within itself elements which, while inseparable in existence, are yet distinguishable in thought. We find a self limited by an objective universe. But the one cannot be separated from the other, and we come to find that, although it is only as apparently external to and independent of one another that these two elements can be made objects of knowledge, they must yet be assigned to a common position as moments in a higher synthesis of thought. But this synthesis can never become an object, *i.e.*, conscious of itself, save under this form of limitation" (p. 44).

The elements somewhat hidden in the statement that "we find a self limited by an objective universe," I take to be—the consciousness of self, inseparable from the consciousness of a not-self. If the theory is merely "an analysis of the fundamental unity of knowledge," what is meant seems to be that the consciousness of self and the consciousness of not-self are both *mine*, are both the consciousness of my (transcendental) Ego. In this case the Ego is the "synthesis" and becomes conscious of itself (empirical) as limited by an objective universe. So far as this statement is merely "an analysis of the fundamental unity of knowledge" it may be accepted. But much more seems to be attempted, in the essay at least, if not in the above particular passage concerning the "fully-developed theory". If such a theory is "not a theory of creation," why is the synthesis called in various places throughout the essay *creative*? However, an explanation of the fact of experience *is* offered, and asserted to be the "only possible" one. It is that mind, as the creative synthesis of thought, is the ultimate reality and constitutes experience (p. 46). The higher synthesis, then, of which the self and the objective universe are moments, is Mind. I am at this stage not sure of the interpretation. I admit for the present the term Mind as applicable to something which underlies, or overlies, the whole of my experience, and which as such can never be made an object of my experience. In the above offered explanation I do not know whether it is *my* mind or some *universal* mind which is meant. If my mind be meant, I

see no reason for assuming that it is *creative*, or that it *constitutes* experience, if *constitutes* means any more than I have admitted above. On the contrary, the *creation* involved in such an assumption is inconceivable. If some universal mind is meant, the hypothesis, besides being open to the objection that *creation* here also is inconceivable, is open to the further objection that the so-called explanation is no explanation at all. Nevertheless it is this latter position which appears to be intended. Experience is explained when we see that there is a universal self-consciousness in which the knowable world and the individual consciousness are constituted in an organic relationship. This explains nothing and assumes everything. The individual does in truth clearly know that the world manifested to him is not of his own making. How is it possible, then, for him to know it? Could he consciously spin out from himself every fact before him, the wandering problem would vanish for ever. As he cannot do so, let him shove the problem before the Unknowable, and there solve it for the same. But the problem so solved is solved only for the Unknowable, not for us. We have relieved It from the concern of pondering the cosmos, have shown It what It is, and how the thing is done. But until It changes places with the individual, the individual is as wise, or as foolish, as ever. But does not the Universal Self-consciousness constitute an organic relationship between the individual and the world? I thought we knew the chief part of this before. That there is a relationship between the individual consciousness and the world beyond it is only another way of stating the fact that the individual does in some way get to know that world,

"And when, or how, or where we met
I own to me's a secret yet."

But I suppose the answer that will be given to this is that the individual consciousness is identical with the universal consciousness. "Even finite self-conscious knowledge is potentially infinite, *i.e.*, is, in ultimate analysis, thought, not as presented to itself in self-consciousness, but as identical with the creative synthesis" (p. 45). Where, then, is it presented to itself if not in self-consciousness? A criticism of categories is here desirable.

Again, this creative synthesis "manifests itself in fundamental modes, which definitely differ from one another, but which mutually imply each other and are related in a dialectical development" (p. 46). This development is said to be "no affair of space and time," which are nevertheless "two of its stages". Does the word "dialectical" affect the word "development" so as to give it any significance when bereft of the notion of time? Are these "fundamental modes" objects of experience? If yes, how can there be a development of them which is no affair of time? If no, how can we predicate anything at all of them? Is it the development of the synthesis that is spoken of, and not the development of its modes? But the synthesis has been explicitly

distinguished by the impossibility of its becoming an object of experience; how then can we speak of its development? In short, the proposed explanation of experience needs more explaining than experience itself. The manifestations in the individual consciousness are reflected upon, and the antithesis between the self and the world accepted as in some sense necessary. Escape from it seems vain. That the individual should be conscious of what is not his consciousness must be unmeaning—and the other individuals of which he is conscious are not his consciousness. There can be nothing else but his consciousness,—which proposition even he regards as absurd. *Eureka!* there is a universal consciousness breaking up into subject and object, into self and world, and with this universal consciousness the individual consciousness is identical; and so the awkward limit is supposed to disappear. Such perhaps is the sort of process, where it is seen that the explanation, so far as it is thinkable, is simply an idealisation of the problem with which we started. I have admitted above that the underlying or overlying something of my experience may be called Mind. Otherwise it is the (transcendental) Ego, and, as Messrs. Haldane clearly state on p. 46, it is not to be confounded with what they call “the subject-matter of empirical psychology”. No more, then, is it to be confounded with what I call Thought, of which the only notion I can form is drawn from this same “subject-matter of empirical psychology”.

The truth or untruth of the doctrine we have been considering does not affect the validity of the writers' illustrations of confusion between categories, though such confusion can be much more clearly shown, as it seems to me, from other standpoints. It does not follow, they say, that an object which from one point of view must be regarded as existing in a certain way, “exists in the world of fact only in that way”. We are not entitled to regard the object as constituted by one category alone. With Kant there is a distinction in kind between the sorts of knowledge, but with the later theory the distinction is one of degree merely, and “from the relations of pure mathematics up to those of self-consciousness we have a chain of aspects of nature not one of which is reducible to another, but which are yet inseparably united together in thought” (p. 52). The writers illustrate the misapplication of categories by considering the phenomena of consciousness and of teleology, and also the scientific conceptions of organisation and development. The controversy about free will and necessity is also said to be due to a misapplication of categories. In dealing with the question concerning the relation between the physical phenomena of human organisms and the psychical phenomena we “naturally attribute,” the writers appear to use phenomena of consciousness, phenomena of self-consciousness, and psychical phenomena as equivalent terms; and while apparently preferring the term psychological to psychical (p. 61,

note) they refrain from using it. No doubt the true distinction between physical and psychical phenomena is not clearly seen by the ordinary man of science. But why is Kant's view expounded, on p. 49, very much as though it were correct (with the *creative synthesis* introduced), while the fact that it is wrong is left to be pointed out in a note? The addition here of Kant's view in this way may prove misleading, especially as it is in the exact meaning of the supposed parallelism *in time* between the two series of events that the problem centres. The writers do not sufficiently show the importance of their special theory of knowledge in explaining the common error. We are told about different ways of regarding the phenomena, and the presence of higher categories, but nothing definite is given us, certainly nothing definite that is new and characteristic. And here I think we see not only the desirability of knowing when to apply such categories, but the need of having the categories systematically arranged, such an arrangement not being by any means "for the purposes of practical criticism of categories irrelevant" (p. 52). From the different standpoint of Barratt and Clifford the question gets a much clearer treatment, as in the distinction between objects and ejects to which the writers refer. No objection is made to Clifford's view beyond what may be implied in the remark that he had no acquaintance with "Kant's *real* teaching about the nature of knowledge" (p. 51, note). The other illustrations offered by the writers are also capable, I think, of a much clearer treatment from some standpoint *analogous* to that of the Mind-Stuff theory.

The scientific conceptions of Organisation and Development are dealt with at considerable length. The general view may be accepted, though not as peculiar to the essayists' theory of knowledge. The mechanical problem in connexion with changes in the organism is well put on p. 53, in fact so well put that the view propounded shortly afterwards concerning the growth of a newt's new hand in place of one amputated appears by comparison erroneous. If the links in the physiological series sequent upon the application of an electrical stimulus to the tongue can be regarded as due to the actions of forces mechanically considered, so also must be regarded the phenomena of reproduction. I do not mean in any way to challenge the position of the writers that "the categories of mechanism do not exhaust reality in its aspect of life" (p. 45), but I do mean to say that we must not entangle the plane of mechanism with the plane of teleology. The physical changes must be regarded as due to preceding physical changes, and as such perfectly explicable, or they are without interpretation at all, and the writers themselves appear to me in the instance before us to confuse the categories. They ask: "Is it conceivable that each of the thousands of separately existing cells concerned in the process should have a mechanism within it, which would cause it in spite of all obstacles to take up the

position, and undergo the modification requisite for the proper performance of its work in the newly developed hand?" (p. 55). The very form of this question shows a misappreciation of the scientific problem. Further, they ask: "Or is it conceivable that mechanical pressure of any kind should cause the bud to grow into a perfect hand?" Certainly it is conceivable, though the question, if not put incorrectly, is put crudely. Whether conceivable or not in the particular process, the hand as a physical arrangement is interpretable in no other way than by physical changes. This of course is not to deny that there are other aspects of the reality which are inexplicable by the category of mechanism. It follows then that the hypothesis stated by the writers and characterised as "alternative," is not "alternative". To call it so is to propound a dilemma analogous to that propounded by the dogmatist on p. 51, and to avoid such a reconciliation as the writers are seeking (p. 60). The limits of this notice forbid further detailed criticism of Messrs. Haldane's illustrations, and forbid also the substantiation of a more general criticism which may be made with reference to the method they adopt.

The method as put before us lacks psychological foundations. There can be no criticism of categories without psychological analysis of the conceptions involved and their relations to one another. Before we can speak of applying this or that category there should be some agreement reached as to the significance of the terms we use as categories. As an instance of what I mean, I may refer to the conception of Cause. The writers urge (p. 60), that "so soon as it is recognised that volition is really not to be looked upon as a process taking place in space, the dilemma that it must either be caused or uncaused disappears". But from my point of view, the central element of Cause is Will, and therefore the statement quoted seems to me to have no relevance to the controversy of free-will and necessity.

The writers' view of their method is that it "is not distinguishable in principle from the method of science". The object of the theory of knowledge, the fact of self-consciousness, must be assumed "as something ultimate given to it, just as all sciences assume their own objects". The peculiarity of the object here is that it falls only partially within "the field of the object," being "at once knowledge as presented to itself and the act of presentation". The method must therefore "not presuppose a distinction between knowledge and its object," and this condition is satisfied in seeking from the nature of experience "to determine a conception of the nature of knowledge that would explain it" (p. 63). How far experience has been explained by the writers we have already seen. They conclude that the theory of knowledge must have a place in relation to the whole body of scientific inquiry, dealing critically with the abstractions of the inquirer, assigning to them their true position, and making clear the real nature of scientific method.

Mr. Sorley's essay on "The Historical Method" has its importance as indicating the position of the essayists on psychological questions. The writer points out the value in certain ways of the historical method as he interprets it, considers its use in Jurisprudence, Psychology, and Ethics, urges that its worth in the philosophical inquiry as to the nature of knowledge is his fundamental question, and regards his examination as leading to the conclusion that the applicability of the historical method, "however wide, is necessarily limited. It implies categories of which it can only trace the historical manifestation, leaving the investigation of their logical position and nature to the theory of knowledge or to the theory of action; and it leads up to problems which pass out of the range of the chronological sequence to which it is restricted" (p. 125). But surely no adherent to the so-called historical method would admit that it is to be adopted *in place of* "that of direct observation and reasoning," as the writer implies (p. 106), even if he admitted it was "but a branch of the realistic or experiential method" (p. 104)? At the outset, it is not made clear whether the social sciences are to be placed on "a different level from the natural" because of the "self-consciousness" in the former, or because of their greater complexity of factors (pp. 103, 104), and this last is certainly not a sufficient reason. A similar confusion occurs on pp. 110, 111 as regards the difference between the legal conceptions of the vulgar and those of the expert. There is an obscurity, too, in the statement of "the fundamental question of ethics," which is said to be "the differentiation of moral or consciously determined action from that which is merely natural or determined by conditions independent of consciousness" (p. 120). This rather suggests that Mr. Sorley would do what Messrs. Haldane urge we cannot do, *viz.*, "construct the moral consciousness upon physical principles" (p. 57). By "conditions independent of consciousness" the writer, no doubt, means conditions independent of the individual consciousness. The "final question of ethics" is to decide "between various ethical ends, and to determine that which 'ought' to be followed". The writer very easily denies the competence of the historical method, as he conceives it, to deal with either of these questions. In the body of the essay, passing from the dependence of the explanation of "ideals" upon the philosophic method adopted, Mr. Sorley contends that the central point of Kant's *Critique* is "the necessity of a reference to self-consciousness for all knowledge," and proceeds then to deal specially with Mr. Spencer's analysis of Space as a typical case of the failure of the "historical treatment" applied to a question "connected both with the theory of knowledge and with the analysis of mental states". He apparently supposes that the passage from the non-spatial to the spatial must be shown at some particular stage (p. 117). This shows his misappreciation of Evolution, and his deficiency in

psychological analysis. At no special moment of time can it be said—here the non-spatial is converted into the spatial, any more than we can point to a moment of differentiation of moral from natural action. There is, moreover, in the writer's view, a "germinal perception" (p. 119) which is not analysable, from which it appears that he has courageously hopped or skipped over divers critical and crucial parts of Mr. Spencer's argument. Hence such a misapprehension as that Mr. Spencer's analysis of space "presupposes that the distinction between various parts of our organism is already a distinction for the percipient subject before there is any spatial perception, and then evolves the perception of space from the consciousness of this distinction". Mr. Sorley confuses an inquiry concerning our "perception of space in its totality," where certain elements are given, with an account of the "primitive element out of which the consciousness of Space is built," viz., the consciousness of co-existence. He should refer to § 334 of *Principles of Psychology* and the chapter on "The Relations of Coexistence and Non-coexistence," which seem to have entirely escaped his notice. Mr. Spencer is represented on p. 117 as identifying the "perception of motion" with "muscular sensations"! The word perception indeed does not occur on the page given in reference by the writer, Mr. Spencer's real description of "The Perception of Motion" being given at the conclusion of the chapter so entitled (ii., p. 231). Similar misconceptions vitiate the whole of Mr. Sorley's argument on the evolution of our notion of space. The application of the new method is here at least not successful. Contrariwise, there is exhibited an utter failure in comprehending the plainly-marked stages of a psychological analysis.

For the remaining Essays little more than a brief statement of their purport must suffice.

Mr. Bosanquet, the writer of "Logic as the Science of Knowledge," holds that the nature of knowledge can be exhibited in a system of stages or types. His object is to "indicate the combined unity and comprehensiveness which such a point of view may confer on the treatment of logic" (p. 68), and he attempts, first, to determine the nature and conditions of a science of knowledge; secondly, to explain the relation of logic as such a science to metaphysic and the real world; and, thirdly, to explain its relation to the traditional types of formal logic with their modern offshoots (p. 68). The province of logic is the science of such thought as claims to be knowledge. Thought that corresponds to fact is knowledge,—fact comes by experience—so that experience is the criterion of knowledge. The judgment is the rudimentary form of "that systematic unity the more and less of which constitutes the more and less of knowledge". "To understand this unity in its different but kindred manifestations, to appreciate the demands which in its various phases it makes upon its material, and to formulate these demands as the logical ideal

of knowledge, is what we understand by the function of logic as a science" (p. 72). The consideration of the contrast between logic, the science of thought as knowledge, and metaphysic, the science of reality as such, leads the writer to the conclusion that the general science of reality cannot be distinguished from the science of knowledge, and ontological speculations are to disappear. The writer compares his "proposed treatment" at great length with the formal logic of tradition,—and adopts Jevons's view of Induction that it is deduction regarded inversely. The writer's view of reason may be noted: "That the action of reason is varied and limited in individual men by dependence upon an animal mechanism is a belief now almost inevitable, whether true or not" (p. 74).

In "The Rationality of History," Mr. Ritchie considers the possibility and the character of a philosophy of history. The philosophy of history, we are told, "seeks to discover the 'ideas' of different periods in their relation to one another," and it "implies a teleological view of phenomena". The question how far such "an attempt to read the plan of Providence" (p. 132) is possible, is discussed. History is a "struggle towards rational freedom," and in this struggle the unity of humanity is presupposed. There are six main ways of regarding history, six categories by which to explain its phenomena, *viz.*, Chance, Providence, Decadence, Progress, Cycles, and Progress by Antithesis. I might ask whether the writer would assign another way to Evolution, or whether he would identify this with Progress. But he says that, in the attempt to make the conception of Progress real, it has been "narrowed down to intellectual advance," and this statement would not be applicable to Evolution. The formula adopted by Mr. Ritchie, though he admits it "can only be applied with great limitations in history" (p. 153), is that of Progress by Antithesis. The positive meaning of progress is "the struggle for freedom . . . the liberation of man from the domination of nature and fate". The "Antithesis" is not so clear.

"Some elements of the spiritual life of man are realised by one period or nation; but just because they are *some* elements only, they are realised in a one-sided and exaggerated, and therefore self-destructive way. The next step is, therefore, in a contrary direction. Then comes an attempt to bring the two sides together. But because spirit is infinite and its temporal manifestation finite, this must always prove incomplete; and thus the world must proceed again through a new antithesis to a new reconciliation" (p. 152).

Now I do not deny that progress or evolution or the development of the idea may proceed by what might be called Rhythms, but that "the attempt to bring the two sides together" must always prove incomplete—I cannot get as a conclusion from the statement that "spirit is infinite and its temporal manifestation finite". The writer illustrates his view, chiefly by reference to Greece and Rome, and points out the difficulty of interpreting our own time, a difficulty which, as the writer is careful to note, Hegel did not

escape. The essay as to results is rather negative, saving the formula, but of this the writer himself seems somewhat doubtful.

In the essay "On the Philosophy of Art," Mr. Ker first describes Plato's theory of art, and shows the imperfection of it, art being represented in that theory as "valueless in comparison with philosophy". This separation of the two is the necessary beginning of a philosophy of art. The "theory of art as an education" is considered, and so also are the relations between art, science, and morality. The main point about works of art is stated to be that "they are phenomena that explain themselves" (p. 170). A moral act is said to be "a phenomenon whose true nature is not wholly apparent" (p. 173). I should class Mr. Ker's essay as a moral act rather than as a work of art. But perhaps the reader may find such passages as the following more intelligible than I do myself:—

"The self-consciousness would believe itself to be absolute in itself, but it finds that it is absolute only so long as it does nothing. Its freedom is not freedom to do anything, it is mere negation. Then begins the endless progress of morality; it is forced outward into the objective world to make that freedom *apparent* which to the self-conscious subject is the reality of realities" (p. 175).

Much is said about the freedom shown in art. "Art is the vindication of present freedom." The problem of the philosophy of art is "to make the history of art intelligible—not simply a series of biographies or catalogues, of artists or their works, but a history showing the place of art in the development of the human reason" (p. 179).

As might be expected from the title of Mr. Jones's essay, "The Social Organism," he offers various objections to Mr. Spencer's view expressed in its later form in *Principles of Sociology*, vol. i. These parts of the essay are rendered worthless by the writer's peculiar misapprehensions of Mr. Spencer's view. One instance will suffice. On p. 190 Mr. Spencer is said to silently admit the supposition that "society is inorganic because discrete". A reference to §§ 220, 221 will show that the reverse of this is the case. In the very sections from which Mr. Jones quotes, Mr. Spencer shows how "the mutual dependence of parts which constitutes organisation is thus effectually established. Though discrete instead of concrete, the social aggregate is rendered a living whole" (*Prin. of Soc.*, i., 478). That Mr. Spencer's establishment has not escaped the notice of Mr. Jones is manifest from the fact that on p. 211 Mr. Jones curiously singles out the argument for that establishment, but applies it to a passage in the following section, which deals with the social sensorium! "We think Mr. Spencer's attempt to re-create the social unity by means of 'emotional language, and by the language, oral and written, of the intellect,' inadequate and superficial, though we cannot here fully discuss it" (p. 211). Other parts of the paper are more directly ethical, and these are marked by the writer's

emphatic assertions of the individual's freedom. Freedom is also the bond of the social organism, "its self-differentiating, self-integrating life" (p. 200). Hedonism, interpreted in the narrow sense of pursuit of pleasant sensations, is briefly criticised in order "to show that because its ideal is particular it has no ethical character". The writer's ethical ideal is the social organism, or rather "the moral organism which is embodied in the various forms of society" (p. 206). The synthesis here would appear exceeding small in the eyes of the writer of the last essay. Society is an organism "because the individual realises himself as an ethical being in society, and society realises itself in the individual" (p. 208). Mr. Jones seems to me to evade the difficulty as to the self-consciousness of the social organism. If the individual becomes conscious of himself by distinguishing himself from the environment (p. 211), why may not the social organism act likewise? But self-consciousness must be placed on the social organism somehow, which is said to be self-conscious because "it is conscious of itself in every self-conscious being" (p. 212). There is a noteworthy admission by the writer that a line can be drawn, if not very definitely, between consciousness and self-consciousness, though where it is drawn is "perfectly indifferent, at least to idealism;" and he insists that "the animal which is incapable of grasping its own end is an instrument, and not an organism in the true sense of the word" (p. 196).

The next essay "The Struggle for Existence—Hints for a Philosophy of Economics"—by Mr. Bonar, is clothed in somewhat different garb from the other essays in the book. The essay might be supposed to have mistaken its place but for a few "categories" it scatters towards the close. The writer of the previous essay would find it hard to reconcile his statements with some of those—much healthier—made by Mr. Bonar, e.g.: "To modern notions, then, society is made for man, not man for society" (p. 225). Mr. Bonar points out certain "social prolegomena, without which economical science is abstract and unreal". "They point to the entire impossibility of the Ricardian *regime* of rigorous competition; and, granting the possibility, they would qualify the conclusions of orthodox economics." He urges that the 'struggle for existence,' literally taken, is an evil; that progress depends upon ideas. The 'struggle for existence' means, in all but the lowest strata, ambition. Hence desire for material wealth as a means, modified in various ways by social and moral influences connected with the real end whatever that may be. Further, the competition of business-men is in many ways less rigorous than is commonly supposed. But surely these points are distinctly recognised by the economics of the present day. The writer's view of the function of the State I do not find definitely expressed. He would at least have all its members "placed in possession of their powers and made equal in oppor-

tunity". He is of course right in objecting to *laissez faire* doctrine, but just as much of course wrong in identifying Mr. Spencer's view with this, as he does on p. 231. Nor, as Mr. Spencer long ago pointed out, is the title "Administrative Nihilism" rightly applicable to his doctrine of Specialised Administration.

Repetition of an obscure principle does not always produce clearness, any more than it evolves truth out of error. In Mr. Kilpatrick's "Pessimism and the Religious Consciousness," the repetition is excessive. That the individual must be grounded in the universal consciousness, and that no criticism of the world is sound except from the point of view of the constitutive principle—these enunciations form no small ingredient in his exposition. From the point of view of this universal consciousness the truth of pessimism ceases, for the world no longer answers to its description. The synthesis of humanity as in Comte's Positivism is deemed insufficient, but the writer does not consider the wider view manifest in the doctrine of Evolution, which can hardly be called pessimistic. One of the main points of the essay seems to involve a contradiction. On p. 269 we find that all the evil of which an individual is conscious is due to his own act, and it is so due because the individual "is lifted out of his individuality, and is united to the principle through which the world is for him". But on p. 272 evil is asserted to be "the assertion of the self in its individuality" against this principle, and on p. 275 it appears that his deliverance from evil is his union with that principle. To him for whom the cosmos creaks along on a pivot of pain, I cannot see that any help is given by these vaguenesses about a universal consciousness. The comparative solidity manifest in the opening essays of the book is here frittered away into a febrile and futile phraseology, and the essay serves as a final indication of how words may be taken for thoughts, and of the critical state of a theory exhibiting the attempt at philosophy without a mastery of the meaning of psychology.

RICHARD HODGSON.

Studies in Logic. By MEMBERS OF THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY. Boston: Little & Brown, 1883. Pp. 203.

Mr. C. S. Peirce's name is so well known to those who take an interest in the development of the Boolean or symbolic treatment of Logic that the knowledge that he was engaged in lecturing upon the subject to advanced classes at the Johns Hopkins University will have been an assurance that some interesting contributions to the subject might soon be looked for. And such assurance is justified in the volume under notice, which seems to me to contain a greater quantity of novel and suggestive matter than any other recent work on the same or allied subjects which has happened to come under my notice.

It is a collection of papers or essays by several different authors—pupils, it may be inferred, of Mr. Peirce—concluding with an essay on the nature and foundations of Inductive Logic contributed by Mr. Peirce himself.

The two contributions which deal specially with symbolic non-quantitative Logic are furnished respectively by Miss Ladd and Mr. O. H. Mitchell. The former of these adopts substantially the Boolean calculus as modified by Herr Schröder, but with considerable additions. The main departures from the original calculus are to be found in the adoption of the now familiar mode of expressing alternatives in an inexclusive notation, and in the introduction of a symbolic procedure for expressing the true particular proposition. Of the former of these two points little need be said here, as the procedure in question is distinctly the popular one at present, and indeed ever since it was first familiarised to us by Jevons. That it produces a great simplification in procedure is undeniable, but it has what seems to me the serious defect, from a speculative point of view, that it does not lend itself to the use of inverse formulæ, such for example as those analogous to the operation of division. Against the use of such formulæ, however, the writers before us show a rather unreasonable antipathy, and Miss Ladd is certainly wrong in declaring that the only justification for them is based on the analogy of mathematics.¹ That the use of the division-sign was first suggested by virtue of such analogy is doubtless true; but each can now stand equally on its own ground of justification, for not a shadow of reason can be alleged why the notion of an inverse operation should not exist in purely qualitative inference. I can hardly conceive any more valuable speculative exercise than that of clearly realising and determining the conditions of an inverse process in Logic—say that of ascertaining, after we have defined and symbolised the process of determination or restriction, what must be the starting point, and what the limits of indefiniteness in the step of such restriction in order to arrive at a given result: in other words, having defined xy , of putting our interpretation upon $x \div y$. I am confirmed in this opinion by the fact that a writer such as Jevons, in his last logical work, should have still regarded such expressions as “impossible” ones. To my thinking, the value of the mental exercise in question outweighs the merits of the very elegant devices (of which a good account is given by Miss Ladd) for denoting the contradictory of any complicated expression, which are available on the non-exclusive method.

¹ “It is only on account of a supposed resemblance between the logical and the mathematical processes that an attempt to introduce them has been made” (p. 19). Considering the extent to which they *are* introduced by Boole, and with what no one denies to be consistent usage and correct results, something more than an “attempt” might be admitted.

The most important and characteristic point insisted on in this volume is the necessity of introducing an additional form of copula (or predicate) for the due expression of particular propositions. As the reader probably knows, it is a characteristic of one main form of the Symbolic Logic that it aims at throwing propositions into the form of denying that a certain class-combination exists: thus 'All x is y ' is regarded as denying that there is any x not- y . This plan does well enough so long as we deal with universals, but when we come to particulars we find that if we are to retain the full signification, in respect of indefiniteness, of the word 'some,' such propositions cannot be expressed without recourse to some new device. Both Boole and Jevons indeed claim to introduce particulars, but scarcely any one who will carefully analyse the full import of the expressions they employ can allow them to be successful. In Boole's $vx = vy$, it is distinctly admitted that v is not to be treated as an ordinary class-symbol that may be equated to zero, and this restriction invalidates the introduction of such an expression into his most important generalisations. Jevons's $CA = CB$ escapes this difficulty by the denial that *any* of his single letter-symbols can be equated to zero. In this respect he stands alone amongst modern symbolists, and the consequences are fatal to the true generality of his expression of universal propositions. An indefinite number of perfectly consistent groups of propositions would have to be refused admittance by him on the ground of mutual inconsistency, because they would lead to the obliteration of some single letter or class-symbol.

It is one great merit of the writers under review to have fully recognised this fact and to have grappled with the attempt at the general introduction of such propositions in their true indefinite form. With consistency, therefore, the fundamental distinction is found to lie, not between affirmative and negative, but between universal and particular propositions. It is the function of the former to *deny*, whatever may be their character in their common signification—to deny, that is, not a predicate of a subject, but the existence of a certain combination made out of the subject and predicate taken together. It is the function of the latter to *affirm*, *viz.*, to save the existence of a similar compound. 'All x is y ' and 'No x is y ' respectively deny the existence of the compounds xy and xy ; whilst 'Some x is not y ' and 'Some x is y ' respectively save these compounds. Accordingly whilst mere class-reference leads to a dichotomy only, in that a thing must belong to the class or not, the act of judgment or assertion leads to a trichotomy, for we may affirm or deny or be in doubt about the matter. I do not mean that this distinction is in any way peculiar to the conception of logic in question, but it seems to be much more strongly emphasised here; for when we break up the universe into all the possible sub-classes yielded by the class-terms, it would seem that to save or destroy any one

of these classes makes as complete a pair of alternatives as to include or exclude an object in reference to them. Why this difference, then, it may be asked, between class-reference and predication; and is the three-fold character of the latter a necessary and permanent one? To enter fully into this inquiry would be a digression in a brief review of this kind, but a few hints may be permitted. In respect of the distinction between class-reference and predication, the answer would seem to be that subjectively regarded we should equally have to admit a three-fold division in the case of the former; for we must either know that an object does belong to a given class, or that it does not, or we must be in doubt about it. But we find it simpler to take a completely objective standing-point here, by admitting only the two alternatives, one or other of which must exist physically, and by referring the element of doubt to the region of judgment, *viz.*, of predication. As regards the finality of any such logical convention, it must be frankly admitted that it is not final, but then the science of logic itself belongs to a progressive or imperfect state of knowledge. Were our knowledge absolutely complete we should know for certain of any object whether it did or did not belong to any assigned class; its x and $not-x$ status would not only exist but be known. And in the same way we should know of every assignable sub-class whether it existed or not. Accordingly, not to affirm would be to deny and not to deny would be to affirm: that is, on the Boolean conception of the logical universe, the class-elements which were not destroyed would be known to be saved. But this is of course a merely ideal state of knowledge, and its realisation would do away with all the utility and significance of Logic.

The copula-symbols employed by Miss Ladd are \vee and ∇ . $A \vee B$ is to be read 'A is in part B,' or 'A is not-wholly excluded from B,' always with the special signification above assigned to the particular proposition. On the other hand, $A \nabla B$ is to be read 'A is-not B,' or 'A is wholly excluded from B,' and gives no implication that either A or B exists. That is, these are the expressions for the particular affirmative and universal negative, whilst the universal affirmative 'All A is B,' is written $A \nabla \bar{B}$, *viz.*, A excludes not-B. This mode of writing propositions is, I think, more consistent and intelligible when the constituent class-symbols are all gathered to the left side of the expression, and the whole is read as a declaration of existence or non-existence of the compound class-term thus produced. For instance, we may substitute 'AB is' for 'A is in part B,' when the particular proposition is interpreted under the conditions above-stated; and 'AB is not' for 'No A is B'. The symbolic expressions for these forms necessitate of course some symbol for the 'universe' and its absence, for which Miss Ladd employs, in common with some other writers, the mathematical forms ∞ and 0. But, as is pointed out, the introduction of a double copula symbol enables

us to make use of one only of these universe symbols, and the result is simplified by taking ∞ for this purpose, and (by taking it for granted) avoiding the necessity of actually introducing it into our equations. Thus, 'There is x ' and 'There is no x ,' being written in full $x \vee \infty$ and $x \bar{\vee} \infty$, we may take the latter symbol for granted and simply write $x \vee$ and $x \bar{\vee}$. When for x here we substitute a complex expression, *e.g.*, xy , we obtain propositions which break up into the familiar subject and predicate form. Thus, $xy \vee$ means 'There is x which is not y ,' or 'Some x is not y '; and $xy \bar{\vee}$ means 'There is no x which is not y ,' namely, 'All x is y '.¹

It should be remarked that the different symbols thus aggregated on the left side are necessarily commutative and transferable at will to the other side. Thus, for $xyz \bar{\vee}$ which means 'There is no xyz ,' we may substitute such equivalent forms as $xz \bar{\vee} y$, *viz.*, 'All xz is y ,' or $xy \bar{\vee} z$, *viz.*, 'No x which is not y is z ,' and so on to any extent which the available number of permutations may permit. A large part of the essay is devoted to the exhibition and comparison of convenient equivalent or inferrible expressions founded on this leading idea.

The remarks already made about the expression of particular propositions naturally suggest the inquiry whether any perfectly general treatment of them is available, that is, corresponding in generality and brevity to those which Boole has given and which have been simplified in their practical employment by a succession of writers. I am inclined to think that it is not; at least I do not remember to have seen anything at all rivalling the completeness with which groups of universal propositions can be grappled with. The passage in which one would most expect to find the desired formulæ in the volume before us is at page 45, under the head of "Resolution of Problems". As the passage seems to me obscure, I quote it in full:—

"From a combination of universal propositions, the conclusion, irrespective of any term or set of terms to be eliminated, x , consists of the universal exclusion of the product of the co-efficient of x by that of the negative of x , added to the excluded combinations which are free from x as given. If the premisses include an alternation of particular propositions, the conclusion consists of the partial inclusion of the total co-efficient of x in the particular propositions by the negative of that of x in the universal propositions, added to the included combinations which are free from x as given."

The first part of this statement is simple enough. It is the

¹ The originality of treatment here consists mainly in the notation and certain consequences thereof. The general conception of forming a scheme of propositions by equating all the possible combinations of class-terms to 0 and *something*, has been suggested before. For instance, I have suggested such a scheme myself, on a plan modified with less departure from Boole's plan.

well-known rule, For $f(x)$ write $f(1)f(0)$, put into its simpler concrete form; for when $f(x)$ is represented as a logical expression involving x and not- x , it stands $Ax + B\bar{x} + C$, and the above formula becomes (regard had to the suggestions of simplification which Boole recommends) $AB + C = 0$.¹ But the latter sentence does not seem to me at all clear. Take a simple instance embracing one universal proposition, or resultant of several such, and one alternation of particulars. The fullest expression for the former, regard being had to any class-term x and its negation, is as above $Ax + B\bar{x} + C = 0$; or as Miss Ladd writes it $Ax + B\bar{x} + C\bar{\vee}$. The correspondingly full form for the latter would then be $Ex + F\bar{x} + G = \text{something}$, or $Ex + F\bar{x} + G\vee$; viz., it intimates that something comprised in this aggregate of class-combinations is to be saved. Now "the total co-efficient of x in the particular propositions" is here E , and "the negative of that of x in the universal proposition" is \bar{A} , and "the combinations which are free from x as given" are C and G , and by "partial inclusion" is meant combination into a particular proposition. According to this, the solution of the problem would be $EA + C + G\vee$, if the "addition of the included combinations free from x " is to be carried out as when we are dealing with universals alone. But this clearly will not do. The rule may possibly be intended for the much simpler case of two such premisses as $Ax + B\bar{x}\bar{\vee}$, and $Ex + G\vee$. A value (not the full value) of x , determined from the former, is that it is \bar{A} : substitute this in the latter, and we should have $EA + G\vee$, which answers to the rule given.

It may be worth while to digress from the present treatment for a few minutes in order to point out how we might attempt to represent diagrammatically the results of combining any number of universal propositions and any number of alternatives of particulars. I have suggested elsewhere a plan for thus representing any combination of universals by drawing a system of circles or other closed and mutually intersecting figures, and shading out all the compartments which are shown to be destroyed when the propositions are interpreted with the usual symbolic signification. If we introduce particular propositions also, we must of course employ some additional form of diagrammatical notation, just as the writers under notice find it neces-

¹ This formula is sometimes (as here) called Schröder's modification of Boole's formula of elimination. It hardly appears to me to deserve a distinct name. No doubt it seems at first sight, as Miss Ladd says, to differ from Boole's by the omission of the redundant terms AC and BC given by the multiplication of the factors $(A + C)(B + C)$ or $f(1)f(0)$. But Boole himself recommends (p. 130) the omission of such terms in the practical application of his rules. The simple fact is that the formula $f(1)f(0)$ is the most abstract or general form, and $AB + C$ the form suggested for adoption when our expression is one degree more concrete in its statement.

sary to employ two forms of copula. We might, for example, just draw a bar across the compartments declared to be saved; remembering of course that, whereas destruction is distributive, *i.e.*, every included sub-section is destroyed, the salvation is only alternative or partial, *i.e.*, we can only be sure that some of the included sub-sections are saved. Thus, 'No x is y ,' leading to the destruction of xy , will destroy both xyz and $xy\bar{z}$, if z has to be taken account of. But 'Some x is y ,' saving a part of xy , does not in the least indicate whether such part is xyz or $xy\bar{z}$. Thus, if we had the general alternative premiss that $Ax + B\bar{x} + C$ exists, this means that either there is x which is A , or not- x which is B , or that there is C . Draw a line of some recognisable kind through, or in any way put a mark on the list of elements included above, and the import of the proposition is complete when we are informed that some or other of their contents is to be reserved. We may then proceed to fill in all the information furnished by the universal propositions, by erasing the compartments with which they deal, and the full information of the combined propositions is represented to the eye. Of course, if several groups of such alternatives of particulars are given in the premisses we must employ a distinctive line or mark for each such group. If it were worth while thus to illustrate complicated groups of propositions of the kind in question, it could, I fancy, be done with very tolerable success.

Miss Ladd's paper is illustrated by a good selection of examples. Some of these are of considerable difficulty and complexity, and show very forcibly the progress that has been made within the last few years, as logicians have begun to acquire ease and dexterity in the manipulation of their rules and in the invention of intermediate formulæ and practical simplifications. They seem, so far as I have tried them, to be concisely and correctly worked out, and several of the devices adopted represent real simplifications in procedure.

The following minor points seem to me to call for revision or reconsideration. On p. 42, the example is certainly wrong, or else \bar{x} has been written by mistake for x . On p. 27, it is maintained that the notation employed will suit the expression of negative propositions whether interpreted in extension or intension; "the proposition *no stones are plants* means that the objects denoted and the qualities connoted by the term *stone* are inconsistent with the objects denoted and the qualities connoted by the term *plant*". This seems to me a very misleading statement. The objects denoted are of course numerically entirely distinct, but in what appropriate sense they can be called "inconsistent," I cannot perceive, for each may necessarily imply the existence of the other, *e.g.*, 'No husbands are wives'. On the other hand, the qualities connoted are by no means necessarily distinct as wholes, the utmost we can say being that in one at least of the

two groups there must be some attribute which is not found in the other.

The second of the two principal papers on Symbolic Logic is by Mr. O. H. Mitchell, and seems to me one of the most valuable and original in the volume. Its fundamental method turns upon an ingenious modification of the Boolean plan of expressing propositions. Starting from the fundamental expression for the full development of a combination of two terms, $xy + x\bar{y} + \bar{x}y + \bar{x}\bar{y} = 1$, the import of a universal proposition is most usually read off as destroying one or more of these elements. Thus, 'All x is y ,' or $x\bar{y} = 0$, expunges $x\bar{y}$, and so on with the others. But it is an exactly equivalent alternative form to say that the aggregate of the remaining elements constitute the logical universe, for $x\bar{y} = 0$ is obviously the same result as $xy + \bar{x}y + \bar{x}\bar{y} = 1$. So much is of course familiar to every student of the subject, but what I confess was new to me was the ease with which groups of propositions could be combined on this plan, and the fact that on this mode of procedure the process of multiplication corresponds to that of addition on the ordinary process; another of the interesting parallelisms which have been pointed out as existing between $+$ and \times in the logical algebra. Thus, if we take the two propositions 'All x is y ,' and 'All y is x ,' they give $x\bar{y} = 0$, $\bar{x}y = 0$, and the combination of the two is given by *adding* the results. But when we equate the remainders to unity, or the universe, we must *multiply*, for $(xy + \bar{x}y + \bar{x}\bar{y} = 1) \times (xy + x\bar{y} + \bar{x}\bar{y} = 1)$ gives $xy + \bar{x}\bar{y} = 1$, which is of course the same as if we had added $x\bar{y} = 0$ to $\bar{x}y = 0$. The process, obvious in this simple case, admits of an easy symbolic generalisation. And this leads to a further development by which we may not only represent particular propositions but also combine them with universals. The notation adopted for this purpose is to write F_1 for $F = 1$, where F is any logical polynomial or aggregate of class-terms, so that that aggregate is declared to constitute the whole universe; and F_u for the assertion that F simply exists, that is, that some one or more of its constituent elements is represented as existent. The former therefore belongs to universal propositions and the latter to particular. A large number of derivative formulæ are then given, such as the following: $F_1G_1 = (FG)_1$, $F_u + G_u = (F + G)_u$, to quote two only of the simplest.

This method of procedure sometimes gives a decidedly more compact and convenient expression than the more familiar one, sometimes the reverse, according to the nature of the propositions dealt with; for as more elements have to be equated to zero the residue that have to be equated to unity, or the universe, become fewer. For instance, the expression on this scheme of 'No x is y ' is decidedly more cumbrous, since we have to put it $(\bar{a} + \bar{b})_1$, viz., to make it assert that not- a and not- b make up the whole.

The problem of elimination on this scheme becomes simple. It rests upon the same fundamental basis, of course, viz., that

logical elimination is simply the dropping of irrelevant information, only here it assumes the form of expanding or widening the extent of any class term in the aggregate. For instance if xy and z together fill the universe, it is clear *à fortiori* that y and z together will do so, *viz.*, we may drop the constituent element x . The element z , which stands alone, cannot be thus dropped; or rather it must be regarded as (what it is) a constituent of 1, *viz.*, as $1z$, so that the elimination of z above would be given as $xy + 1 = 1$, which is of course a truism. This is expressed by saying "If F be a polynomial of the class-terms $a, b, c, \dots x, y, z$, then x, y, z , may be eliminated from F by erasure, provided no aggregant term is thereby destroyed" (p. 80).

The best way of illustrating the peculiarities of this scheme of procedure and notation will be to take one of Mr. Mitchell's simpler examples as he does it, and to give the solution as it might be worked out on Boole's plan.

"What may be inferred independent of x and y from the two premisses 'Either some a that is x is not y , or all d is both x and y ,' and 'Either some y is both b and x , or all x is either not y or c and not b '? (p. 85).

"The premisses are

$$\begin{aligned}(axy)_u + (\bar{d} + xy)_1, \\ (bxy)_u + (\bar{x} + \bar{y} + bc)_1.\end{aligned}$$

"By multiplication we get

$$(axy)_u(bxy)_u + (bxy)_u + (axy)_u + (dx + \bar{d}\bar{y} + \bar{b}c\bar{d} + \bar{b}cxy)_1.$$

"Whence, dropping x, y , and reducing, we get

$$(b + a)_u + (\bar{d} + \bar{b}c)_1,$$

which may be interpreted in words, 'There is some b or a , or else all d is c and not b .'

The Boolean process is not at its best in dealing with particulars and hypotheticals, but, as it happens, this example yields little difficulty. Merely premising that 'Either a is β or γ is δ ' means 'If a is not β , γ is δ ,' and that this may be expressed $\gamma\bar{\delta}(1 - a\beta)$, the premisses stand,

$$\begin{aligned}d(1 - xy)(1 - a\bar{x}\bar{y}) &= 0 \\ xy(1 - c\bar{b})(1 - b\bar{x}\bar{y}) &= 0,\end{aligned}$$

or, more simply,

$$\begin{aligned}d(x\bar{y}\bar{a} + \bar{x}) &= 0 \\ xy\bar{b}\bar{c} &= 0\end{aligned}$$

The elimination of x gives at once $y\bar{b}\bar{c} + \bar{d}\bar{y}\bar{a} = 0$, and that of y gives $d\bar{a}\bar{b}\bar{c} = 0$, *viz.*, 'All d is either a or b or c '.

Mr. Mitchell's result is in reality the same as this, but it is expressed with needless prolixity. To say that 'There is some b or a , or else all d is c and not b ,' is to say that 'If there is neither b nor a then d is c and not b ,' and under these circumstances it is clearly needless to say that d is not b .

In addition to the essays which we have thus noticed, there are several others all of them deserving of study. Dr. Marquand

contributes two: one of these describes a mechanical device for representing certain syllogistic results; and the other contains an account of the Epicurean system of empirical logic as this has been recovered from certain fragments of MSS. at Herculaneum, the substance being taken from the monographs of Gomperz and Bahnsch. Mr. Gilman contributes a paper upon the intricacies of the Logic of Relatives, that is, which deals with propositions not involving mere predication in the way of class-relation, but relation generally. The most interesting paper philosophically is the concluding one by Mr. Peirce himself. It deals with the nature and foundations of statistical reasoning and the mutual connexion between Probability and Induction, but it is too long and intricate to admit of a brief summary. It supplies an element which is somewhat missing in the other papers; for whilst the younger authors write more as mathematicians who have turned to the consideration of logical formulæ, Mr. Peirce is well acquainted with the history of the subject, and realises more clearly what are the special characteristics to be looked for in a symbolical or algebraical treatment of Logic.

J. VENN.

The Elements of Logic. By T. K. ABBOTT, B.D., Fellow and Tutor of Trinity College, Dublin. Dublin: Hodges; London: Longmans, 1883. Pp. 102.

IT is impossible to read this little treatise without arriving at two conclusions: first, that the author is a master of his subject, namely, Aristotelian Logic; and, secondly, that his work has been to a great extent injured by following too closely the outlines of Dr. Murray's treatise on the same subject, which forms the present text-book of the University of Dublin. Of that work Sir W. Hamilton wrote, just half a century ago, that while Cambridge was dependent on a treatise which dispensed "a muddy scantling of metaphysic, psychology and dialectic," "Dr. Murray's *Compendium Logice*, the Trinity College text-book, may show that matters are if possible at a lower pass in Dublin" (*Discussions*, p. 123). Had the great logician seen Walker's Commentary, which largely aggravated the faults of the original work, he would doubtless have omitted the "if possible". It is only now, however, that the University authorities are beginning to become alive to the fact, which has long been somewhat rudely expressed by the students, that the Provost and Mathematician whose work has been studied for nearly a century was (as regards this subject at least) not up to the mark; and, seeing that Mr. Abbott, like Mr. Walker, can write the magic words "Fellow and Tutor" after his name, it may be confidently hoped that the reign of Murray is at an end, while perhaps after the lapse of

another half-century some other "Fellow and Tutor" may carry the subject a little beyond the point at which Mr. Abbott has dropped it.

Mr. Abbott defines Logic as "the Science of the Form of Thought," but as he gives no explanation of the important words "Science" and "Thought," the reader is not very much assisted by the definition. Form, he is indeed told, is the invariable part of anything while Matter is the variable part—an explanation which will probably suggest to him the question: If thought invariably conforms to the rules laid down by logicians, how can there be such a thing as a fallacy? A bad definition, however, often forms, as in the present instance, the introduction to a good treatise. Some portions of the work, however, seem to me obscure and confused, mainly I believe owing to the fact that the writer travels in the beaten track far beyond the point to which his own convictions (if exercised independently) would lead him.

Mr. Abbott, for instance, correctly describes a Definition as "a statement of the connotation of a term" (p. 11). But this description is almost immediately lost sight of. His first rule is that a definition must be "adequate, that is, its extension must be exactly equal to that of the term defined" (*Ibid*). The adequacy of a definition evidently consists in its stating the connotation, the whole connotation, and nothing but the connotation; if which is done, the extension may be safely left to take care of itself. Mr. Abbott himself, moreover, has elsewhere noticed that identity of extension is no proof of identity of connotation, and therefore no proof of the adequacy of a definition (pp. 6, 7). Another of his rules for definition is that "if possible" it should not be by negative attributes. The true rule here is that all the attributes comprised in the connotation should be set out whether they are positive or negative. He then adds that "definitions of natural objects, or kinds of things such as we know by experience, can never be complete," because they "possess an indefinite number of attributes in common" (p. 12). Surely the author does not mean that the connotation of the name cannot be exhausted because the common properties of the things denoted by it are inexhaustible. It is true, as he says, that names often change their connotations. Definitions may not for that reason be final; but finality is one thing and completeness is another. A little of the same confusion creeps into his language when explaining Division. "We might divide Book," says he, "according to contents, into histories, novels, &c." The passage would be rendered more intelligible (as well as more correct) by writing "books" instead of "Book". In no intelligible sense is the extension of a concept (or notion) identical with that concept or with any part of it.

That the old rules of Syllogistic inference require amendment may I think be conceded; but the proper way to amend them is not to lay them down in the old terms, and then to inform the

reader that they are not universally true. This, however, seems to me to be what Mr. Abbott has done in the case of an Undistributed Middle. He tells us (p. 44) that though we cannot draw any conclusion in extension from premisses with undistributed middle, "we may sometimes draw an inference in Attribution" (which latter term occurs here I believe for the first time without any explanation). He gives as an instance, "Men have eyes: insects have eyes: therefore men have some attributes in common with insects". If Mr. Abbott had formulated this class of inferences and qualified the rule against Undistributed Middle so as not to conflict with them, he would have done something for the science of logic; but, as the observation stands, it is more calculated to perplex than to assist the reader—more especially as Mr. Abbott seeks to prove the general rules of syllogism by an appeal to common sense without the aid of any axioms.

Our author would, I suspect, have adopted the Quantification of the Predicate far beyond what appears in this work if left free to exercise his own judgment; but the effect of what he has done in this respect will be, I fear, merely to leave his reader in an uncomfortable state of doubt as to whether the predicate of an affirmative proposition is particular or universal. And in some of his examples the common system is curiously mixed up with the Hamiltonian. Thus he gives "A is equal to B" as an instance of an affirmative proposition which is simply convertible (p. 38). It is so in Hamilton's system, where the copula may be always rendered by "is equal to". But in the ordinary system "is equal to" is not the copula simply but the copula together with a portion of the predicate. In this system the simple converse of "A is equal to B" is "That which is equal to B is A" or "Everything that is equal to B is A"—a proposition which does not follow from the convertend since other things besides A may be equal to B.

I have already dealt with this work at greater length than I should have done, if it were not likely to become the text-book of the principal Irish University, and I have dilated on its defects rather than its merits (which are by no means inconsiderable) for the same reason. But I cannot refrain from observing that if brevity is the soul of wit it certainly is not the soul of explanation. It is, I think, high time that *Reductio ad impossibile* should disappear from treatises on Logic, but even the advanced student will have some difficulty in comprehending Mr. Abbott's reasons for its exclusion (pp. 61-2). And when comprehended I doubt whether they are sound. In every syllogism the truth of the conclusion depends on the hypothesis that the premisses are true, and if this hypothesis is sufficient to render the reasoning hypothetical, every syllogism is a hypothetical syllogism. But if the distinct existence of the categorical syllogism is conceded, where is the material difference between showing that the conclusion is true on the hypothesis that the premisses are true and showing

that one (at least) of the premisses is false on the hypothesis that the conclusion is false? Truth or falsehood in both cases is hypothetical, but in both cases there is one element that is not hypothetical and that element is the sequence. Mr. Abbott's objection, however, was probably suggested by Dr. Murray's incorrect description of *Reductio ad impossibile*, in which the absolute truth of both premisses is assumed.

One more remark in conclusion. Mr. Abbott is, I think, perfectly justified in objecting to the reduction of hypothetical to categorical propositions, if such a reduction was ever seriously proposed (p. 71). They are in most cases really distinct. But it is a totally different question whether the logician may not throw hypothetical propositions into the categorical form, when treating of syllogisms, in order to show the identity of the reasoning process in the two cases. Mr. Abbott, I think, would admit this identity. If so, why should not the logician introduce for that special purpose the only reduction which can render the identity of the two processes manifest to the reader—which shows, for example, that inferring the truth of the antecedent from that of the consequent in a hypothetical proposition is the very same fallacy that has been already signalised as Undistributed Middle in the case of categorical syllogisms. Hypothetical propositions are really distinct from categorical propositions, but hypothetical reasoning is not really distinct from categorical reasoning: or, if I am to adopt Mr. Abbott's phraseology, simple syllogisms and complex syllogisms are merely two forms of the same process. The materials may be different but the inference in both cases depends on the same principles.

W. H. S. MONCK.

Hume-Studien. II. Zur Relationstheorie. Von Dr. ALEXIUS MEINONG, a. ö. Professor der Philosophie an der Universität in Graz. Wien: Gerold's Sohn, 1882. Pp. 182.

THE results of Dr. Meinong's investigation of the theory of Relation are presented as a development of the treatment by Locke and Hume of the same subject, not so much on account of the agreement of some of these results with particular doctrines of those thinkers, as on account of his use of the method of research employed by them. This method is "the empirical method of psychological analysis," introduced by Locke, "the Aristotle of the new psychology," and carried further by Berkeley, Hume, and the English school in general. Dr. Meinong regards it as, in the last resort, the only method that the psychologist can command. He defends Locke's position against the Kantian objection that, from his own point of view, he had no right to have either a theory of knowledge or a theory of relation. In the theory of relation, as well as in his other psychological in-

vestigations, Dr. Meinong holds that Locke has laid the foundations; for others it has only been left to add the superstructure. Locke's theory of knowledge is, he says, one of the most important results that the history of philosophy has to show.

The closeness of the connexion of Locke's theory of relation with his theory of knowledge is pointed out in a chapter dealing specially with Locke. It is shown that his theory of knowledge is a development of his theory of relation, and that although he nowhere explicitly identifies knowledge with the perception of relations he often does this implicitly. Locke's theory of knowledge is, however, erroneous in many respects, but especially as regards judgments about real existence. Thus it was in need of the corrections of Hume, who has not only brought out clearly what is implicit in Locke,—the significance of relations for the theory of knowledge,—but has seen that judgments about real existence must be placed in a class by themselves, that they differ fundamentally from the judgments that constitute intuitive and demonstrative knowledge. Hume's classification of relations deserves attention as the foundation for this important distinction. It is, besides, a step forward in psychology, for it is the first attempt that has been made to classify relations exhaustively.

Before criticising Hume's classification, Dr. Meinong discusses the definitions of "relation" and "foundation of relation" that have been given by J. S. Mill (both in the *Logic* and in a note to his father's *Analysis*) and by Mr. Herbert Spencer. His own positions are that the *fundamentum relationis* is nothing but the related feelings themselves, and that a relation is, as Lotze says, a product of the psychical activity excited in the subject by the impressions that are its foundation. There can be no relation without two foundations. These may be themselves relations; but we cannot go on making relations the foundations of relations to infinity; every relation has for its ultimate foundations feelings that are not themselves relations.

The criticism of Hume's classification shows clearly its defects. At the same time a study of the divisions of Hume gives suggestions for a more accurate classification. In the next place, the classifications of James Mill and of Mr. Spencer are discussed. The first of these is not considered in detail, but Mr. Spencer's treatment of relations in the *Psychology* is submitted to a careful examination. Dr. Meinong contends that the derivation of all relations from that of difference or sequence is not psychologically proved; that it is a hypothetical application of the doctrine of evolution, and that other reductions—for example, a reduction of all relations to that of likeness—might be made on the same ground with equal plausibility.

Dr. Meinong divides relations into two fundamental classes, relations of Comparison (*Vergleichungsrelationen*), and relations of Compatibility (*Verträglichkeitsrelationen*). The former class is divided into relations of likeness (*Gleichheit*) and of unlikeness or

difference (*Ungleichheit, Verschiedenheit*), which is not to be regarded as the mere negation of likeness. All other relations of comparison, such as (imperfect) resemblance (*Aehnlichkeit*) and its opposite, are combinations of these. Relations of space and time come within this class. Their foundations are like and unlike space- and time-determinations in (subjective) space- and time-continua. Relations of compatibility and incompatibility are based on likeness of space- and time-determinations. When we cannot think of two physical or psychical qualities as having like determinations in space or time there is a relation of incompatibility. The relation of compatibility is the negation of this relation. Necessary coexistence is reducible to a relation of incompatibility. No attempt to reduce this class of relations to empirical data has been successful. Incompatibility of representations must therefore be accepted as an ultimate fact.

The relations of Causation and Identity are considered separately. The negative results of Hume as to causation are accepted. Dr. Meinong's positive view of causation is, as he himself points out, essentially that which is set forth in Mill's *Logic*. With regard to identity it is shown that "this relation also requires two foundations". "Identity without difference of time-determination" may be asserted of anything, in so far as it is capable of being in relation with more than one thing at the same time; the assertion of identity means that there is question of one thing and not of two or more. "Identity with difference of time-determination" is shown to admit of an analogous explanation.

Hume distinguishes between those relations that depend entirely on their foundations and those that change independently of their foundations. This is the distinction that has already been referred to as so important for the theory of knowledge. We may call the relations of the first class "pure," those of the second "empirical". Those that belong to the fundamental classes (relations of comparison and compatibility) are pure relations; the relations of causality and identity are empirical relations. In the case of the last two relations it is impossible to confine our attention to objects of representation. We must also take into account the reference to things, to real existence.

With regard to Hume's sevenfold division of relations in the *Treatise*, the final results are that "resemblance" is a relation of comparison, to which "difference," supposed by Hume to be derivative, must be added as another irreducible relation of the same class; that three of Hume's classes (relations of "space and time," "quantity and number," and "degrees of quality"), since they are not determined by the nature of the relation, but by the nature of the foundations, may be subsumed under both primary classes; that "contrariety" is an arbitrarily selected case of incompatibility; that "identity" and "cause and effect," being "determinations of the simple cases already known to us with a view to definite practical ends," are secondary relations.

The distinction of primary and secondary coincides with that of pure and empirical relations.

All relations are necessarily at the same time judgments, though in some cases their aspect as judgments may be left out of sight. The pure relations are *a priori*, for they are products of a psychical activity that is excited by the mere presence of the feelings compared. Since they are at the same time judgments they constitute knowledge *a priori*. But no judgment about real existence is *a priori*.

Relations that are the result of the comparison of objects of representation are themselves representations. They must be placed in a class apart, for they belong neither to Locke's "ideas of sensation" nor to his "ideas of reflection"; nor can they be placed among Hume's "impressions". It may be objected that to admit such a class of representations is contrary to the empirical tradition. Dr. Meinong replies that it is not essential to the empirical doctrine that there should only be two ways of acquiring representations, that of receiving impressions and that of copying them. The doctrines of Mental Chemistry and of Association as they have been developed by the English empirical school, are inconsistent with the positions of Locke and Hume as to the origin of representations, but no one has thought of making this an objection to those doctrines.

All the relations that are considered in detail in the present volume are called by Dr. Meinong "ideal relations," to distinguish them from another group to which he gives the name of "real relations". The relation between representation and content of representation, both of which are necessarily thought of as realities, is a real relation. Ideal relations on the other hand are relations between objects of representation, which may or may not be thought of as realities. Another ground of distinction is that real relations are passively perceived while ideal relations are products of psychical activity.

It is obvious that the term "real" here does not refer to an extra-psychical reality. None but ideal relations are "carried over into the external world". And again, in speaking of an external world, of a real existence to which the (ideal) relation of cause and effect, for example, is applied, of "comparison of substances," &c., Dr. Meinong always intends to express some psychological fact, not to imply acceptance of realism. His view is that the psychologist, whether he is himself an idealist or a realist, cannot get beyond the idealistic position in his treatment of problems such as those which form the subject of the present study.

The attitude of the empirical psychologist, which is maintained consistently by Dr. Meinong throughout, gives a special interest to his study. We learn from him how far it is possible to proceed in the analysis of a group of mental phenomena by this method alone, without the aid of any theories from physical science.

But the interest of his investigations is quite as much in the details as in the general results, and thus it becomes difficult to give an idea of their value by a mere outline. The compression of Dr. Meinong's treatment adds to the difficulty of doing this. In many cases the purely psychological method seems to lead to the best results that can be attained at present. With regard to the question of causation, however, this method taken alone does not seem so satisfactory as with regard to some other questions. That "the old historical difficulties as to the action of body on mind or mind on body, &c.," are all removed by considering the relation of cause and effect as one of necessary and immediate succession (the "emptiness" of this conception permitting its application to any pair of ideas whatever), is scarcely an argument in favour of this view, if the idea of cause is to be in agreement with modern physical conceptions. And it seems difficult to avoid the conclusion that "the scientific conception of cause" ought to be taken from the more developed sciences, such as mechanics and physics. Now in these sciences is not the conception of causation as a kind of sequence giving place to the conception of the identity of "cause" and "effect"? But the question of causation may perhaps be considered by Dr. Meinong in more detail in the fuller treatment which he promises of the theory of Relation.

THOMAS WHITTAKER.

Sancti Thomæ Aquinatis, Doctoris Angelici, Opera Omnia, jussu impensaque Leonis XIII., P.M., edita. Tomus Primus. *Commentaria in Aristotelis Libros Peri Hermeneias et Posteriorum Analyticorum*, cum Synopsis et Annotationibus Fr. Thomæ Mariæ Zigliara, Ordinis Prædicatorum, S.R.E. Cardinalis. Romæ. Ex Typographia S.C. de Propaganda Fide, 1882.

The Germans have a very happy way of designating what frequently happens, and perhaps must happen, in this hasty world of ours, the uncompromising and wholesale rejection of a thing or a system, which, though containing much that is of great value, has been so abused as to have rendered itself obnoxious in practice. They call this *Das Kind mit dem Bade ausschütten*—To empty out the baby with the bath. Now this is exactly what the spirit of Freedom, that took shape in the Protestant Reformation and in modern philosophy, did with Scholasticism. That system, the result of the combined labours of the best intellects in Europe, carried on unceasingly for five hundred years, could hardly have been the mere mass of fruitless hair-splitting which it is now for the most part considered to be by modern thinkers, who, as a rule, know very little about it. Very far from it! Scholasticism worked out into clearness some of

the most weighty and far-reaching of philosophical truths—truths which men can ill afford to let slip either from thought or life,—and it imparted to the intellect a training which has perhaps never been equalled, and for which we look in vain among the adherents of that philosophy which took its place. Unfortunately, however, it had allied itself with an oppressive religious system, which sought to subordinate intelligence to faith and authority, and so to make men and nations the bond-slaves of irresponsible masters. This alliance was fatal to it: it was included in the proscriptive decree issued by the spirit of Freedom against Catholicism and all that abetted it. This was, no doubt, a species of intellectual vandalism, as deeply to be regretted as that which tore down grand old cathedrals and abbeys; but it was less avoidable and, in the end, much less irreparable. No doubt, if we could enter into the feelings and conditions of the men of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, we should find justification for this, as well as for much else that, to our calm, critical eyes, now appears ruthless wantonness. At the same time, the circumstances that justified them in trampling upon Scholasticism, which to them had become an instrument of oppression, does not justify us in following their example, now that Scholasticism has become as harmless as Papal bulls. The once mighty system that sought to strike human freedom at its roots is practically overthrown, and we can now afford to be just to what was true and good in it, and therefore, to what is true in Scholasticism.

Scholasticism cultivated a well-defined field of thought—the field of Being. This extensive field is naturally barren, and it took all the patience of self-denying, world-scorning monks to draw any grain whereby a man could live from its eternal rocks. But grain they did draw, grain of the most nourishing kind, and they fed their souls with it, and lived in blessedness. Modern Philosophy, on the contrary, turning its back upon Scholasticism and its labours, has devoted itself almost solely to cultivating the field of Becoming, and so much is its attention occupied with this that it either declares that the field of Being does not exist, or that, if it does, it never has been, and never can be, cultivated. This is what it means when it says, as it so frequently does, that there is no such thing as a Science of Ontology.

Now a Science of Ontology, however unfashionable it may seem to say so, is just what modern thought wants, in order to lift it out of the low estate of mere rude sensism—Hegelian or Comtian—into the condition of a true philosophy. It is pitiful to hear men who have followed earnestly in the track of modern thought declaring that, with their dearest efforts, they cannot discover a subject or an object of thought, that all they find is phenomena, appearances of nothing appearing to nobody, or that the universe consists solely of relations which relate

nothing. And yet, if there be no Science of Ontology, that is, if being cannot be known in such a way as to be distinguishable from nothing (if it can be so known, there is a Science of Ontology, however narrow), these men are unquestionably right, and science is a mere dream of a dream dreamt by—Zero. But science, in fact, is no such thing, and no man, in his sane senses, believes anything of the kind. It is only that a false, one-sided and reactionary philosophy, through pure caprice refusing to recognise one very important region of thought, makes it impossible to justify to reason what reason knows perfectly well to be true and constantly acts upon. This region is Being—the field of the Science of Ontology. The next step, therefore, that modern thought must take, if it does not mean to retrograde or stand still, is in the direction of Ontology, taking up that science at the point where the Schoolmen, or those more recent men that continued to pursue their path, left it.

This fact renders it desirable that the works of the great Schoolmen should at this time be brought prominently before the philosophic world, in editions answering to the critical demands of modern philology; and it is, therefore, a fortunate thing that the Dominican and Franciscan orders are each bringing out, in an edition of this kind, the complete works of its most illustrious thinker, the former those of St. Thomas of Aquino, the latter those of St. Bonaventura (John Fidanza) of Bagnorea.

Of the works of St. Thomas the first volume is before us, a very handsome folio of nearly 800 pages, of which 348 are occupied with introductory matter. First comes a dedication to the Pope, then the text of the Encyclical, *Æterni Patris*, whereby the Pope restored the study of St. Thomas in the Church, then three other shorter papal documents of similar tendency, then the editor's preface, then Echard's life of St. Thomas, and then De Rubeis's *Dissertationes Criticæ et Apologeticæ*, occupying over 300 pages. Then follow the Commentaries on the *Περὶ Ἑρμηνείας*¹ and *Ἀναλυτικὰ ὕστερα* of Aristotle with copious critical, exegetical, and polemical notes by the editor.

The most objectionable thing in the whole volume is the dedication, which breathes a spirit of the narrowest, most uncharitable and most misrepresenting bigotry. That it should have been accepted by the Pope shows how much reason we have to congratulate ourselves that the Papacy has been rendered harmless and what we might expect from it, if ever it should have the power to be otherwise. Here are a couple of sentences from it:—"When in the sixteenth century, the Lutheran pestilence broke out, nefarious men, hurried on by revolutionary lust, opposed the Catholic truth, having (as is the wont of heretics) licentiously

¹ St. Thomas's Commentary on this work is incomplete; but is supplemented in the present edition by the continuation written by Cardinal De Vio, his most subtle interpreter.

interpreted the sacred writings by the glimmer (*igniculo*) of human reason and a depraved will." . . . "The Lutheran views, which, having long crept through the veins of Europe, had penetrated deep into the minds of many, at last, changing name and form, gave birth, through force of logic, to that monstrous doctrine, which, despising and even rejecting the word of God, places its whole confidence in the weakness of human reason; and so it has come to pass that in the nineteenth century we are forced with sorrow to behold an open and most barbarous war waged against Christ, the Church and God Himself." If this is a specimen of the spirit of Christ and of the Church, the war is assuredly a most just one.

The Papal documents having reference to the restoration of Thomism as the Philosophy of the Church are marked by much moderation, and show that the Pope has a clear appreciation of the conditions of the Church's authority. He sees plainly that reason, left to develop freely, is of necessity fatal to this authority, which can be maintained only on condition that a source of truth be admitted, to which reason is a mere handmaid; and he fondly thinks that St. Thomas, who did so much to rescue faith in the thirteenth century, will be able to perform the same service in the nineteenth. One need not hesitate to admit that, if St. Thomas cannot do this, no one can. But objections, even of a philosophical kind, are in our day raised against faith, such as St. Thomas never dreamt of, and therefore, could not provide against; and, besides these, there is the whole host of objections offered by historical criticism—objections which no philosophy can answer. If the Doctors of the Church would just once make plain to trained understandings that what they call the word of God is in very truth such, they might even dispense with philosophy altogether.

In his Preface, the editor enumerates the various previous editions of St. Thomas's complete works, giving preference to the so-called *Editio Piana*, published in 1570, under the auspices of Pope Pius V. He finds, however, that this edition, contrary to what is usually supposed, is in many points defective, the editors having made up their text from older editions of the separate works rather than from the manuscripts. In the present edition, the *Piana* has indeed been made the basis of the text; but numerous changes have been introduced on the authority of manuscripts collected from all parts of Europe and collated with the utmost care. The editor goes on to point out the new features of this edition, of which we shall speak further on, and to inform us that the order in which the works are arranged in it is the scientific one, and neither the chronological, which would now be impossible to discover, nor that of dignity, which would be very awkward for the student.

The life of St. Thomas, by Echard, is brief, occupying only about two pages, but contains nearly all that is known with

certainly respecting its subject. It is made up exclusively of facts, and has none of that mawkishness that is so common in the "Lives of the Saints," written for edification rather than instruction.

The thirty-two Dissertations of De Rubeis have very various subjects. The first discusses at great length the question whether St. Thomas was a Benedictine before he entered the Dominican order, and comes to the conclusion that he was not. Those from the second to the twenty-fourth, inclusive, discuss the genuineness of the various works attributed to him, and leave one with an uncomfortable impression that many of these are quite as likely to be by followers of the Saint as by himself. Those from the twenty-fifth to the thirty-second defend the orthodoxy and scholarship of the Saint against aspersions cast upon them from various quarters. Throughout these last there is displayed a tendency to prove St. Thomas faultless and right at all hazards. Nevertheless, many of these dissertations are very interesting reading and make us regret that monkish leisure is well-nigh a thing of the past.

This exhausts the preliminary matter, no part of which is due to the editor except the brief preface of less than five pages. This is much to be regretted, because Cardinal Zigliara is so well versed in the philosophy of St. Thomas that, had he chosen to write an introduction to the whole work, he could hardly have failed to contribute much to the understanding of that system. Against the dissertations of De Rubeis there is nothing to be said. They are valuable as far as they go; but they fail to do two most important things, which might very properly have been done in a preface. (1) They fail to show the relation of Thomism to previous systems. This is a great defect; because the real merits of Thomism, as a system, will never be clearly understood, until its relation to ancient philosophy, and especially to Aristotelianism, is completely settled. Catholics, as a rule, very much underrate the influence of "the Philosopher" upon St. Thomas, and try to show that the latter was much more original than he really was. Examples of this underrating, which is due in some degree to the fact that Catholics are very rarely well acquainted either with Greek or with Aristotle, may be seen in two recent works, Talamo's *Aristotelismo nella Scolastica* and Schneid's *Aristoteles in der Scholastik*, both otherwise valuable. (2) They fail to show the relation of Thomism to modern thought. Now, if there be anything that one would have expected to find in the introduction to a philosophy intended to correct and remove the errors into which men have been led by recent thought, it is a clear statement of these errors and the manner in which that philosophy might be expected to counteract them. A most interesting and important treatise might be written on the defects of modern thought due to the rejection of the great truths which Scholasticism had evolved—truths, which,

if properly handled, might still remedy these defects. Materials for such a treatise might easily have been gathered from the works of Rosmini, with which Cardinal Zigliara is apparently not unacquainted.

The Commentaries on Aristotle's *De Interpretatione* and *Later Analytics*, which occupy the rest of the volume, are edited with great care, and encourage the hope that the whole of the present edition of St. Thomas will be much superior to those that have preceded it. Several new features are here introduced. (1) Instead of the two Latin versions of the text of Aristotle placed at the head of the different *Lectiones* in the old editions, we have here the original Greek text of Aristotle and one Latin version, the so-called *antiqua*, which St. Thomas probably used. This is a great improvement, because it enables the student to see at a glance how the Saint understood Aristotle, and where he was led astray, as he sometimes was, by a false translation and the meagreness of the Latin tongue. The Greek text is that of the Paris edition of Aristotle, corrected by comparison with the editions of Waitz and others. Any changes that have been introduced seem to have been made with the view of bringing the Greek text more into accordance with the Latin rendering. This is especially true with respect to punctuation. With respect to the Latin version the editor says:—"Quoad versionem textui præfigendam non est electioni locus. Quæ enim fuerit versio qua usus est S. Thomas, nobis non constat: codices nostri versionem nullam habent præfixam Commentariis. Hinc antiqua versio, quæ generatim est ipsa versio Boethii aut integra aut parum immutata, quæque habetur in edd. Venetis Sæc. XV. et 1526, nec non in Piana, quoad libros Perihēr. et Poster. Analytic. erat retinenda. Eam tamen comparavimus cum præcitata versione Boethii et præcipue cum littera S. Thomæ, ut saltem sphalmata majoris momenti lector non offenderet" (Præf. p. xxxviii.). (2) The text of the commentary is divided into numbered paragraphs, which greatly facilitates reference. (3) Each *Lectio* is preceded by a brief and careful synopsis, with numbers corresponding to those of the paragraphs. (4) The commentaries are furnished with extensive notes, critical, exegetical, and polemic. Besides these new features, there are two others not altogether new, which deserve to be noticed: the various readings are placed on the margin instead of at the foot of the page; and the letters referring to the notes are placed both in the text and upon the margin opposite.

Of course, by far the most important of all these features is the Editor's notes. We cannot profess to have read the whole of them; but those which we have read are for the most part both learned and judicious. This is especially true of the critical and exegetical notes; less so of the polemical ones. And this is intelligible enough. St. Thomas was not always right, and any attempt to show that he was so must necessarily fail. In this

respect we can only admire the words of the Papal Encyclical :—"Si quid enim est a doctoribus Scholasticis vel nimia subtilitate quæsitum vel parum considerate traditum, si quid cum exploratis posterioris ævi doctrinis minus cohærens, vel denique quoquo modo non probabile, id nullo pacto in animo est ætati nostræ ad imitandum proponi." So long as Card. Zigliara is combating Kantianism, Hegelianism, or Evolutionism, he has a pretty easy task ; for these philosophies must always seem unsatisfactory to any one well-skilled in Logic ; but when he comes to Rosmini, the most he can do is to make it seem that that philosopher is at variance with St. Thomas, without showing that he is wrong. Indeed, it may be said that, when St. Thomas and Rosmini agree, they may both be wrong, but when they differ, the latter is almost certain to be right. In regard to the point on which the editor tries to show discrepancy between the two, the truth is that St. Thomas had no settled theory. He appears to have held different views on it at different parts of his life ; and this leads us to say that the same is true in regard to many points. This is a fact that all modern Thomists seem to ignore. They speak as if St. Thomas had settled all his views, before he began to write. Consequently, when they find contradictions in his writings (and these are not rare), they try, by what they call a "benign interpretation," to explain them away. Unfortunately, a benign interpretation generally means a disingenuous interpretation, and how far such interpretations may be carried may be seen in a little work by Father Cornoldi on St. Thomas's views with regard to the Immaculate Conception, in which that zealous Jesuit tries to show that St. Thomas meant exactly the opposite of what he said. The Saint's views on the Immaculate Conception were anything but orthodox. It is but fair to say that Card. Zigliara, in the volume before us, shows no tendency to benign interpretations, and that he treats his opponents, when speaking of them individually, with becoming respect.

We have to note that the Greek, both of the texts commented upon and of the foot-notes, contains a good many misprints, showing carelessness on the part of the proof-corrector.

In conclusion, we can only repeat what we said at the beginning, namely, that these Commentaries of St. Thomas, and his works generally, are well deserving of careful study, as a supplement and corrective to the too exclusively phenomenal philosophy of our time. A clear presentation of Scholasticism in its valuable features is an *opus desideratissimum*, even after the labours of Erdmann, Ueberweg, and Stöckl, and a task that any scholarly philosopher might be proud to undertake.

THOMAS DAVIDSON.

VII.—NEW BOOKS.

[These Notes do not exclude Critical Notices later on.]

Kant's Prolegomena and Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. Translated from the Original, with a Biography and Introduction, by ERNEST BELFORT BAX. With a Portrait of Kant. London: Bell & Sons, 1883. Pp. xix., 254.

This volume is welcome as including, besides a handier or at least a much cheaper translation of the *Prolegomena* than was previously to be had, the first English rendering of Kant's important constructive work, *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft*. We have not been able to compare Mr. Bax's *Prolegomena* with Prof. Mahaffy's, but think he was well justified in attempting anew the task of translation. The result is satisfactory, though there are passages where his plan of "giving, as far as possible, the *ipsissima verba* of Kant" might without disadvantage have been still more closely adhered to. Mr. Bax, like his predecessor, while referring to Richardson the predecessor of both, has nothing to say of Thomas Wirgman, whose article 'Metaphysic' in the *Encyclopædia Londinensis* was the earliest attempt, and a far worthier than Richardson's, to make the *Prolegomena* known to English readers. The biography and appreciation of Kant which fill nearly a third of the present volume, give evidence of independent reading and study, but have for the most part been anticipated.

An Examination of the Structural Principles of Mr. Herbert Spencer's Philosophy: Intended as a Proof that Theism is the only Theory of the Universe that can satisfy Reason. By the Rev. W. D. GROUND, Curate of Newburn, Newcastle-on-Tyne. Oxford: Parker, 1883. Pp. xvi., 346.

The title of this work, which might be easily misunderstood, is thus expanded by the author in his Preface:

"This volume is written for the purpose of showing that, if the system [of Mr. Spencer] be made one logical and consistent whole, it is congruous with nothing but Theism. I have also attempted to show that the system when thus made consistent with itself, affords a scientific demonstration of the truth of the Theistic hypothesis which is of a higher and more convincing character than has been presented to any former age."

No words are too strong for his admiration of "Mr. Spencer's intellectual edifice": "it has an intellectual majesty rivalling the framework of the heavens". He finds accordingly that it has got scant justice from such hostile critics as Dr. Martineau,

the late Prof. Birks, and Mr. Mivart. It involves, indeed, three serious contradictions : but let it be granted (1) that "Force is of the order of Mind as well as of Matter and is guided by intelligence" ; (2) that "each Ego is a distinct Personality, is a living Mind, underlying—forming the substratum of—those transitory states of mind which occupy consciousness" ; and (3) that the Will is free, or, in other words, "that the immaterial ego guides and controls the material nerve-currents" ;—nothing hinders then that the genuine theistic character of the system should be rendered fully manifest. At the end of his task, the author even declares that "it would not surprise" him to learn that Mr. Spencer, "with Mr. Darwin, is regarded by our Lord as He regarded Cyrus, the needed agent for the building of the second Temple,—and that as such his system represents some vast idea which Christ intends to make structural in his church". Nor should it be supposed that the author leaves out of sight those parts of the system that have not before suggested to anybody that Mr. Spencer had just such a 'call'. He is well aware that others have put a different interpretation on many of the philosopher's views, and is at pains to set them all honestly forth. His *Examination* is thus not without its significance ; and the imposing list of Church-dignitaries, headed by His Grace of York, figuring in front as subscribers to the work, gives promise that the novel interpretation will receive attention.

First Lessons in Philosophy. Being an Introduction to Metaphysic and Logic for Beginners. By M. S. HANDLEY, Lecturer on Moral Philosophy. London : Laurie, 1883. Pp. viii., 59.

The author, in six dialogues with a pupil, seeks to explain some of the fundamental conceptions of philosophy, as set forth by Mr. Shadworth Hodgson, more especially in his first work *Time and Space*. The topics selected are Subject and Object—Consciousness and Existence ; Time and Space—Distinction of Elements and Aspects ; Presentative and Representative ; Red-integration ; Conception ; Connexion of Metaphysic and Ethic.

Lorenz Oken. A Biographical Sketch. By ALEXANDER ECKER, Professor of Anatomy and Comparative Anatomy in the University of Freiburg, Baden. With Explanatory Notes, Selections from Oken's Correspondence and a Portrait. From the German by ALFRED TULK. London : Kegan Paul, Trench, 1883. Pp. xxiv., 183.

The biographical sketch worked up into this volume was read before the fifty-second meeting of the German Association for the Advancement of Science in 1879, in celebration of the centenary of Oken's birth. It gives a sufficient account of his scientific and practical activity ; his philosophical ideas, such as they were, are left mostly in shadow. In the Correspondence appended are

a number of letters from Oken to Schelling with two or three replies, all interesting but hardly touching on philosophy.

The Reformation of the 16th Century in its Relation to Modern Thought and Knowledge. "Hibbert Lectures" delivered at Oxford and in London in April, May, and June, 1883. By CHARLES BEARD, B.A. London: Williams & Norgate, 1883. Pp. 451.

The Reformation, in these careful and interesting Lectures, being understood, at its widest, as a general movement of the human spirit, the author includes within his survey an intelligent view of the philosophical as well as scientific thought of modern times.

Dynamic Sociology, or Applied Social Science as based upon Statical Sociology and the Less Complex Sciences. By LESTER F. WARD, A.M. 2 Vols. New York: Appleton, 1883. Pp. xx., 606; vii., 690.

This is an ambitious but also an important work. According to the author, Sociology has been advanced by the school of Mill and Spencer, beyond the purely statical stage, no further than "the passively dynamic stage which recognises only the changes wrought by Nature, unaided by Art; but, before the science of society can be truly founded, another advance must be made, and the actively dynamic stage reached, in which social phenomena shall be contemplated as capable of intelligent control by society itself in its own interest". This further advance he essays in Vol. ii. After a General Introduction and an Historical Review of the Positive Philosophy of Comte and the Synthetic Philosophy of Mr. Spencer, Vol. i. is taken up with an exposition of the Cosmical Principles underlying Social Phenomena: one pervading "Law of Aggregation" being traced as it determines (1) Cosmogony, (2) Biogeny, Psychogeny, and Anthropogeny, (3) Sociogeny (involving Statical and Passively Dynamical Sociology). While going the whole length of the later evolutionary school, the author, before making his own advance, brings into prominence the earlier achievement of Comte, and has much sympathy with the general intellectual position of the positivist philosopher. Otherwise, off the line of English thought, he concerns himself almost exclusively to Kant. There is much acute psychological observation to be found at different stages of the argument in both volumes, and the properly sociological views are marked by great vigour and independence of spirit.

The Yoga Aphorisms of Patanjali with the Commentary of Bhoja Rājā and an English Translation. By RAJENDRALALA MITRA, LL.D., C.I.E. Published by the Asiatic Society of Bengal. Calcutta: Baptist Mission Press, 1883. Pp. cxxvi., 227.

The translator prefixes to his work an elaborate Preface (pp. iii.-xcii.), and Index (pp. xciii.-cxxi.). He comes to the conclusion that the Yoga text-book is posterior to the Sāṅkhya text-book of Kapila, and that both are later than Buddha, but that the *doctrines* of the two schools are very old. They "are the immediate ancient Hindu archetypes of the nihilist theory of Buddha and indirectly of the pessimism of Schopenhauer and Hartmann. The Yoga, moreover, is the archetype of another modern doctrine, that of spiritualism with its occult appendage." Bhoja, the author of the Commentary, is supposed by the translator to have been a king of Dhārā in the 10th century. He has this interesting passage at the close of his Preface :—

"When I undertook the task [of translation] I had hopes of reading the work with the assistance of a professional Yogī; but I have been disappointed. I could find no Pandit in Bengal who had made Yoga the special subject of his study, and the only person I met at Benares who could help me was most exorbitant in his demands. He cared not for the world and its wealth, and the only condition under which he would teach me was strict pupilage under Hindu rules—living in his hut and ever following his footsteps—to which I would not submit. I had, therefore, to depend on my own knowledge of the Sanskrit language to arrive at the meaning of Patanjali, availing myself, &c."

The Sanskrit text of Yoga-sūtra and its Commentary is appended.

Éléments de Psychophysique générale et spéciale. Par J. DELBOEUF, Professeur à l'Université de Liège. Paris: Germer Baillière, 1883. Pp. 256.

The distinguished author has happily been moved to begin, under the general heading of "Questions of Philosophy and Science," a collection of his scattered philosophical writings—all of them inspired with the idea "of applying to the philosophical sciences the proceedings and results of the exact and the natural sciences". The present volume contains the substance of his two well-known memoirs on Psychophysics—*Mesure des Sensations de Lumière et Fatigue* and *Théorie générale de la Sensibilité*—dating from ten years back. He has omitted a considerable part of the mathematical discussions, retaining only the absolutely indispensable formulæ, for the understanding of which an elementary knowledge of algebra is sufficient; most of the tables of experiments are also left aside. Between the two memoirs, pp. 109-44, is included a reprint of a correspondence in which MM. Tannery and Ribot and Prof. Wundt took part with the author, in 1875, on the subject of Fechner's law.

Grundzüge der Metaphysik. Dictate aus den Vorlesungen von HERMANN LOTZE. Leipzig: Hirzel, 1883. Pp. 94.

After this seventh piece in the issue of Lotze's notes for dictation in lecture, there remains but one to come, on *Æsthetic*. The present *Outlines of Metaphysic* falls, after an Introduction,

into three parts: Ontology, Cosmology, Phaenomenology; the last head treating of the Subjectivity of Knowing and the Objectivity of Knowledge.

Der Rassenkampf. Sociologische Untersuchungen von Dr. LUDWIG GUMFLOWICZ, Professor der Staatswissenschaften an der k. k. Universität in Graz. Innsbruck: Wagner, 1883. Pp. 376.

The author adopts the name Sociology for the "great science of the future" which might rather, but for the danger of misunderstanding, be called the Natural History of Man. In five divisions—Philosophy of History and Sociology, *Polygenismus*, Original Multiplicity of Languages and Cults, Natural Process of History, Historical Indications—he contends for an initial plurality of human stocks and finds the explanation of history in their mutual conflict. The general conclusion to which he finally comes is that there is no such thing as either progress or regress in the course of history taken as a whole, but only in the particular periods of a process that is going on for ever in a circle,—in particular countries where the social process is for ever recommencing. At each time and place there is a beginning of development, a culminating point and then of necessity a decline.

Fallacies: A View of Logic from the Practical Side. ("International Scientific Series"). By ALFRED SIDGWICK. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, 1883. Pp. 363.

The author sends the following:—

"The direct aim of this *presently forthcoming* volume is to help the general reader to a connected view of logical doctrines in relation to the detection of Fallacy; but it is also hoped that such a treatment may be of service indirectly towards justifying, on the plea of practical needs alone, certain views of the general theory of knowledge that have been current in England since the time of Mill, and that have possibly been sometimes stretched beyond their legitimate scope.

"The chief points are:—(1) the consistent separation of the two distinct purposes, Inference (or Discovery), and Proof; (2) the treatment of Propositions as asserting a *relation* between two subjects or things named; the words in which a proposition is expressed being not themselves the proposition, but rough guides to its real content; (3) the use made of the relation of *Indication*, the forward movement in 'real' propositions consisting always in setting up the known as sign or mark of the inferrible, and an asserted *nota rei* demanding always the indication of an admitted sign behind it; (4) the recognition that names of special fallacies, to be applicable in practice, presuppose a knowledge of the *cause* of error in the individual case; and therefore that, in order to avoid unjust accusations, we must fall back upon *Reductio ad absurdum*,—this method itself being used, however, not as claiming that an absurdity is present, but interrogatively and as fixing the assertor in a dilemma: either he may lack any sign asserted as trustworthy, or he may set up a sign whose asserted trustworthiness is open to more or less objection."

IX.—MISCELLANEOUS.

Mr. James Sully has finished a treatise, under the title of *Outlines of Mental Science, with their Application to Education*, in which he aims at going briefly over the whole field of mental development, though a large portion of the book is naturally occupied with the first department, the growth of Intellect. It is intended as an introduction to psychology which may be useful to students generally. At the same time it seeks to be practical, and in separate sections appended to each chapter indicates the main bearings of the principles expounded on the art of Education. Finally, while written specially for beginners and those who do not need to advance into the more arduous regions of psychological speculation, the work endeavours, as far as possible, to guide the more ambitious student by help of special paragraphs and references. The author has not desired to make a new contribution to the science, so much as to present the results of modern research in a clear and concise form. No book, however, in psychology can be wholly devoid of that measure of novelty which comes from the writer's peculiar way of regarding and approaching his subject. The writer hopes that in all that concerns speciality of treatment he may have succeeded in combining the simplicity and clearness which belong to popular exposition with the thoroughness and exactness which are inseparable from science. The volume will probably appear in November.

The fourth session of the Aristotelian Society which closed in June last, was devoted chiefly to a study of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, and the result was satisfactory enough to encourage the Society to pursue a similar course of work during the ensuing fifth session when the authors to be studied will be Berkeley and Hume. The session will open on Oct. 15th, at 8, John Street, Adelphi, W.C., at 7.30 P.M., when the President, Mr. Shadworth H. Hodgson, will deliver an address on "The Two Senses of Reality". The meetings will be continued thereafter fortnightly. A few meetings will be given to original communications on philosophical subjects, but the chief work will be the study of Berkeley's *Theory of Vision* and *Principles of Knowledge*, and Hume's *Treatise of Human Nature*. Applications for admission to the opening meeting, or for further particulars, should be addressed to the Honorary Secretary, Dr. Senier, 1, Bloomsbury Square, W.C.

We have received Parts II. and III. of the *Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research* (Trübner). These include, besides a second Address by the President (Mr. H. Sidgwick), chiefly replying to critics, second and third reports on Thought-transference (with illustrations), a preliminary and a first report of the Reichenbach Committee, first report on Haunted Houses, a long report of

the Literary Committee, and first report on Mesmerism, with some other papers. A new mode of 'Thought-transference' (substituted for the name of 'Thought-reading' used in Part I.) is brought forward, in which a 'percipient' has been found able to make rough approximations to line-drawings which an 'agent' keeps before his mind, without previous collusion or, so far as appears under all possible precautions, any kind of sensible communication between them. At the same time it is mentioned that the percipient power of the Creery girls recorded in Part I., and also in these Parts, seems to be passing away. The Reichenbach Committee has found three 'sensitives' who appear to see light-forms in connexion with the poles of an electro-magnet. With Braid's method of hypnotising the Committee on Mesmerism seems to have had little or no success, but noteworthy evidence is given of anaesthesia in 'subjects' put into the trance-state by a special operator—the same person, by the way, who is one of the Reichenbach 'sensitives' and who manifests the novel power of picture-drawing.

The Knightsbridge Professorship of Moral Philosophy at Cambridge is vacant by the death, in July, of the Rev. T. R. Birks, who held it from 1872, but for some years back was disabled by illness from lecturing.

Mr. Andrew Seth has been appointed Professor of Logic and Mental and Moral Philosophy in the newly founded University College of South Wales and Monmouth, at Cardiff.

Mr. Henry Sidgwick is revising his *Methods of Ethics* for a third edition, which will appear before long.

THE JOURNAL OF SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY.—Vol. XVII. No. 1. G. H. Howison—Some Aspects of recent German Philosophy. H. K. H. Delf—Faith and Knowledge (trans.). J. Dewey—Knowledge and the Relativity of Feeling. E. P. Peabody—Primeval Man. Notes and Discussions. Book Notices.

REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE.—VIII^{me} Année, No. 7. C. Lévêque—L'esthétique musicale en France : iv. Étendue et limites psychologiques de l'expression instrumentale. A. Fouillée—Causalité et liberté. P. Souriau—Les sensations et les perceptions (i.). Analyses, &c. Notices bibliographiques, &c. No. 8. E. v. Hartmann—L'école de Schopenhauer. P. Souriau—Les sensations et les perceptions (fin). Ch. Bénard—Le problème de la division des arts dans son développement historique. Revue générale (Th. Ribot—Contributions à la psychologie des mouvements, d'après Stricker). Analyses, &c. Rev. des Period. Correspondance (J. Delboeuf—Note rectificative d'une assertion de Fechner).

LA CRITIQUE PHILOSOPHIQUE.—XII^{me} Année, Nos. 20—31. F. Pillon—Quatre anciens manuels ou catéchismes d'instruction morale et civique (20) ; Le catéchisme impérial (24, 25) ; A propos de la notion de nombre (25, 27, 28, 29). C. Renouvier—Politique et socialisme : xiv. La philosophie de Fourier (21, 28, 29) ; Les arguments psychologiques pour et contre le libre arbitre (22, 23, 24, 26, 30). F. Grindelle—Les petits traités d'éducation morale et civique. J. Berthoud—Un esprit pur pourrait-il acquérir l'idée de fraction ? (Réponse par F. Pillon).

LA FILOSOFIA DELLE SCUOLE ITALIANE.—Vol. XXVII. Disp. 1. F. Bertinaria—Fondamenti filosofici della scienza politica (ii.). A. Macchia—Pensieri di filosofia (i.). R. Bobba—Il problema di conoscenza secondo l'empirismo fisiologico e la filosofia sperimentale di Aristotele (i.). P. Ragnisco—Il principio di contraddizione in Hegel. L. Ferri—Il fenomeno nelle sue relazioni con la sensazione e l'oggetto. T. Mamiani—Del senso morale e del libero arbitrio. Bibliografia, &c. Disp. 2. P. Ragnisco—Il principio di contraddizione in Herbart. A. Macchia—Pensieri di filosofia (ii.). R. Bobba—Il problema di conoscenza secondo l'empirismo, &c. (ii.). T. Mamiani—Opere edita ed inedite di A. Rosmini Serbati. Bibliografia.

RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA SCIENTIFICA.—An. II. No. 4. T. Vignoli—L'eredità dell' indole morale, secondo la dottrina generale dell' evoluzione. . . . E. Ferri—Studi di psicologia comparata: Le uccisioni criminose tra gli animali. . . . G. Buccola—Sulla durata delle percezioni olfattive, nota di psicologia sperimentale . . . Riv. Anal. (J. Lubbock, *Ants, Bees and Wasps*), &c. No. 5. . . . E. Kraepelin—La colpa e la pena: i. Il concetto scientifico della colpa. G. Sergi—La stratificazione del carattere e la delinquenza. . . . Riv. Sint. (F. Puglia—L'idea del diritto nella filosofia scientifica). &c. No. 6. E. Kraepelin—La colpa e la pena: i. Il concetto scientifico della colpa. L. Paolucci—Studi di psicologia comparata: Il linguaggio degli uccelli. ii. Sull' espressione psichica delle voci usate dagli uccelli. . . . Riv. Sint. (G. Buccola—Le illusioni della memoria). Riv. Anal. &c.

ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PHILOSOPHIE, &c.—Bd. LXXXIII. Heft. 1. M. Sartorius—Die Entwicklung der Astronomie bei den Griechen bis Anaxagoras u. Empedokles, in besonderem Anschluss an Theophrast (ii.). P. Hohlfeld—Mathematik u. Philosophie. H. Sachtler—Ueber den Raum- u. Zeitbegriff. J. Nathan—Die imaginären Begriffe. L. Weis—Der Glaube an die Atome u. der Streit über die metaphysischen u. chemischen Atome. E. Dreher—Antikritik. Recensionen (J. Veitch, *Hamilton*; A. Bain, *James Mill and John Stuart Mill*; A. Seth, *The Development from Kant to Hegel*; J. Watson, *Schelling's Transcendental Idealism*; J. Martineau, *A Study of Spinoza*; J. M'Cosh, *Criteria of Diverse Kinds of Truth*; E. Wallace, *Aristotle's Psychology*, &c.). F. Kirchner—Erklärung. Bibliographie.

PHILOSOPHISCHE MONATSHEFTE.—Bd. XIX. Heft 6, 7. F. Staudinger—Noch einmal Kant's synthetische Einheit der Apperception. B. Münz—Locke's Ethik. J. Baumann—Nochmals "Wundt's Lehre vom Willen u. sein animistischer Monismus". H. Vaihinger—Eine angebliche Widerlegung der "Blattversetzung" in Kant's *Prolegomena*. Recensionen. Literaturbericht, &c. Heft 8. E. Feuerlein—Kant u. der Pietismus. E. v. Hartmann—In welchem Sinne war Kant ein Pessimist? Recensionen u. Anzeigen. Literaturbericht. Bibliographie, &c.

VIERTELJAHRSSCHRIFT FÜR WISSENSCHAFTLICHE PHILOSOPHIE.—Das kategoriale Gepräge des Denkens in seinem Einflusse auf die Probleme der Philosophie, insbesondere der Erkenntnistheorie. H. Höffding—Die psychologische Bedeutung der Wiederholung. R. Seydel—Raum, Zeit, Zahl. F. Tönnies—Studie zur Entwicklungsgeschichte des Spinoza (ii., Schluss). Anzeigen. Selbstanzeigen, &c.

Other Books, &c., received: J. R. Nichols, *Whence, What, Where? A View of the Origin, Nature and Destiny of Man*, 4th Ed., revised, Boston (Williams), London (Trübner), pp. 198. John Fiske, *Evolution and Religion*, London (Foulger), pp. 12. G. V. Papale, *Darwinismo naturale, Darwinismo sociale*, Roma (Loescher), pp. 420.

